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This dissertation examines the causes and consequences of the industrialization of pig 
farming in reform era China. As one of the most dramatic agricultural transformations in the 
world today, the shifting conditions and relations of livestock and meat production in China have 
profound social and environmental impacts for communities and agroecosystems in both local 
and global contexts. Investigating how modernity and food security are defined, practiced, and 
legitimated through the country’s agricultural development model, and to what effect for social 
equality and environmental sustainability, is the primary task of this work.   
The study is framed around the meatification project, a concept that directly engages the 
intentional and constructed nature of the shift of meat from the periphery to the center of human 
diets. I’ve defined the meatification project as “a strategically managed set of policies, 
discourses, relations, and resources enacted with the goal of increasing commodity meat 
production, modern forms of meat consumption, and agribusiness profits.” Framed around pork 
and the processes involved in its making, my approach combines theories of development, 
political economy, and political ecology to explore the politics and consequences of industrial 
pork production and the rise of domestic agribusiness since Reform and Opening in 1978. The 
work is principally concerned with understanding how these agricultural transformations impact 
smallholder farmers, rural environments and social reproduction, food security and class diets, as 
well as how the form and management of China’s agricultural development model is remaking 
global agri-food politics.
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Chapter One 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The MEATIFICATION PROJECT 
in REFORM ERA CHINA 
 
_____________ 
 
 
“Meat signifies wealth. The more money you have,  
the more meat you will eat.” 
 CEO and founder of a commercial pork production enterprise 
Shanghai, January 2007 
 
 
“In China, everyone eats pork.” 
Manager of an online food marketing company 
Chengdu, November 2010 
 
 
 
Meatscapes in China 
 
China is awash with meat. On most any street in Beijing, there is some combination of 
meat on sticks, meat in soups, meat on platters, meat in tubes, meat on hooks. These items are 
sold fresh and processed from street vendor carts; in mom and pop stores; in wet markets, 
supermarkets, and hypermarkets; and at restaurants that range from a grill and a few stools on the 
sidewalk, to regionally-specialized dining spots, to domestic and transnational fast food stores, to 
ultra-modern palaces of haute cuisine. In the almost two years I spent living in Beijing between 
2008 and 2011, I found meatscapes1 composed of chicken, duck, beef, mutton, horse, deer, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  By “meatscapes,” I do not intend a direct connection to Arjun Appanduri’s (1996) five “-scapes” of global cultural 
flows. A “meatscape” can be considered to include the various forms of meat (types, cuts, sources, markets, 
relations) available at a particular time and in a particular place.	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donkey, dog, seafood, scorpion, and most importantly, pork. In Mandarin Chinese, the word for 
meat (rou 肉) means pork2, the so-called national food (Wang and Watanabe, 2007).  
 Outside of Beijing, the streets of China’s cities are similarly flooded with meat, and 
people buying and selling it. I lived in Chengdu, a metropolis of 11 million in southwest China, 
for nine months in 2010. As the capital of Sichuan Province, the country’s largest pig producing 
province, Chengdu is at the heart of China’s contemporary pork boom. The city’s meatscape is 
as diverse as Beijing’s, ranging from tiny street vendors peddling meat from the back of bicycles 
to massive global retailers with brightly lit meat cases offering a China-specific variety of both 
packaged and cut meats. I visited wet and hyper markets on my own, and went shopping with 
friends and neighbors – women in their late 60s and their grandchildren for whom they are the 
primary caregivers – to get a sense of the different arrangements through which pork arrives at 
the market, as well as to understand how meat relates to notions of development and modernity 
in China today. For many in the city, especially people like my middle-to-upper class neighbors, 
buying and eating meat is a daily activity, and a meal without meat is considered no meal at all. 
 But while rising meat consumption is positively correlated with income and urbanization, 
the thoroughfares in towns and villages are also and increasingly sites of meat commerce. Urban 
and rural meat consumption is anything but even, with city dwellers eating on average almost 
twice as much meat as those in the countryside (Ministry of Agriculture, 2009). And yet mom 
and pop shops (xiaomaibu 小卖部) in rural areas offer a variety of packaged and processed meat 
products, and butchers sell meat on village roads, either alone, or alongside locally grown and 
harvested vegetables and grains at daily fresh markets.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Zhurou (猪肉, “pig meat”) is the formal word for pork, but in conversation, on menus, and when ordering at a 
restaurant or butcher, “rou” by itself means “pork.” Chicken, beef, and mutton, for instance, must be specified as 
“chicken meat” (jirou 鸡肉), cow meat (niurou 牛肉), and “sheep meat” (yangrou 羊肉). 
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I met Ms. Chun, a farmer-butcher, in East Creek Village in Sichuan Province. Ms. Chun 
begins her days at 3:00 am when she wakes to slaughter a pig, either from her own or a 
neighboring farm. By 7:00 am, she hauls the carcass to her stand on the main road in the village, 
hoists it onto a hook, and hacks away at the body until every last bit of muscle, fat, skin, 
intestines, head, legs, and ears have been sold to villagers before 9:00 am. Ms. Chun is one of 
two farmer-butchers in East Creek Village, providing fresh pork for households where mostly 
grandmothers will buy, cook, and eat the meat with their grandchildren (and perhaps husbands 
who are not away working as migrant laborers) in the same day. Depending on price and 
household budgets, meat is not necessarily a daily purchase in East Creek Village, but it is an 
increasingly regular and expected dietary component.  
Today, meat is available more broadly than ever before in China, though it comes in 
different forms and through different channels and relations, depending on the social and 
geographic locations of the people raising and buying it. Meatscapes, in other words, are diverse 
and uneven, even as availability and access to meat are increasing across the board.  
This was not the picture 30, 70, or 3,000 years ago. Meat, and especially pork, has been a 
consistent part of the major agricultural and food traditions in China for thousands of years3, but 
peripheral in diets until very recently. For most of history, and for most Chinese people, eating 
pork was limited to social and ceremonial events, never produced in quantities that would allow 
for routine consumption for the entire population. Before 1949, Chinese farmers received only 
one percent of their food energy from animal products, while grains made up the bulk of their 
diets (Hsu & Hsu, 1977).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For detailed treatments of the uses and significance of pork in Chinese cooking, eating, and cultural organization, 
see Chang (1977) and Anderson (1988). Also note that Chinese Muslims - including the Hui, Uyghur, Kazakh, 
Dongxiang, Kyrgyz, Salar, Tajik, Uzbeks, Bonan, and Tatar minority groups - who make up 1-2% of the country’s 
total population, do not eat pork in any form.	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Rather than being awash with meat, pre-reform China might be better imagined as being 
awash with pigs. Starting 6,000 to 10,000 years ago, when pigs were domesticated in various 
parts of China, each place had its own locally-adapted pig breed, and most households raised at 
least one or two pigs each year (Li, 2010; Zheng, 1984). Pigs were more valuable alive than 
dead, acting as efficient converters of kitchen and agricultural scraps into nutrient-rich fertilizer, 
before becoming pork that could be given as a wedding gift, used to curry political or social 
favor, or eaten as part of Chinese New Year celebrations (Wittwer et al., 1987). Pigs were a 
staple of Chinese farming systems and households, while for the vast majority of people, pork 
was a rare treat. Although this long tradition of pork consumption in China includes variation 
across different times, places, and social relations, the smallholder model of raising pigs as part 
of diverse crop and livestock agroecosystems, coupled with only occasional meat eating, defines 
much of the country’s 7,000 years of agricultural history. 
In the contemporary period, the value of pigs and pork have changed dramatically, with 
sweeping political and social changes in the 20th Century bringing about changes in the ways 
meat was produced, sold, and eaten. During the Maoist period, from the founding of the People’s 
Republic of China in 1949 until Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, regulation of pigs followed larger 
political debates about property and private ownership. Following massive production losses 
during the Chinese Civil War (1927-1950), livestock policy in the interim period from 1949-
1957 allowed farmers to own the pigs they raised. This policy was reversed during the “Great 
Leap Forward” from 1958, when farmers were required to put private pigs into collectives for 
distribution. Inadequate feedstocks, general decreases in agricultural productivity, and severe 
natural disasters during this period reduced pig inventories to shortage levels, such that from 
1961-1966, the State Council once again allowed private pigs in addition to collective swine. The 
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ownership status of pigs would change again during the Cultural Revolution, when from 1967-
1976, private pig breeding policies were abolished, and production was once again collectivized 
(Wang and Watanabe, 2007).  
During much of the Maoist period, central planning dictated that pigs would be sold to 
government purchasing stations and rationed to villagers and urbanites by coupon. In the wake of 
disastrous droughts, problems with distribution, and more general policy failures, the first 30 
years of the People’s Republic were punctuated with large-scale agricultural shortfalls, 
household-level food insecurity, and infamously, even famine. While Chairman Mao regularly 
indulged in his favorite dish of Red-Braised Pork (hongshaorou 红烧肉), allegedly to the extent 
that it played a role in his failing health and death, most Chinese people were not eating or living 
high on the hog, as the saying goes. 
  The next profound set of changes that affected meat production and consumption came 
in the wake of Deng Xiaoping’s “Reform and Opening” (gaige kaifang 改革开放) in 1978, 
which launched the idea of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” (zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi 
中国特色社会主义) (Deng, 1984). Rapid economic and social transformations also re-formed 
agriculture and diets. As central authorities selectively privatized and liberalized agricultural 
markets, while at the same time decollectivizing the countryside and divorcing social welfare 
benefits and food from work units, pork became a commodity and agribusiness was opened as a 
new site for investment and profit. The industrialization of the swine and pork sectors proceeded 
at a rapid pace, with specialized and commercial forms of production displacing smallholder 
farmers and to a large degree, replacing household self-provisioning with marketized pork.  
As a result of these changes, pork production and consumption skyrocketed in China after 
1978, initiating a long march to the top of global meat markets. Starting in 1979, pork became 
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the most produced and consumed meat category worldwide. It surpassed beef as the global 
leader, and later almost doubled it. Today half of the world’s pigs, half of the world’s pork 
production, and half of the world’s pork consumption is in China. In 2012, farmers and 
companies in China produced 50 million metric tons of pork from a domestic swineherd of 660 
million head (United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), 2012). This was twice the 
amount of pork produced in all 27 European Union countries combined, and five times the 
amount in the United States. Domestic consumption matches production, and pork imports and 
exports are currently negligible (see figures below). 
 
Figure 1. World meat production, 1961-2010 (FAOSTAT).  
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Figure 2. China meat production, 1961-2010 (FAOSTAT). 
 
 
Figure 3. China pork supply, imports, and exports, 1961-2009 (FAOSTAT). 
 
 
 
Meatification 
 The figures above provide graphic representation of the striking expansion of the swine 
sector in reform era China. They also elicit a number of important questions: How and why did 
China become the world leader in pork production and consumption? How has it maintained and 
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increased its position throughout the reform era? What are the social and ecological implications 
of massively ramping up pork production?  
These seemingly straightforward questions at first appear to have rather straightforward 
answers. For example, a standard developmentalist interpretation would have it that China is in 
the midst of a nutrition transition (Du et al., 2002; Popkin, 1994) and a livestock revolution 
(Delgado et al. 1999; Waldron et al., 2007), in which rising incomes and higher levels of 
urbanization have brought about increasing demand for meat4 (FAO, 1970). The World Bank 
and similar neoliberal organizations see the industrialization of livestock agriculture as an answer 
to this demand, with restructuring and scaling-up of production that at once “frees” some 
smallholder farmers from the land, while incorporating others into commercial value chains 
(World Bank, 2007). The environmental consequences of industrial transformation are serious, 
but in the developmentalist camp, can be managed by increasing production efficiencies, 
managed largely through providing market incentives for commercial producers to invest in 
technological fixes without altering underlying structures or resources5. And the social 
consequences – the dietary transitions in particular – are considered to be improvement in the 
human condition. Meat consumption is a kind of development metric, indicating progress 
(Fiddes, 1990) along a predetermined path to a protein-rich modernity, corresponding to 
Rostow’s (1960) stages of economic growth. The social inequalities that these changes both 
create and reproduce (see Chapter Six) are largely ignored in this approach. 
More critical responses to questions about the pork (and meat) boom in reform era China 
would propose that China’s encounter with industrialization of agriculture follows a neoliberal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 In addition to increased meat consumption, the nutrition transition describes a general shift from complex 
carbohydrates and fiber as the highest proportion of caloric intake, to plant and animal fats, saturated fats, and 
simple sugars (Drewnowski & Popkin, 1997). 
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path of privatization, standardization, depeasantization, and transnationalization, with attendant 
social and ecological consequences. For instance, when I began this research project, I intended 
to situate my study of the pork sector in China as an analysis of the global hog, adding to the 
sociology of food systems literature on the world steer (Sanderson, 1986) and the global chicken 
(Dixon, 2002). I was concerned with how transnational agribusiness corporations – the entities 
that scholars have analyzed as among the most powerful in the organization of the world food 
system – were restructuring pig farming in China, and how smallholder peasant farmers in 
particular were experiencing these changes. The key political economic relationships, I thought, 
were between and among transnational corporations (TNCs), the Chinese state, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and other institutions of global governance, and farmers. The more I 
learned about China’s model of agricultural development, however, the more I realized that I was 
framing my inquiry in a way that missed an important set of relations between these well-known 
entities and a new emergent group of powerful Chinese agribusiness firms. As I expanded my 
study to include domestic operations, I found that China’s agrarian transformation is not just a 
“typical” neoliberal development, in which capital accumulation is a private and largely 
transnational process: rather, I found that China’s transformation is a complex of domestic and 
global, and state and private, processes and actors , which together are transforming global agri-
food politics. 
To theorize pork’s meteoric rise in China since 1978 as a political economic process with 
profound and multi-scaled social and environmental implications, one concept in particular has 
remained as a broad and orienting analytical frame in my study. Tony Weis (2007) connects the 
industrialization of agriculture and rural landscapes to the meatification of diets, or “the radical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See for example the $66 million Asian Development Bank biogas project that aims to turn manure from industrial 
livestock operations in Northeast China into energy that can be sold as a commodity (Schneider, 2010). 
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shift of animal products from the periphery to the centre of human food consumption patterns” 
(p. 17). He notes that meatification is an uneven process, bought about by a global political 
economy in which firms focused solely on profit enact factory farming on a world scale, 
resulting in both unequal markets and diets, and environmental crises. A key component of 
Weis’s argument is that meatification occurs because land that would otherwise be used to 
produce food crops for human consumption is diverted to produce feed crops for livestock. In 
other words, “rising meat consumption and industrial livestock production should be understood 
together to comprise a powerful long-term vector of global inequality” (Weis, 2013, p. 65). 
Meatification picks up on a long tradition in critical food studies of problems associated 
with unequal food distribution (for example, Lappé, 1971), of the privileging of meat production 
for consumer classes (for example, Rifkin, 1992), and of global feed-livestock regimes (for 
example, Friedmann & McMichael, 1989; Sanderson, 1987). For theorizing agricultural and 
dietary transformations in contemporary China, the meatification concept offers a analytical lens 
that links the politics of industrialization to the politics of dietary change, and as Weis is 
currently developing in his forthcoming book on the Ecological Hoofprint, that highlights both 
the political economic conditions and the environmental implications of increased meat 
consumption6.  
But Weis’s formulation is most appropriate as an analysis of what is global in the process 
of meatification. In order to further specify the concept, and make it more flexible for 
understanding particular cases that express changing conditions, I propose the meatification 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 It is important to note that the ecological hoofprint varies greatly depending on the species being raised and the 
environment in which production is taking place. Pigs, because their nutritional requirements are similar to those of 
humans, are in some respects a worst case scenario, while traditional pastoral systems in semi-arid areas are often 
the least damaging agricultural enterprise. The Fulani in the Sahel or the Borana in Ethiopia, for example, are not 
involved in heavy industrialization, but rely on meat consumption. Additionally, crop production in these regions 
often has more adverse environmental impacts than animal production. 
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project as an analytical framework. This approach combines Weis’s description of meatification 
with Philip McMichael’s articulation of development-as-project – in which “the meaning and 
practice of development changes with changing political-economic and environmental 
conditions” (2012, p. 15) – and his elaboration of food regime analysis, which “prioritizes the 
ways in which forms of capital accumulation in agriculture constitute global power 
arrangements, as expressed through patterns of circulation of food” (2009 p. 140). My argument 
is that meatification is an important component of notions and trajectories of modernization and 
development, and that the logics, mechanisms, and relations that animate it need to be 
understood in context. This approach teases out what is general and what is particular, and 
suggests ways that the general – or the global – is being reconstituted.  
The meatification project also exposes consumer demand as a social construction, and 
denaturalizes the idea that economic growth necessarily leads to growth in meat consumption. 
Research makes clear that in the present historic moment, demonstrable relationships exists 
between rising income, rising meat consumption, and rising levels of pollution and greenhouse 
gas emissions7. This is certainly the case in China, where scholars see a livestock-revolution-
fueled-nutrition-transition taking place that is associated with far reaching implications for 
human health, the environment, and trade (Du, et al., 2002; Waldron et al., 2007). These 
methods, however, take for granted that consumer demand for meat is a natural outgrowth of 
increasing urban populations, leaving questions unanswered about the ways in which consumer 
demand and desires are structured, what these structures conceal, and how urbanization is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The classic FAO study from 1970 first demonstrated that countries with high GNP levels were associated with 
diets higher in animal protein and fat (as opposed to plant-based diets based on complex carbohydrates).  The joint 
FAO-LEAD (Livestock Environment and Development Initiative) report from 2006, Livestock’s Long Shadow: 
Environmental Issues and Options, is perhaps the most well-known and oft cited publication on the contribution of 
global meat production to environmental and climate crises, though the topic is now the subject of substantial and 
growing literatures both in academic and popular contexts. 
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structured. By showing that increasing meat production and consumption is an institutionally 
enacted and managed process of social change rather than a natural or spontaneous one arising 
from consumer demand (which itself is a construction), the meatification project approach 
complicates nutrition transition and livestock revolution theories, asking questions about the 
distribution of benefits and harm, as well as about political origins. It allows a look behind the 
veil of statistical data and the assumptions they express to understand how and why the income-
meat correlate exists, and to bring the social inequalities and ecological crises it conditions to the 
analytical fore. 
I’m defining the meatification project as a strategically managed set of policies, 
discourses, relations, and resources enacted with the goal of increasing commodity meat 
production, modern forms of meat consumption, and agribusiness profits. As a general analytical 
concept, the meatification project is a complex involving the industrialization of agriculture, 
agrarian transformations, dietary change, class diets, changes in food security policy, the 
expansion (and often off-shoring) of livestock feed production with attendant forms of 
smallholder dispossession, and a range of environmental and climate crises and inequalities. 
More specifically, the meatification project is based on and reproduces prevailing notions of 
what constitutes modernity and how human societies are related to ecological cycles (see Rifkin, 
1992). It is managed by political and economic elites in global, national, and/or local contexts. It 
is enacted in particular historical moments, based on historical processes and legacies, and 
changes accordingly. It transforms agroecosystems, diets, health, economies, and the 
composition and meaning of meat. It produces ecological crises and reproduces social 
inequalities. And it is framed in a way that suggests progress, improvement, development.  
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My intention is that the meatification project concept can be analytically applied to 
unveiling the processes and relations involved in commodity meat in general, and meat and 
livestock-related developments at different spatial and temporal scales. For instance, it could be 
used to analyze the mechanisms and implications of stockyard development in the US Midwest 
in the 19th century (building on Cronon, 1991), of increasing meat consumption in the Global 
South since the 1960s (Nierenberg, 2005; Weis, 2007; GRAIN, 2010), of the U.S. export of 
industrial livestock farming as a model of efficiency across the globe (Nierenberg, 2005), and for 
my purposes, of global and local causes and consequences of swine sector and dietary 
transformations in contemporary China. The following section introduces China’s meatification 
project, and its particular pork flavor. 
 
China’s Meatification Project  
Of all agrifood sectors, pork is perhaps the most distinctly Chinese. I interviewed Mr. Bu 
Hongguo, the founder and general manager of a Shanghai-based commercial pig and chicken 
operation in 2007. From Mr. Bu I got my first glance into the world of Chinese agribusiness, but 
more importantly, he taught me about the significance of pigs in Chinese history and culture, 
bringing ideas I’d read about and found to be of passing academic interest more squarely into my 
analysis. Mr. Bu is not just an executive, but also a dedicated pig enthusiast and cultural 
entrepreneur. He opened a farm resort (nongjiale 农家乐) on the outskirts of Shanghai where he 
built “traditional peasant homes” as sites for tourism, complete with a restaurant serving 
“traditional” dishes and a guesthouse with traditionally-styled but contemporarily-rich 
furnishings. Nongjiale are becoming increasingly popular across the country, as middle- and 
upper-class urbanites want to reconnect with what is considered to be an agricultural past, 
 	   14	  
understood in stark and somewhat romantic contrast to the seemingly inevitable industrial 
present and future. 
On the same site, Mr. Bu also founded and operates a Pig Culture Museum, where he 
took me on a personal tour, and I started to understand some of the cultural meanings attached to 
pigs. He led me through displays showing archeological evidence of how the Chinese character 
for home and family, 家(jia),  evolved through various historical periods. The character 家 was 
created some 3,500 years ago by adding the roof radical to the pig radical8, or more figuratively, 
by putting a roof over a pig’s head (Harbaugh, 1998). Mr. Bu highlighted the saying, “meiyou 
zhu, meiyou jia” (没有猪，没有家), which translates as “no pig, no home” to demonstrate that 
at one time pigs lived in houses with families (Wieger, 1927), and were long thought of as key 
components of the household, and of the very meaning of “home.” My host was also keen to 
note that even though fewer and fewer people raise pigs in China today, swine continue to be 
important cultural and social signifiers of China as a modern nation, and one with enduring 
ancient legacies. Mr. Bu went on to say that, “Meat [pork] signifies wealth. The more money you 
have, the more meat [pork] you will eat.” This sentiment very clearly illustrates the changing 
value of pigs and pork, and the way those values define the modern era. 
Starting with the Reform and Opening in 1978, and in the context of agrarian transition 
and agro-industrialization, the meaning associated with pigs has shifted decidedly: today, pork in 
its commoditized form is the primary source of value, expressed in socio-cultural and political 
economic terms. In contemporary China, meat in general and pork in particular signify progress 
against a backdrop of scarcity. During the Cultural Revolution (1967-1976), pig production and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Radicals are simple characters used as building blocks for making more complex characters (Wong, 1990). 家(jia) 
is the combination of the roof radical and a condensed version of the character for pig 猪(zhu). 	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distribution was collectivized, and meat was rationed to households by coupon. Even though 
farmers for centuries ate meat only once or twice a year for holidays and special occasions, meat 
rationing impacted the diets of virtually all Chinese people, changing popular notions and 
expectations of the frequency and amount of meat consumption. Several people whom I 
interviewed in Northeast China described the monotony of seemingly endless meals of rice, 
cabbage (baicai 白菜), and steamed buns (mantou 馒头) during that time, and how meatless 
dinners and intermittent coupons constructed feelings of scarcity and desire. A man who grew up 
in Liaoning province in the early 1970s expressed this sentiment:  
“When I was a boy, my dream was to eat meat. Today I can eat meat for breakfast, lunch, 
and dinner if I want to…This is progress.”  
 
These legacies and experiences of rationing and “meat dreams” inform the state’s reform era 
focus on increasing pork production and consumption, both to satisfy what people described as 
“eating meat in revenge” (against past scarcity), and to legitimize the state for its role in creating 
a bountiful agrifood system that satisfies those dreams.  
 Animal husbandry, and pig production specifically, have been on the state’s agenda 
throughout the reform era, but came even more into focus in the wake of the 2006 Porcine 
Reproductive and Respiratory Syndrome (PRRS, or porcine blue-ear disease) epidemic and the 
skyrocketing pork prices that followed. The State Council’s Views on Promoting the 
Development of Live Pigs and the Stability of Pig Markets from 2007 laid out measures to 
increase state support for large-scale, industrialized, and standardized pork production as a way 
to stabilize the industry and protect against shocks (Wang & Watanabe, 2009). Measures 
included direct farm payments for sow insurance and disease prevention, and compensation for 
losses from the PRRS epidemic. There were also subsidies for seed-breeding of live pigs, 
investments in production infrastructure and market monitoring systems, grants for safe disposal 
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of sick pigs at slaughter, rewards for counties that significantly increased production, and 
financial incentives for leading agribusiness firms. Many of these post-disaster subsidies and 
programs continue presently, either from national or provincial governments.  
 China’s strategic pork reserve, the only one of its kind in the world, also underscores the 
political (and economic) importance of pork in the meatification project, as well as the use of 
pork in state attempts to quell potential protests that might threaten state legitimacy. Pork prices 
are the most influential component of the Consumer Price Index in China, so much so that some 
in the press have called it the “China Pig Index” (Orlik, 2011). When the inflation rate hit 6.5 
percent in 2007, and the price of meat and poultry surged 49 percent from the previous year, 
central authorities created the strategic pork reserve to help control pork prices and to work as a 
signal for needed policy shifts. The specifics of how the reserve operates are not public 
information, and according to a pork industry analyst I interviewed in Beijing, are tightly held 
state secrets. What is known is that the reserve consists of two different parts: a live pig reserve 
housed on 200 to 300 commercial pig farms, and a frozen pork reserve administered through 
packing plants, both of which are monopolized by the China National Cereals, Oils and 
Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO), the state-owned agribusiness giant. The state purchases pigs 
and pork for the reserve when the pork/corn price ratio falls below 6:1, and releases stocks when 
prices are too high. Analysts disagree about the effectiveness of the reserve (see for example 
Wines, 2011; Woosley & Zhang, 2010), yet it continues to be used as a price-controlling 
mechanism (or in the words of an agricultural attaché at the USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 
office in Beijing, a “price distorting mechanism.”) 
 In terms of massively ramping up both production and consumption throughout the 
reform era, and particularly after 2007, the pork focus in the meatification project has been 
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wildly successful. Subsidies to recover the national sow herd after the PRRS outbreak 
successfully boosted the herd from 40 million to nearly 50 million animals, igniting overall 
production growth (Woosley & Zhang, 2010). The structure of subsidies has not only increased 
production, but also restructured it. After dedicating 2.5 billion RMB ($366 million) to subsidize 
large-scale production facilities or specialized “pig barns” in 2009, the Ministry of Agriculture 
reported that farms that raise more than 50 hogs a year accounted for almost 60 percent of total 
slaughter, up from less than half in 2007 (Woolsey & Zhang, 2010). At the same time, the 
number of rural households that raise pigs has rapidly declined, while the production share of 
large-scale commercial pig farms has grown quickly. For state and private, and domestic and 
foreign investors alike, this growing commercial pork sector is seen as a promising arena for 
investment and profit. As a result, all stages of pork production, distribution, and retail are 
becoming increasingly commercialized, capitalized, and industrialized, and vertical integration is 
proceeding rapidly. This study illuminates these as general processes, with distinctively Chinese 
characteristics. 
 
Organization of the Dissertation 
 The following chapters further specify China’s meatification project; the policies, 
discourses, meanings, and relations that define it, as well as the transformations and 
contradictions it produces. The eight propositions below summarize the approach and findings of 
this work, and outline the organization of the dissertation. 
(1) China’s meatification project is pork-focused. While chicken9, mutton, beef, and aquaculture  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  There has been a parallel, but smaller, increase in chicken production in the reform era, and a recent Rabobank 
(2013) report indicates that the poultry industry is growing faster than the swine industry in China. These two 
sectors will continue to grow in tandem, but the historical importance of pigs in Chinese culture and farming 
systems imbues pork with a distinctive character that places it at the heart of the country’s meatification project. 
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are also being promoted and supported by policies and investments, as the “national food” 
with long-standing cultural significance, pork is the meat of the meatification project 
(Chapter 1). 
(2) The meatification project reflects broader political and economic processes, and vice versa. 
Reform and Opening in 1978 conditioned the emergence of the project by commodifying 
pork and opening pig farming to agribusiness penetration, moves that have in turn further 
solidified the project throughout the reform era. Ensuring and increasing pork supply is a 
mechanism through which the state can claim legitimacy as a political entity that responds to 
the consumer demands, while maintaining stability and a “harmonious society” (Chapter 1). 
(3) The making of modern meat in reform era China is best described as a kind of “pork and 
beans” development that hinges on imported exotic pig breeds and imported soybeans. Co-
development of the swine and feed industries since 1978 has largely displaced indigenous 
pigs, locally-based feeding practices, and culturally preferred forms of pork (Chapter 2).   
(4) The meatification project transforms agroecosystems, diets, notions of modernity and value, 
and the distribution of environmental harm. These transformations are based on, and deepen, 
the metabolic rift. As people, livestock, and agricultural practice are uprooted from 
agroecological cycles, humans are separated from nature in both minds and bodies. Changes 
in swine feeding and manure management in particular reveal these ruptures and their crises 
(Chapter 3). 
(5) In the march toward a meat-rich modernity, smallholder farmers are (re)defined as 
backwards, redundant, and a drag on development. Political discourse and pronouncements, 
as well as popular imaginations and meanings around farmers (nongmin 农民), illustrate 
prevailing assumptions about the “low quality” of smallholders, and the desire to improve 
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them through industrial agriculture as a mechanism of dispossession and/or vertical 
integration. In other words, nongmin are cast as a problem for industrial agriculture to solve 
(Chapter 4).  
(6) Rather than just an expression of neoliberal development with TNCs at the helm, China’s 
state-led meatification project operates primarily through leading domestic agribusiness firms 
called Dragon Head Enterprises. Through the operation of the country’s agricultural 
development model, China is a site of agribusiness development in its own right, not simply 
a destination for transnational capital. The pork sector is an exemplar (Chapter 5). 
(7) The rationale for the meatification project is based on the discourse that industrial production 
is the most efficient way to overcome the challenge of feeding 21 percent of the world’s 
population on nine percent of its arable land. But rather than promoting food and agricultural 
self-sufficiency, the project increasingly enacts the “go out” strategy to invest in land and 
infrastructure abroad, externalizing many of the social and environmental consequences that 
accompany increased meat production to land and farmers in other parts of the world 
(Chapter 6). 
(8) The state manages tensions between meatification and food security through a livestock feed 
regime that is a complex of both soy and maize imports, and more recently, land grabs. Off-
shoring feed allows Chinese middle- and upper-class urbanites to join a growing global 
consumer class of meat eaters whose diets require the diversion of more land, resources, and 
crops to feed livestock rather than people. This deepening of class diets produces a 
contradictory food security politics around meat for the elite and grains for the masses, with 
both domestic and global articulations (Chapter 6).  
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Taken together, these chapters detail and develop the meatification project concept, and 
specify its practice in reform era China. My overall argument is that the further the 
meatification project proceeds, the further it creates the conditions of its demise. In the 
meantime, its contradictions and crises are already being disproportionately borne by rural 
people and environments, both of which fuel the project without benefitting from it. 
 
Methods and Study Sites 
The empirical material in this dissertation derives from fieldwork in China from 2009-
2011, and shorter research trips in 2007 and 2008. My work took me to Northeast, Southwest, 
and Coastal China, including three municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, and Chongqing), and cities 
and villages in five provinces (Sichuan, Guangdong, Hebei, Heilongjiang, and Guizhou).  I 
conducted participant observation at 81 research sites, including: farms, agribusiness firms, 
government agricultural offices, universities, agricultural trade shows, agriculture and 
agribusiness conferences, food markets, banquets, nongovernmental organizations,  rural farm 
resorts, factories, a migrant worker legal support center, and a “pig culture museum” (see 
Appendix A). Additionally, I conducted 47 interviews with farmers, agribusiness executives, 
government officials, university researchers, migrant workers, factory owners, journalists, food 
market workers and customers, and NGO workers, using a combination of purposive and 
snowball sampling. I had 72 informal conversations with strangers, colleagues, friends, 
acquaintances, and neighbors that informed my research, and several email exchanges with 
informants that provided further information and insights. I also administered and analyzed 
surveys of 123 factory workers in Xiamen in Fujian Province and Dongguan in Guangdong 
Province. I have changed the names of all people, companies, and locations that might 
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compromise confidentiality. Otherwise, the names of government ministries and of national-level 
agribusiness firms are real. 
Ethnographic material is supplemented with secondary data from newspapers, scholarly 
journals, agribusiness and government websites and documents, and government statistics. 
Specific methodologies and expositions of study sites are included in the following chapters.  
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Chapter Two 
 
 
PORK and BEANS DEVELOPMENT 
 
The MAKING of MODERN MEAT 
 
_____________ 
 
 
“Plants and animals have been turned into homogenous  
rivers of grain and tides of flesh, more closely 
 resembling the money that enlivens their movement  
from field to table, than their wild ancestors.” 
Harriet Friedmann (2000, p. 481) 
 
 
“The pork today is no good. It has no flavor, 
 not like when I was a boy.” 
Man in his late 50s 
Village outside of Beijing, April 2011 
 
 
Pork and Beans Development 
A pork-focused meatification project makes sense in China. As I detailed in Chapter One, 
pigs have long held cultural and agroecological significance, and as the “national food,” pork is a 
highly valued form of protein. The making of modern meat, however, bears little resemblance to 
the history of pig raising in China. In the process of industrialization and commodification, the 
materials, practices, and knowledges used to produce pork have changed dramatically. Whereas 
Chinese farmers for millennia raised locally adapted indigenous pigs on locally produced or 
occurring feedstuffs, in the reform era, modern pork is made from exotic pig breeds and largely 
imported oilseeds and grains. These transformations have resulted in a kind of meat for which 
consumer demand has to be created: modern pork is lean pork, and from countless conversations 
with Chinese consumers who remember eating meat before industrialization, “the pork today is 
no good.” 
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In this chapter, I examine the political economy of the making of modern meat in reform 
era China as “pork and beans development.” I begin by discussing the displacement of Chinese 
indigenous pigs by imported exotics, and then detail the co-development of the swine and feed 
industries since 1978. Chapter Three builds on the information presented here by putting changes 
in breeding and feeding in the context of the metabolic rift, with a particular focus on how 
farming practices and knowledges are shifting, and with what social and ecological implications. 
 
Making Modern Pigs; Making Modern Meat 
 When the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences undertook the first national survey 
of indigenous livestock in 1960, researchers found more than 100 indigenous pig breeds, which 
ranged from the extreme northeast of present day Heilongjiang Province, to the Tibetan Plateau 
in the southwest, and all the places in between (Zheng, 1984). Millenia of animal husbandry 
produced a genetically diverse range of locally adapted pigs with characteristics such as high 
prolificacy (large litters), the ability to thrive on course feedstuffs and often in unfavorable 
environments, and production of juicy flavorful pork (Tang et al., 2008). For virtually all of 
China’s 7,000 years of agricultural history, local people raised local pigs on local resources and 
ate them in local (geographic, cultural, social, dietary) contexts.  
 In the contemporary era, the production of modern pigs and modern pork are radical 
departures from this historical model. A modern pig reaches market weight and finishing 
standards in the shortest possible time (Holden & Ensminger, 2005). It is an animal that has been 
bred to efficiently (quickly and prolifically) convert feed (soy and maize) into lean pork that can 
be processed, packaged, and sold in a variety of different forms. And increasingly, it is one of a 
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narrow range of pork breeds, owned and traded by a narrow range of agribusiness firms (Gura, 
2008).  
In China, improving the national swine herd by replacing indigenous pigs with imported 
exotic breeds is an important agricultural development goal. I interviewed Dr. Tai Hong, an 
official in the National Animal Husbandry Service at the Ministry of Agriculture about this 
process. He told me that the “modern industrial hog” has taken over swine production in China 
as elsewhere around the world. Presently, three exotic breeds - namely Duroc, Landrace, and 
Yorkshire (DLY) - have all but replaced indigenous pigs. Farmers at all scales of production, 
from smallholders to vertically integrated commercial operations, raise these breeds either in 
pure or crossbred form. The less than 50 remaining indigenous pig breeds are now maintained on 
state-funded and privately operated conservation farms, where they have to be grown out and 
reproduced using fresh semen, either through natural or artificial insemination; unlike many 
other animals, pig semen does not remain viable when frozen, so storage in a gene bank is not 
currently an option (though this is changing). Dr. Tai estimates that indigenous pork accounts for 
less than ten percent of the county’s total pork production.  
In interviews with agribusiness executives, government officials, researchers, and 
farmers, I was told over and over again that replacing China’s pigs with “DLY” (spoken in 
English) is the key to modernizing the sector. Agribusiness brochures are filled with glossy color 
images of their best DLY boars and sows, agricultural expos are abuzz with vendors touting their 
“superior” DLY stocks, and state-operated breeder farms use DLY and other “improved” exotic 
breeds in their hybridization efforts. I attended the Guangdong Pig Industry Association’s 
Annual Swine Expo in Guangzhou in 2010, the largest of its kind in China. In the swine auction, 
DLY pigs were the stars of the show. Agribusiness buyers paid 4,800 RMB ($780) to 10,000 
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RMB ($1,625) per head for boars that performed well on feed-to-meat conversion measures. 
These prices are commensurate to what similar boars – good industrial performers, but not prize 
or show pigs – would cost in the United States. 
DLY and other so-called “improved” pig breeds are posed as the opposite of China’s 
“traditional” indigenous pigs, which like the smallholder farmers who raise them, are thought of 
as best done away with as soon as possible so that the country can get on with the business of 
modernizing. (I’ll return to the point about smallholders in Chapter Four.) But there are cruel 
ironies in these constructions.  
First, Chinese indigenous pigs have historically, and continue today, to contribute to the 
making of the “improved” pigs breeds that are replacing them. According to Yu Youtai (1987), a 
former professor at China’s Northeast Agricultural College, the Roman Empire imported pigs 
from southern China to cross with their own indigenous swine during the third century B.C. 
These early hybrids were grown out for thousands of years, ultimately passing along genes from 
Chinese indigenous pigs all the way to the now world famous English breeds, including the 
Yorkshire and Berkshire. Later, Chinese pigs were introduced in England around 1700, and 
again at the beginning of the 19th century into other Europe countries where they were used in 
breeding the current incarnations of Middle White and Large White (Yorkshire) pigs (McOrist & 
Walters, 2009; White, 2011). Also in the 1800s, hybridizers in the U.S. used Chinese pigs in 
crosses to produce the popular Poland China and the Chester White (Yu, 1987).  
More recently, in the 1970s and 1980s, firms in Europe and the U.S. imported Chinese 
Taihu Meishan pigs to improve fertility characteristics of commercial swine. In 1989, the USDA 
and the Universities of Illinois and Iowa brought 144 Fengjing, Meishan, and Minzhu pigs to the 
U.S. for a breed improvement and research program, based on the animals’ pork flavor, disease 
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resistance, and large litters (Holden & Ensminger, 2005; McOrist & Walters, 2009; Tang et al., 
2008; Young 1998). A 2009 issue of Pig Progress, an international publication on the pig 
industry, ran a cover story on the “Native Pig Breeds of China,” suggesting that while these 
animals don’t fit modern production systems, they do have traits that warrant breed conservation 
(McOrist & Walters, 2009).  
On the significance of Chinese indigenous pigs to global processes, Sam White (2011) 
argues that when introduced in England around 1700, the emergence of capitalism and 
industrialization together “ensured that the newly introduced Chinese pig would not continue its 
traditional role as a small farm animal, but would instead facilitate the transformation of Western 
hogs from a household animal into an industrial commodity” (p. 95). 
At the same time that Chinese pigs have been used in breeding programs abroad, exotics 
have been coming in since the end of the 19th century. Crossbreeding with Berkshires, 
Yorkshires, U.S.S.R. Big Whites, and Landraces began around this time, and continued through 
targeted hybridization campaigns in the early 20th century. These crosses resulted in several new 
breeds, including the Northeast Xinjin, the Fuzhou Black, the Ningxia Black, the Shanghai 
White, the Xinhuai, the Harbin White, the Hanzhong White, the Northeast Spotted White, and 
the San Jiang White (Yu, 1987). With Reform and Opening, transnational agribusiness 
corporations began to stake a claim in the development of the country’s animal husbandry 
industry, and domestic genetics firms began to operate through joint ventures or as sole 
proprietorships. Today both PIC and Hendrix Genetics, the first and second largest pig breeding 
companies in the world, have established firm footholds in China10. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See company websites: http://www.picchina.com/ (in Chinese), http://www.hypor.com/en/local-activities/china/. 
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The second irony is that exotic lean type pigs produce meat that is not well-suited to 
Chinese cooking traditions or to Chinese consumer preferences. DLY and other “improved” 
varieties are meat pigs, bred primarily for quickly converting protein- and energy-rich (soy and 
maize) feed into lean muscle. In industrial production, meat pigs are seen as the most advanced 
in three stages of breed classification, following lard pigs as the traditional type, and bacon pigs 
as the post-World War II type. Lard pigs are thick, compact animals with short legs and fat 
bodies, producing meat with a high fat content that separates easily from the lean components 
through rendering. In the U.S., lard pigs were raised in the 19th and early 20th centuries both for 
their flavorful meat, and for their lard, which was used as a cooking fat and as a mechanical 
lubricant. In the Midwest, pigs were bred specifically to convert the region’s massive maize crop 
into pork as a more highly valued commodity, earning them the name “corn on the hoof” (Towne 
& Wentworth, 1950, p. 164). A high energy maize diet, in combination with lard pig breeds, 
produced a fatty kind of pork. 
During the Second World War, because most lard was diverted for military purposes in 
the manufacture of explosives, people began using vegetable oil for cooking. After the war, 
when petrochemicals and synthetic nitroglycerine replaced lard for industrial and military 
purposes, and marketing campaigns had successfully sold consumers on the idea that vegetable 
oil was healthier than fat for cooking, lard pigs were replaced with bacon pigs. This new type, 
bred for muscling rather than fattening, produced leaner meat from the glut of soy and maize that  
was emerging in the wake of the synthetic fertilizer boom. Berkshire, Duroc, Hampshire, Poland 
China, and Yorkshire were the most popular breeds at the time, and were further developed into 
the modern meat pig in the intervening years (Christman, 1997). 
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 Using this classification system, Chinese indigenous swine would by and large be 
categorized as lard pigs, which is intimately linked to the development of culinary cultures and 
traditions. As a result of thousands of years of raising pigs on coarse feeds with low protein 
content, Chinese pork was historically fatty pork. Many Chinese recipes use cooking methods 
based on pork with easily distinguishable and separable sections of meat and fat. This is in stark 
contrast to marbling, or intramuscular fat, that is an artifact of the modern pork industry. Also, 
lard has typically been preferred over vegetables oils for cooking (Anderson & Anderson, 1977). 
When pigs were slaughtered at Chinese New Year, rendered lard was saved and used throughout 
the year, supplemented with locally-specific cooking oils.  
The hegemony of exotic lean-type meat pigs has changed the consistency and flavor of 
pork, and for some, has lessened its appeal. This kind of modern meat is not the meat that 
enlivens Chinese cooking, or the taste preferences of especially middle-aged and older Chinese 
people who have memories of pre-industrial pork. Despite this, the market for pork continues to 
grow, and younger consumers demand leaner pork (Personal Communication, 2010). The pork 
industry has sold consumers on the idea that modern pork is better pork, revealing the 
construction of consumer demand as a mechanism to support the meatification project and the 
accumulation of agribusiness profits. 
 The third irony is that “improved” pig breeds are only “improved” for industrial 
production systems, and not for smallholder farmers who cannot afford the requisite soy and 
maize-based commercial feedstuffs. Even though smallholders increasingly raise exotic hybrids, 
because their feed is higher in energy (coarse feeds and maize) and lower in protein (oilseeds like 
soy), they cannot compete with the faster production cycles on factory farms, and often cannot 
meet market standards for leanness that are required for sale to vertically integrated processors. 
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Currently, small-scale farmers use other local markets for their pigs, but producing under 
contract with state-supported agribusiness firms is the predominant rural and agricultural 
development model in China today, which I’ll detail in Chapter Five. The point here is that DLY 
(and other exotic breed) pigs are proposed as a way to improve and modernize pig farming – not  
just for the commercial sector, but also as a form of development for rural households – but the 
benefits of “improved” varieties accrue predominantly to agribusiness firms, and only when 
combined with industrial feeding.  
 
The Meatification Project: Feeding People or Feeding Pigs? 
 To understand China’s meatification project is to understand the political economy of the 
feed industry, and the ways in which the pork and feed trajectories are interdependent. Making 
modern meat is a process as much about feeding livestock as it is about feeding people. In the 
sections that follow, I detail the development of China’s feed industry in the reform era, which 
conditions and co-develops the pork industry. 
Feeding China’s Pigs 
Before 1975, most Chinese pigs’ lips would never have touched processed feed. Grains 
and oilseeds were cultivated for human consumption, while livestock were raised on weeds, 
grass, crop residues, kitchen scraps, or any of a number of other readily available feedstuffs. In 
an effort to speed up the conversion of plant materials into meat, from 1976 to 1985 China’s 
leaders supported rapid development of a milling industry that would provide compound 
livestock feeds, as well as employment opportunities in rural areas. These changes were expected 
to increase meat consumption in the country, improving diets and food security, and moving the 
population beyond the famines and meat rationing of the past. Through a combination of market 
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reforms and government financial support, China’s feed industry went from practically nothing 
before 1975 to becoming the world’s second largest feed producer by 1995.  Pig feed was the 
first boom in the 1980s, followed by chicken feed in the 90s (Ministry of Agriculture, 2009).   
Today, China has a multi-billion dollar (US$) livestock feed industry.  Its 2008 gross 
output value was 425.8 billion RMB (US$62.3 billion), an 8.5 percent increase from 2007.  Of 
that total, 381.29 billion RMB was from formula feed, 28.66 billion RMB from feed additives, 
6.96 billion RMB from animal-derived feed, and 8.88 billion RMB from feed machines and 
equipment (Ministry of Agriculture, 2009).  For the past 10 years, domestic feed demand has 
been rising by about eight percent each year, making China home to one of the largest feed 
industries in the world, and poised to pass the U.S. as global leader in the coming decade.  
Since its inception, the ownership and management structure of the feed industry has 
changed dramatically. During the first two decades after reform, government agencies such as 
the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and the Ministry of Finance and Commerce (MOFCOM) 
managed most feed mills. Farmers cooperatively owned some mills through township and village 
enterprises (TVEs), generally under MOA supervision. At the same time, private ownership 
increased, and central authorities also started to encourage foreign firms to invest in joint venture 
mills. Before the turn of the century, private and public/private operations accounted for 30 
percent of all mills, and foreign investment in 66 joint ventures totaled over US$200 million 
(Ministry of Agriculture, 2009).   
Currently, private enterprise, both of the domestic and transnational agribusiness variety, 
defines much of the sector, particularly in soybean crushing. An analyst I interviewed in Beijing 
estimates that 69% of the active soybean crushers in China are privately owned. Of the 31% 
state-owned share, several operations also have foreign and domestic private investors.  
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Soybeans: The Key to Modern, Lean Pork 
Producing modern, industrial pork requires modern, industrial feed. Soybean, a plant that 
was domesticated in China 5,000 years ago, is a current feed industry star, sharing the spotlight 
with maize, but under very different political conditions. Similar to the diversity in Chinese 
indigenous pigs, the millennial-scale cultivation of soy has produced around 6,000 domestic 
varieties and a rich associated knowledge about soy production, processing, and uses.  But 
whereas China continues to be largely self-sufficient in pork as an end-product-food-category, 
centuries of soy self-sufficiency came to an end in the mid-1990s, with soy import dependency 
following in subsequent years.  After being a leading soy export country for decades, China 
became a net importer in 1996, and by 2003, had taken over as the world’s largest importer of 
soybeans. In 2009 and again in 2010, China’s imports accounted for more than half of the total 
global soy market (USDA, 2011). In the 2011-2012 trade year, China imported 56% of the total 
global soy market (USDA, 2012). 
Given that soybeans are touted as the ultimate source of protein in modern feed mixes for 
shorter-cycle, leaner pork production, these developments might seem natural or expected.  And 
surely most all of the rapid growth in soy imports is in response to increased domestic demand to 
feed the ever-growing national swineherd.  But the shift to imported soy and the associated 
changes in China’s feed industry are not because of the so-called invisible hand of the market. 
Rather, they are the direct result of a set of policies, agreements, and conflicts – some quite 
visible, and others less obvious – involving a diverse set of Chinese and international actors.  For 
its part, the Chinese central government has enacted measures aimed at ensuring China’s food 
security on a limited amount of land, supporting increased consumption of cheap pork, 
liberalizing the soy sector, and anticipating and abiding by WTO regulations.  From the 
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perspective of soybean exporting countries and transnational agribusiness firms (and the 
institutions that regulate international trade), China was and remains a key site for investment 
and profit and a central component of future development plans.  With soybeans, what is at stake 
is nothing less than control of the flow of soy into the country and throughout the food system. 
Liberalizing and Industrializing Soy  
To increase meat consumption for 1.3 billion people on only 120 million hectares of 
arable land, something has to give. For China’s central authorities, a key “something” has been 
soybeans. Recognizing that domestic soy output would not be able to keep up with the massive 
growth planned for the livestock industry, the government moved to liberalize the soy sector 
starting in the 1990s, allowing imports to overtake both exports and domestic production. 
Officials used a number of methods to open this market. 
Central authorities implemented the VAT system in 1993 to encourage production and 
export of certain products11, and as a key source of state revenue.  For food and agricultural 
goods, the VAT rate is generally 13 percent (Gale & Hansen, 2003).  In 1995, to spur the 
livestock industry and to get around limitations in domestic soybean crushing, the government 
lifted the VAT on soybean meal.  As a result, meal imports surged to 3.6 million tons in 1996-
1997, making China the world’s largest soybean meal importer that year, and then to 4.2 million 
tons in 1997-1998. This increase in supply depressed domestic soy prices, reduced domestic 
crushing margins, and discouraged producers from planting soybeans during those years.  As 
domestic crush fell, so too did soy oil production, since soybean meal and soy oil are co-products 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The VAT is not assessed on products sold by “agricultural producers”, for instance the soybeans a farmer sells to 
a crusher or trader.  When a trader sells soy, however, the VAT is assessed.  In theory, the VAT makes imported 
products more expensive than domestic products, since domestic sales often are not assessed a VAT. 	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in the crushing process.  Several sources reported edible oil smuggling in the country as a result 
of the shortfall.   
In an attempt to correct these imbalances, the central government reimposed the 13 
percent VAT on all imported soybean meal in 1999, a move that favored the import of 
unprocessed soybeans instead.  Consequently, soybean meal imports dropped from 4.2 million 
tons in 1997-1998 to 0.1 million tons in 2000-2001, while soybean imports soared from 3.8 
million tons in 1998-1999 to 10.1 million tons in 1999-2000 (USDA, 2001).  Domestic soybean 
meal prices rose, crushing margins improved, employment increased, and edible oil smuggling 
stopped.  To this day, China’s soy import strategy is focused on whole, unprocessed soybeans, 
not soybean meal. 
WTO and bilateral trade agreements were also important drivers of soy sector 
liberalization. In 1996, the government reduced the import tariff on soybeans from 40 percent to 
3 percent in anticipation of accession to the WTO in 2001.  The tariff rate on soybean meal was 
set at 5 percent, while soy oil was 9 percent (Provance, 2003). In 1999, China and the U.S. 
became closer trade partners when the two countries signed a bilateral trade agreement that 
contained a tariff-rate quota for soy oil (that would later turn into a bound 9-percent tariff rate), 
but excluded soybeans and soybean meal (Hsu, 2001). In 2003, Brazil came on the scene when 
China accepted the country’s soy export application (Provance, 2003). These agreements defined 
the terms of trade and China’s major trading partners for the next several years.  
Changes in how soybeans and soybean meal are defined and regulated were also key 
policy maneuvers with important consequences for trade and domestic production. In 2002, in 
order to raise domestic soybean meal prices after supplies exceeded demand, central authorities 
defined soybean meal as an industrial, rather than agricultural, product.  This language changed 
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the tax structure of soybean meal, giving it a 13 percent export tariff refund to encourage exports 
and to relieve excess supply on the domestic market (Provance, 2003). Redefining soy in this 
way was related to the government’s more general reclassification of it as a “non-strategic” crop 
for food security.  Upon accession to the WTO in 2001, China’s overall strategy was to focus 
food security policy on maintaining strategic reserves of rice, maize, and wheat – crops 
considered important for direct human consumption – while liberalizing the markets for other 
non-staple crops in order to honor accession protocols and commitments.  At that time, 
authorities liberalized soybeans from strict state control, and removed so-called trade distorting 
mechanisms (Solot, 2006). According to experts I interviewed within China, the main reason that 
soy was “cut loose” was to ensure adequate supplies of feed for industrial pork production.  
As a result of this sectoral restructuring, soybean imports have been soaring since the late 
1990s at an average annual growth rate of about 26 percent. Imported soy is crushed 
domestically to produce livestock feed (soybean meal) with soy oil as a co-product. China is now 
the world leader in both soybean meal and soy oil production, but it is important to remember 
that this output comes overwhelmingly from imported beans.  In 2009, 73 percent of the 
soybeans consumed in China were imported (Ma & Yan, 2010).  The United States and South 
America (Brazil and Argentina12) are seasonal complimentary soybean suppliers for China. 
Because of the “opposite” growing seasons in these two global locations, South America soy 
imports dominate from June to October and United States imports from November to May (Song 
et al., 2009).  This system means that U.S. beans are in direct competition with Chinese domestic 
beans because they share the same growing season.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Argentina was a major supplier of soybean oil until Chinese authorities suspended imports in 2010. Trade has yet 
to be restored, and as a result, domestic soybean meal supplies are outstripping demand since crushing has increased 
to make up for the shortfall in soy oil. 	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Soybean Wars and Foreign Crusher Dominance 
The dominance of foreign firms in the Chinese soybean industry is one the most 
contentious issues in China soy policy and production circles.  The situation is reported in the 
Chinese media as “Soybean Wars,” “Battle of the Beans,” and “Foreign Companies Eat Up Our 
Country’s Soybean Industry,” suggesting the conflict between transnational agribusiness firms 
and domestic crushers and producers.  While foreign enterprises started to enter the Chinese feed 
industry in the 1980s through joint ventures with domestic mills, it was only after the soy crusher 
defaults in 2004 that these companies were able to take control of 80 percent of Chinese soy 
crushing, ushering in a new era of foreign domination. 
After the 13 percent VAT on soybean meal was reimposed in 1999, there was an 
unprecedented crushing boom in China to accompany the surge of whole soybean imports.  
Investment in the sector soared and crush capacity expanded beyond production.  At the same 
time, toward the end of 2003, China and the U.S. were on the brink of a trade war because of the 
U.S.’s growing trade deficit.  Chinese Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao, made a trip to the U.S. and 
promised to send delegates the next year to purchase agricultural products, primarily “non-
strategic” soy and cotton.  The monthly average soybean future price on the Chicago Board of 
Trade (CBOT) at the time of Prime Minister Wen’s visit was US$7.70 per bushel.  In March and 
April of 2004, when Chinese buyers arrived in the U.S. to make the bulk of soy purchases as per 
the previous agreement, the price of soybeans had skyrocketed to US$9.82 and US$9.89 per 
bushel respectively. Average April prices in 2003 and 2005 were US$6.04 and US$6.23 per 
bushel respectively, so the almost US$10 per bushel price was an anomaly (Wen, 2008).   
When deliveries and payments came due from the Chinese buyers in June, July, and 
August of 2004, the price of soybeans had tanked to US$5.93 per bushel.  Rather than incur 
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losses from the radically different per bushel price at the time of purchase and the time of 
delivery, many Chinese importers defaulted on their contracts.  Angry traders took the case to 
arbitration at GAFTA (Grain and Feed Trade Association) in London. Because price fluctuations 
are perfectly legal under the international pricing system based on CBOT futures, but defaulting 
on trade contracts is not, the final ruling was against the Chinese crushers.  They were required 
to fulfill their contracts and pay for soy shipments at the abnormally high March and April 
prices.  A Chinese Academy of Science study estimated that Chinese crushers overpaid for this 
soy by a margin of at least US$1.5 billion (Wen, 2008).   
The immediate result was that many Chinese crushers were forced into bankruptcy and 
had no choice but to sell to foreign firms. Predictably, the firms that made the most market 
headway after the crusher defaults were already leaders in the global soy trade (GRAIN, 2010). 
ADM, Bunge, Cargill, Louis Dreyfus (together, ABCD) bought over 70 percent of the shutdown 
Chinese crushers, and Singapore-based Wilmar also increased its market share at that time 
(PRL.org, 2009). It is important to note, however, that New Hope Group, a private domestic firm 
with annual feed production capacity of over 20 million metric tons13, is the largest feed 
producer in the country. 
Official statistics on the number and type of feed enterprises in China also illustrate the 
continuing and growing prominence and concentration of foreign firm ownership.  According to 
Ministry of Agriculture figures, there were 13,612 feed enterprises in 2008.  This was 11.5 
percent lower (1,764 fewer operations) than in 2007, and recorded the third consecutive year of 
diminishing numbers.  The only enterprise categories that saw an increase in the number of 	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operations were foreign-funded and joint-stock enterprises.  All other categories declined 
(Ministry of Agriculture, 2009). 
Livestock feed is the main driver in the soybean crushing industry, but soy oil is also 
becoming increasingly important.  Before industrialization of pig and feed production, small-
scale farmers cooked their meals with fat from the pigs they slaughtered in the spring, or pressed 
a small amount of cooking oil from crops produced locally.  Today, edible oils have also been 
largely commercialized, and soy oil is now the leading cooking oil in China, accounting for 40 
percent of national use (USDA, 2008).  While there is regional variation in household edible oil 
consumption, with rapeseed, palm, and peanut oil dominating in some parts of the country, soy 
oil is gaining more and more of the market. According to a scholar I interviewed at a leading 
Chinese agricultural university, virtually all restaurants in China today – from street vendors to 
upscale eateries – use soy oil for cooking. It has completely taken over this sector. 
Foreign firms have an important presence in soy oil production, with several operating 
under their own brands within China.  Jinlongyu (金龙鱼) has 30-40 percent of the total market 
for all edible oils in China, and is an important soy oil brand.  Its parent company, Arwana, is 
owned by Kerry Oils and Grains, which was just purchased by Singapore-based Wilmar. Bunge 
started the Douweijia (豆维家) brand of soy oil in Nanjing in 2007. ADM and Wilmar have a 
joint venture in the Jinhai brand (金海) of products, including the Sania (莎妮雅) soy oil brand. 
Through a joint venture with China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Corporation 
(COFCO), ADM and Wilmar also own five companies of crushers and refiners. On its website, 
ADM notes that, “A key part of ADM’s Asia strategy today is our strategic ownership interest in 
Wilmar International Limited” (Archer Daniels Midland, 2010). Cargill and Dreyfuss don’t at 
 	   38	  
present have their own retail soy brands, but instead sell unrefined oil to local refiners or to 
ADM enterprises.   
As a result of the crusher defaults in 2004, on top of crusher buyouts, half of all domestic 
soy oil refineries were forced to close.  Transnational agribusiness corporations now control 80 
percent of soybean crushing, and control 60 percent of China’s soy oil refining (PRL.org, 2009).  
This means that the same firms that control soybean exports to China from production centers in 
the U.S. and South America are also the major importers that control the flow of soy through the 
Chinese food system. 
Protecting Domestic Soy 
 Changes in the feed industry, including ever-increasing soybean imports and the 
dominance of foreign firms, have had definitive impacts not only on domestic soy crushing and 
oil refining, but also on domestic soy production and farmers.  In 2009, Chinese farmers 
produced 16 million tons of soybeans on 9 million hectares, or 7.5 percent of the country’s total 
arable land (Ministry of Agriculture, 2009). Liberalization of the sector has meant that surging 
soy imports have dramatically outpaced domestic production, and more and more farmers are 
opting out of planting soy. 
Soy experts in China estimate that there are 25 million smallholder soy farmers in the 
country today (Ma & Yan, 2010).  So while large-scale soy production is increasing – with 
groups like Beidahuang14, a state-owned conglomerate working to scale-up and mechanize 
production to increase per-acre productivity – smallholders play a vital role in the soy sector, 
acting both individually and through cooperatives.  The real story behind domestic soy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Beidahuang Group is a conglomerate of state-owned agribusiness enterprises headquartered in Harbin City in 
Heilongjiang Province. See the company website (in Chinese) at: http://www.chinabdh.com/. Jiusan (93) Oil and Fat 
Company is a subsidiary of the Group, and is the country’s largest domestic soy processor. According to a soybean 
industry expert I interviewed in Beijing, Beidahuang is actively investing in overseas agribusiness enterprises. 
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production, therefore, is the story of the struggles of smallholders whose livelihoods are 
endangered by changes in the soy industry and in soy pricing.  
There are several reasons why farmers move out of soy production in China.  One 
important factor is that the market price of imported soybeans is cheaper than that of domestic 
soy. A complex mix of subsidies, agricultural policies, and pricing schemes in the United States 
and South America keeps the market price of soybeans (and other agricultural commodities) 
artificially below the cost of production. This is a well-documented phenomenon that has led to 
unfair competition and/or dumping on world markets for decades (Murphy et al., 2005). When 
domestic farmers are undercut by cheap imports, one immediate result is that those farmers can 
no longer make a living from their crops, and are often forced out. On top of this, the foreign 
firms that control 80 percent of crushing and 60 percent of refining in China have the ability to 
import soybeans from their own production centers around the world at a price much cheaper 
than what domestic soybeans can sell for.  In 2010, imported soybeans in China were 300 to 600 
RMB cheaper per ton than domestic beans (Lan, 2010). This situation means that not only are 
domestic soy prices depressed, but that both foreign owned and domestic crushers are buying 
more imported beans in order to increase profits, or in some cases, to stay in business. Tian 
Renli, the president of Heilongjiang Jiusan Oil and Fats Company said, "It's not that the 
processors don't want to use domestic soybeans, but we can't at current prices” (Wang, 2010). 
Domestic crushers can buy soy from local farmer co-ops, but increasingly they are getting soy 
supplies from the same foreign firms that control the vast majority of the processing sector.  
The GM issue, which is highly controversial in China, further complicates soybean 
pricing.  Currently, the central government prohibits commercial planting of GM food crops, but 	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unlike most other countries with similar bans, allows imports (“Single year’s corn import,” 
2010).  In 2009, 90 percent of soy imports were GM (Ma & An, 2010).  Given that 73 percent of 
the soy consumed in China in 2009 was imported, and that 90 percent of imports were GM, that 
means that 81 percent of all soy was GM.  Clearly, this is a challenging market situation for 
domestic producers who grow non-GM soy that should fetch a premium price, but instead 
creates a barrier for them when they are faced with buyers who want (and/or need) the cheapest 
beans possible.  There is little incentive for crushers to buy domestic non-GM soy because, on 
the other side of processing, the price of GM and non-GM soybean meal and soy oil is largely 
the same.  
Farmers are having a hard time breaking even from planting soy, and for smallholders in 
particular, who have an average annual income of about US$690 (4,616 RMB), the implications 
are especially serious.  Experts estimate that 30 percent of soybean farmers have already left 
their homes and families to become migrant workers in China’s coastal cities.  Liberalization of 
the soy sector, including the mass influx of cheap soy imports and domination by foreign 
processors, is linked to urban migration in complex ways.  
The mix of low soy prices for domestic farmers, cheap GM soy imports, foreign 
domination of soy crushing and oil processing, and the exodus of soy farmers to labor in the 
cities has led to a domestic sector in trouble.  In response, central authorities have taken 
measures to protect the soy industry, and experts have advised on alternative markets and 
strategies.  2008 was a particularly active year for soy regulation.  On August 22, China’s 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) issued a directive on the future 
direction of the domestic soy sector.  Some of the key provisions included policies to further 
concentrate soy production and processing in the Northeast and in Inner Mongolia, to scale-up 
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and further industrialize the sector, to develop and improve the domestic soybean futures market, 
to establish a soybean reserve system for commercial circulation, and to develop soy industry 
standards.  The aim of these measures was to support domestic production and maintain a 
consistent supply of soy.   
Also in 2008, the central government imposed new restrictions on foreign investment in 
soy processing to limit the expansion of foreign control, and to try to level the playing field for 
domestic firms.  By these provisions, foreign firms are not allowed to expand existing 
operations, invest in new operations, or have a controlling share (more than 50 percent) in new 
joint ventures. 
To help alleviate downward price pressure on farmers in 2008, the central government 
started buying domestic soy at a minimum purchase price.  At that time, international futures 
markets fell because of the financial crisis, initiating a flood of even cheaper soy into China 
(PRL.org, 2009). The state minimum purchase and storage price for 2008-2009 was 3.7 RMB 
per kg, and 3.74 RMB per kg for 2009-2010 (Wang, 2010).  Between October 2008 and June 
2009, the China Grain Reserve Corporation (CGRC) bought 7.25 million tons of soybeans in 
Northeast China at 3.7 RMB per kilogram (Cheng, 2010).  
Protective purchasing since 2008 has helped to swell the state reserves in Heilongjiang 
Province.  But the degree to which the minimum pricing scheme has helped smallholders and 
domestic processors is unclear.  Many farmers couldn’t afford to transport their beans to state 
warehouses to collect the higher payments.  Additionally, the state reserve only bought the 
highest quality soybeans, and even at that, couldn’t buy the total domestic harvest.  Price alone, 
therefore, wasn’t enough to save all of China’s soy farmers.  Some domestic processors didn’t 
fare much better.  The increased domestic soy price meant that processors’ profit margins shrunk 
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(Xiang, 2010).  Even after the government provided rebates to processors for buying domestic 
beans, they were still losing money.  Further, protective purchasing in 2008 has been linked to 
another wave of processing plant closures in Heilongjiang that year, further challenging the 
ability of domestic producers, especially smallholders, to sell their soy. 
The Chinese Soybean Industry Association (CSIA) has proposed alternatives for the soy 
sector.  Along with other experts, the CSIA urges that China should develop new markets for 
domestic soy so that it doesn’t compete directly with cheap GM imports.  There are two main 
proposals on the table.  One is to use domestic soy exclusively in the manufacture of foodstuffs 
such as tofu, soymilk, and vegetarian products to be marketed within China.  This proposal could 
also include marketing sustainable soy products to link producers to the growing domestic 
market for sustainable food products. Presently, there are a handful of Chinese firms using this 
model.  The other proposal is to (re-) develop the export market for non-GM soy to Japan, South 
Korea, and European countries.  This would involve improving soy varieties and quality to 
internationally accepted standards, and implementing local monitoring and certification schemes.  
Both of these proposals aim at separating the markets for domestic and imported soybeans to 
benefit Chinese producers and processors.  There are similar proposals for labeling and 
promoting non-GM soy oil. 
 The central government, it seems, has other plans for protecting domestic soy from 
cheaper and TNC-controlled beans, but their focus is on the soy industry, rather than soy 
producers. The state is expanding the reach of Chinese firms through the “go out” strategy 
(zouchuqu 走出去), a set of policies initiated in 2000 to encourage Chinese state and private 
firms to invest in operations and infrastructure abroad (see Armory & Strauss, 2012). The 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (Smaller et al., 2012) estimates that Chinese 
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enterprises have invested in soybean production in Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Kazakhstan, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, Zambia, and Russia. Scholars are only beginning to 
explore the terrain of these so-called landgrabs, but the logic of land and production acquisitions 
abroad is clear: the state is concentrated on continuing to increase meat (pork) production and 
consumption, fueled by soy (and maize) based commercial feed, and increasingly arranged by 
domestic agribusiness firms. The landgrabs are a way for China to navigate - at least for the 
moment - around the leading global grain traders for feed supplies, while also propping up 
Chinese firms as agents and sites of capital accumulation. They are also a way for state 
authorities to displace China’s food security issues and some of the environmental consequences 
of industrial livestock production onto vulnerable populations of mostly smallholder farmers in 
places like Brazil, Zambia, and Sudan, who are being dispossessed in the rush to serve China’s 
growing feed demand (see Chapter Six). 
 
Pork and Beans…and Maize 
 Soybeans seem to be the most important livestock feed component in China, as evidenced 
by import figures, the attention and ownership of transnational agribusiness firms, and soy-
related land deals. But maize is also a key feed crop, and one that is used in both industrial 
operations, and by smallholder farmers who grow and grind their own for supplemental pig feed. 
Maize has a very different political history as a feed, and as an import crop. 
While soy is a native crop, maize was introduced from the Americas only during the 
Ming Dynasty, sometime in the early to mid 16th century (Ho, 1955). Maize and soybeans today 
are prime competitors for land and trade, and increasingly, as components in livestock feed.  
Considering productive area, both crops are grown primarily in the Northeast – the soy base is 
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Heilongjiang Province, while Jilin Province is the main maize-growing region. If farmers opt out 
of soy production, they often plant maize instead, and vice versa in some cases. Throughout the 
20th century, maize has been more widely planted than soy, but in some places in the Northeast, 
officials encourage farmers to rotate the two crops.  This is the dominant practice in the USA, 
but is not widely used in China. 
In the early 2000s, maize and soy roughly offset each other in terms of value, largely 
because of massive soy imports coupled with the need for heavy subsidies for maize production 
and export. The central government, in other words, has devoted huge amounts of money to 
these two crops. 
Regulating and Industrializing Maize  
Unlike soy, maize is considered a strategic crop for food security, and so is more tightly 
regulated by the central government.  China is a world leader in maize production, and has long 
been a regular net exporter with negligible imports. In the past ten years, however, the situation 
in the maize sector has started to change dramatically. 
The structure of state support for maize production changed in 2001 when China joined 
the WTO.  In order to fulfill commitments, China was required to eliminate export subsidies on 
maize and open a 5.85 million ton quota for maize imports at a one percent tariff rate (Gale 
2002).  These measures were expected to significantly decrease China’s maize exports and 
increase imports, but much to the surprise of analysts and traders, China’s maize exports in 2002 
– the year after WTO accession – were the highest in the country’s history. Maize imports in 
2002 were also insignificant, meaning that in its first year as a WTO member, China remained, 
and even increased, its global position as a net maize exporter. In 2003, maize exports were even 
higher, supported not by the WTO-forbidden direct export subsidies, but by a package of 
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measures aimed at boosting maize sales to promote the livestock industry and domestic meat 
consumption. These measures included subsidies for maize sales from state grain reserves, 
railroad tax and grain shipment waivers, subsidies for port fees, and a VAT rebate for exported 
maize.   
The above policies were so successful in promoting production that throughout the early 
2000s, maize supply in China persistently exceeded demand, exports boomed, and maize prices 
rose steadily throughout the first years of the new millennium. In 2007, central authorities began 
to encourage and support industrial maize processing as a way to deal with excess supply. In the 
2007-2008 market year, about one fourth of the country’s total maize use was in industrial 
products such as maize starches, sweeteners, alcohols, amino acids, and citric acid. China also 
began exporting these products, changing its maize export profile from trading mostly in 
unprocessed maize, to exporting mainly industrial products.  Industrial maize exports are now 
three times as high as unprocessed maize exports (Gale, 2010).   
2010: From Leading Maize Exporter to Net Maize Importer  
Perhaps the most profound change in the maize sector over the last decade is the 1.3 
million tons of maize that China imported from the United States in 2010. While this amount is 
small relative to China’s total maize production (158 million tons in 2009-2010, and expected 
168 million tons in 2010-2011), it accounted for 1.4 percent of the total global maize trade. This 
was the first time since 1994-1995 that China was a net maize importer. At that time, central 
authorities cut off exports of maize and other grains because of widespread concerns about grain 
shortages and inflation (USDA, 2011).  
The reasons for 2010’s amped up imports are related to high domestic maize prices, 
though among analysts and officials there is disagreement about what drove prices up in the first 
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place.  Government officials at the National Grain and Oils Information Center urged that rising 
maize prices were not the result of falling domestic supplies or reserves, but that market 
speculation was to blame (Xinhua, 2010). Central authorities seemed to be arguing that once they 
cracked down on illegal activities that force prices up (i.e., hoarding), China would return to 
being a net exporter, and maize self-sufficiency would be preserved (“Corn imports set to slow,” 
2010). They insisted that the country would not continue to import significant amounts of maize 
in the future.  
Analysts at the United States Grains Council (USGC) agreed that market speculation 
played a role in increasing maize prices, but argued that drought in 2009 coupled with cool and 
wet conditions at spring planting in 2010 also contributed significantly to the high price 
situation, as did increased processing demand for the livestock industry (USDA, 2010). These 
analysts, along with global grain traders, predicted that China would continue to import maize, 
mostly for feed, and would remain a net importer into the foreseeable future (Takada & Song, 
2010). Hanver Li, the Chairman of Shanghai JC Intelligence Co, a Sino-U.S. joint venture agro-
commodities investment advisor, went so far as to say that, “A new era of China importing corn 
is here,” calling 2010 a “turning point” at which China would become a regular maize buyer.  Li 
and other experts predicted that China’s annual maize purchases will reach 15 million tons by 
2015 (Javier, 2010b). Traders were also anxious for China to continue purchasing maize to help 
recover low international prices, and trade groups like the USGC were excited by the market 
opportunities. Thomas Dorr, USGC president, said, “There is evidence that [China’s] demand for 
high-quality proteins is going to require added energy for livestock rations and we believe it’s an 
excellent opportunity for the U.S. to provide those corn supplies as needed” (Javier, 2010a). 
 	   47	  
As for the mechanics of the 2010 maize imports, COFCO was the top buyer, and the New 
Hope Group was number two.  COFCO didn’t release plans for how it would use the imported 
maize, but the New Hope Group stated publically that it would use purchased maize in the 
manufacture of pig feed (Bin, 2010). Some imports likely went to restoring state stockpiles that 
were drained through auction to cool local prices earlier in 2010.  From April 13 to May 25, the 
state sold 4.67 million tons of reserve maize, mostly to traders in the Northeast who quickly 
shipped it to Guangdong Province for livestock feed processing (Javier, 2010a). After six rounds 
of sales, maize futures on the Dalian Commodity Exchange rose to 1,984 RMB (US$ 302) per 
ton on May 24, a two-year high.  By opening the door to maize imports, the central government 
used the international market to stabilize the domestic market. 
Aside from worries in Beijing that China will no longer be self-sufficient in grain, there 
are several other concerns associated with the possibility that China’s maize imports might 
continue into the long run. First, in terms of global food supplies, if China becomes a major 
importer, there are fears that price fluctuations in global markets will become increasingly 
dramatic, as the world relies on an even narrower set of countries to supply maize.  Jay O’Neil, 
an agricultural economist at Kansas State University in the United States, said, “This means there 
are fewer countries supplying the needs of a growing world and the potential for crop production 
shortfalls is a greater risk to everyone” (Associated Press, 2010).  
There are also important climate and environmental concerns, particularly in terms of the 
deepening relations between pig production in China and soybean and grain production in South 
America. Tom Philpott (2010) argues that increased maize demand from China can only result in 
more land being cleared in South America for large maize plantations. Already, deforestation has 
claimed 528,000 square kilometers of the Brazilian Amazon as cattle grazing and large-scale 
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soybean fields have taken over. Soy production in Brazil quadrupled between 1995 and 2009, 
and almost half of all exports went to China for the feed industry (Gallagher, 2010). At the same 
time, almost half (1 million square kilometers) of Brazil’s Cerrado, the most biologically diverse 
savannah in the world, has been burned for use as cattle pasture, sugarcane fields for ethanol 
production, and large-scale soybean and maize cultivation, primarily for export and the 
manufacture of livestock feed (MacDonald & Simon, 2011). 
This conversion of mass tracts of land to intensive monocrop agriculture has threatened 
the livelihoods of many smallholder Brazilian farmers who are forced to move. At the same time, 
both the processes and long-term impacts of removing forest and burning grasslands contribute 
to climate change, as CO2 stores are released and sinks are lost. On top of that, transporting 
massive amounts of feed around the globe, from Brazil to China for instance, further strains fuel 
demand and contributes even more GHG emissions. If South American countries pursue 
monocrop maize plantations that mirror the way soy has been developed there, these impacts will 
be even more serious. 
Inside China, there are concerns around the GM issue, given that 60 percent of the maize 
imported in 2010 was genetically modified (“Chinese gov’t ‘has an open mind’,” 2010).  That 
said, in 2009 China’s central government approved the first strain of homegrown GM maize to 
be grown for research purposes only (Niu & Miles, 2010). It also approved 11 varieties of GM 
maize for import. While the official stance on GM crops may be changing and perhaps moving 
toward acceptance, the general public continues to have reservations.   
Finally, if maize goes the way of soy in China, and imports become a regular occurrence, 
what are the costs to China’s small-scale producers?  How will their livelihoods be affected?  
What will they grow if they can’t compete with low market prices for either maize or soybeans? 
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Similarly, how do these changes in the structure of the maize industry affect food security, given 
that 64 percent of maize is being used as livestock feed, 25 percent for industrial uses, and only 
11 percent as edible grain ? Because maize is now primarily used for livestock feed, the central 
government is considering a revision to current trade policy, such that maize would no longer be 
regulated in the same way as grains intended exclusively for human consumption (Gale et al, 
2009).  I’ll return to this point in Chapter Six. 
The focus on developing a domestic maize processing industry, allowing GM imports, 
and the possibility that the central government will reclassify maize as a “non-strategic” crop, 
makes this sector sound quite similar to the soy sector.  A feed mill executive in Guangdong 
Province said, “We think maize will follow soy, and imports will become a normal practice 
whenever there is need” (Niu & Miles, 2010). COFCO officials, however, maintain that maize 
imports will always be a supplement to domestic production, and that the central government is 
committed to regulating this sector.  
 
Conclusion: Commodity Pork and Human-Nature Relations 
 The process of making modern meat in China hinges importantly on state management of 
domestic and imported technologies and resources. As diverse and locally-adapted Chinese pigs 
are replaced by imported and genetically-uniform DLY breeds, swine become less valuable 
agroecologically, but more valuable as sources of profit for firms. As CAFO production and the 
need for imported feed grains and oilseeds increases, small-scale domestic soy and maize 
farmers are leaving the countryside in search of jobs, while the state reorganizes production into 
vast monoculture frontiers. In both of these cases, as Harriet Friedmann (2000) is quoted at the 
beginning of this chapter, “Plants and animals have been turned into homogenous rivers of grain 
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and tides of flesh, more closely resembling the money that enlivens their movement from field to 
table, than their wild ancestors” (p. 481). In a similar vein, Jeremy Rifkin (1992) said, “The 
devolution of cattle from the status of a divinity to the status of currency and commodities serves 
as a historical mirror to our own changing relationship to nature” (p. 3). In the next chapter, I 
examine how industrial commodity pork is changing agricultural practice, knowledge, and 
human-nature relations in China today. 
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Chapter Three 
 
 
The METABOLISM of MEATIFICATION  
 
_____________ 
 
 
"The fast development of livestock breeding and aquaculture has 
produced a lot of food but they are also major sources of pollution 
in our lives." 
Wang Yangliang, of the Ministry of Agriculture 
cited in Davison (2013) 
 
 
 
“People come together and pigs come together. That’s the idea.” 
 I asked Dr. Zhang, a prominent swine expert in China, why backyard pig farms were 
declining in Sichuan Province, the country’s long-standing pork production leader. He told me 
the primary reason is that the government is separating people and pigs, and putting them back 
together in new configurations. He said, “People come together and pigs come together. That’s 
the idea.” He was referring to two instances. First, the particular way that the state moved 
farmers into urban apartment buildings following the May 12, 2008 Wenchuan earthquake that 
killed 69,000 people and left 5 to 11 million people homeless15. Second, Dr. Zhang elaborated 
the more general process of concentrating pig production on specialized and commercial farms, 
while funneling “surplus” rural residents to large cities on the coasts as migrant workers, or as 
more permanent urbanites in regional small and mid-sized cities. In both cases, as people come 
together in “modern” urban apartment buildings, pigs come together in “modern” pig barns. 
These movements condition the making of “modern” meat that I detailed in Chapter Two for 
especially urban consumer markets. 
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 Dr. Zhang’s statement is a clear expression of the relationship between urbanization and 
the industrialization of pig farming in China’s meatification project. It also suggests processes 
and consequences of China’s metabolic rift: as human and porcine populations are becoming 
increasingly concentrated and urban, the toxic effects of ruptured nutrient cycles are expressed in 
polluted waterways, polluted soils, and polluted bodies. 
Although he is a strong proponent of commercial swine production, working as both a 
university professor of swine genetics and a paid consultant for a leading agribusiness firm, Dr. 
Zhang betrayed an uneasiness to me in several of our conversations about the development of the 
industry. On the condition of smallholder farmers, he told me that big companies want small 
farms to go out of production, and are opposed to any government measures that support them. 
He went on, “People [smallholders] have no choice in Sichuan. It is very terrible. They have to 
raise pigs to eat themselves, so they can’t stop.” Dr. Zhang was not opposed to the idea of state 
money subsidizing smallholders because “the government giving money to pigs being produced 
is always a good thing.”  
In another exchange, while on a tour of a government demonstration farm, Dr. Zhang 
expressed concern about the environmental implications of large-scale production. He said that 
the “traditional” method of growing two to four pigs per year and using manure to fertilize crops 
is the “true way” to raise pigs. He added, “People think, ‘Easy. Cake. Liquid goes to the river 
and solids to the land.’ But this is one hundred percent wrong: liquid and solid both going back 
to the land is the true way. We have to put it all back to the land.” Later that day we visited 
Golden Age Livestock Company, the commercial breeding farm where Dr. Zhang works as a 
consultant. Golden Age is a private agribusiness firm that operates with state financial support 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 These figures are from Baidu Baike http://baike.baidu.com/view/3486152.htm?fromId=1587399 (in Chinese) and 
the New York Times (Hooker, 2008). 
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and through partnerships with state institutions as a Dragon Head Enterprise (see Chapter Five). 
From their stock of more than 10,000 exotic breed boars and sows, they produce over one 
million piglets annually to sell to other commercial operations from their 250 mu (17 hectare) 
production base. The water under the bridge that we crossed to reach the breeding farm’s 
entrance was completely covered in a slick of lime green algae, the result of excess nitrogen and 
phosphorus coming from the company’s production facilities. Far from the “true way” of pig 
raising that Dr. Zhang identified, Golden Age uses the “modern way,” which consists of raising 
thousands of exotic breed pigs together in enclosed structures, using commercial soy-and-maize-
based feed, and dumping manure and liquid effluent onto surrounding land and into surrounding 
waterways. 
This chapter picks up on Dr. Zhang’s seemingly conflicting sentiments about the 
modernization of pig farming, and explores how the political economic mechanisms of China’s 
meatification project that I discussed in Chapters One and Two are transforming agricultural 
practices, knowledges, notions of value, and agroecosystems. My argument is that the 
meatification project in reform era China – including the relations that condition modern meat 
production, as well as shifting meanings of value – is enabled by, and deepens, the metabolic rift. 
In other words, the process of industrializing meat production is at the same time a process that  
separates humans from the biogeochemical cycles within which social reproduction takes place. 
The separation, however, is more epistemic than material; humans are not distinct from nature, 
and attempts to construct the two as separate realms create rupture, or rifts, in human-nature 
relations and cycles, with uneven and unjust implications.  
As I’ll discuss in Chapters Four and Five in more detail, the state takes as a development 
goal eliminating self-sufficient peasant farming and economies, replacing them with 
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agribusiness-led and vertically integrated large-scale commercial agriculture. In the process, 
farmers become concentrated in urban areas, hogs in confined animal feeding operations 
(CAFOs), and an ever-narrowing range of firms come to control swine breeding, feeding, 
processing, and sales. At the same time, smallholder systems that operate on locally-embedded 
agricultural practices, knowledges, and resources are being replaced with industrial systems that 
rely on long-distance trade and production methods that attempt to overcome agriculture’s 
embeddedness in ecological cycles. As a result, modern meat appears in the market as a 
commodity unencumbered by the confines of a particular agroecosystem, symbolizing progress 
from periods of want, and from a “backwards” agrarian social form (see Chapter Four). But 
modern meat embodies agri-food politics, ruptured nutrient cycles at local and global scales, and 
“rifts” in human-nature relations. 
To theorize the ecology of the meatification project, the “metabolic rift” can be deployed 
in a double sense: first, as a concept that describes “how the logic of accumulation severs basic 
processes of natural reproduction leading to the deterioration of ecological sustainability” 
(Clausen, 2007, p. 40), and second, as an analytical frame to interrogate an “epistemic rift” that 
artificially separates social and natural worlds in thought and practice (Schneider & McMichael, 
2010).  
In discussing agricultural practices and systems in this chapter, and as a way to avoid 
reproducing the epistemic separation of humans and nature, I use agroecology, or the ecology of 
food systems (Francis et al., 2003), as an analytical frame. As John Vandermeer (2011) states,  
The study of agroecosystems is unusual in that it sits on the border of the social and 
natural sciences. Agriculture is not planting a seed and harvesting a crop. Agriculture is 
making a contract among people to provide for one another, using seeds and harvests to 
do so. Studying agroecosystems is not simply studying the way a crop uses nitrogen. It is 
studying the way, for example, an economic blockade by the United States plus the 
failure of the Soviet Union plus the geological background that led to oxisol formation 
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plus the culture of eating sweet potatoes together resulted in the development of new 
strains of Azotobacter, which provides nitrogen to the sweet potatoes growing on Cuba’s 
inherently poor soils today (p. 26). 
 
Agroecology, in other words, is about how humans interact with nature in the process of 
producing food, and how these interactions simultaneously alter natural systems and cycles, as 
well as social bodies and ideas. Based as it is in ecological science, agroecology also frames the 
biogeochemical cycles that underlie agricultural systems as fluid, rather than as being in a static 
state of equilibrium. As Behnke and Scoones (1993) argue, ecosystems are ever-changing with 
or without human intervention, such that farmers have to adapt to their environments and 
respond to imbalances, just as ecosystems respond differently to different agricultural the 
practices.  
The empirical material presented here is based on my ethnographic field research, 
supplemented with secondary data. The chapter begins with a brief review of Karl Marx’s 
metabolic rift concept, particularly as John Bellamy Foster (1999; Foster & Magdoff, 2000) 
develops it in relation to two historical breaks in nutrient cycles, and as I have tried to frame it 
with Philip McMichael as a concept to analyze not only the organization of production, but also 
its practice (Schneider & McMichael, 2010). I then describe restructuring in the swine sector, 
and raise categorical issues to which I return in the end. Next I describe my study sites, and 
provide ethnographic accounts of a backyard farm in Sichuan Province and a commercial pig 
breeding operation in Guangdong Province. I discuss the agroecological transformations that the 
shift to CAFO production brings about, focusing on what is particular in China’s meatification 
project. Finally, I conclude with a section on the epistemic rift, relating it to issues of 
categorization and measurement. 
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The Meatification Project and the Metabolic Rift 
Marx originally posed the metabolic rift concept to explain declining soil fertility in 19th 
century Britain as a rupture in nutrient cycling brought about by a ‘rift’ in the ‘metabolism’ 
between human beings and the land. In Capital, volume 3, he wrote, 
Large landed property reduces the agricultural population to an ever decreasing 
minimum and confronts it with an ever growing industrial population crammed 
together in large towns; in this way it produces conditions which cause an 
irreparable rift in the interdependent process of the social metabolism, a 
metabolism prescribed by the natural laws of life itself. The result of this is a 
squandering of the vitality of the soil, which is carried by trade far beyond the 
bounds of a single country. (Liebig)… Large-scale industry and industrially 
pursued large-scale agriculture have the same effect. If they are originally 
distinguished by the fact that the former lays waste and ruins the labour-power 
and thus the natural power of man, whereas the latter does the same to the natural 
power of the soil, they link up in the latter course of development, since the 
industrial system applied to agriculture also enervates the workers there, while 
industry and trade for their part provide agriculture with the means of exhausting 
the soil (quoted in Foster 1999, 379).16 
 
John Bellamy Foster (1999) reconstructed the mechanisms of the metabolic rift along three key 
proposals: First, that the town-country division of labor created an irreparable rift in the 
metabolism between humans and nature. Second, large-scale agriculture and long-distance trade 
intensified the rift. Third, the corollary to the problem of declining soil fertility in the countryside 
was the accumulation of human waste pollution in towns.  
Along with Fred Magdoff, Foster (Foster & Magdoff, 2000) argues that the metabolic rift 
as Marx originally proposed it describes the first historic break in nutrient cycling. The 
penetration of capital into agriculture pushed rural farmers to the cities in search of waged 
employment, which increased the distance between food production and consumption, and so 
increased the distance nutrients travelled from soil to food to human bodies to environment. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The International Publishers edition of Capital omits use of the term ‘metabolism.’ A similar meaning is implied 
in ‘an irreparable break in the coherence of social interchange prescribed by the natural laws of life’ (Marx 1967, 
813). 
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Labor migrants took with them nutrient-rich humanure, leaving behind unreplenished land in the 
countryside, further degraded by the industrial agriculture that replaced them.  
In more recent history, Foster and Magdoff argue that the second major break in nutrient 
cycling came about in relation to the post-World War II nitrogen fertilizer boom in the United 
States. While grain production had previously depended on manure and/or crop rotations that 
included nitrogen-fixing legumes, the arrival and widespread availability of synthetic fertilizer 
broke the reliance on integrated systems. Farms could specialize in either crop or livestock 
production as separate enterprises, and large-scale processing firms could co-locate with 
concentrated animal production in certain concentrated regions. In this second nutrient cycling 
break, as livestock were separated from cropland – and simultaneously, from the ecological 
limits of what a particular land area can produce – the amount of manure produced exceeded 
what surrounding land could absorb. At the same time, specialized crop farmers came to rely 
increasingly on synthetic fertilizers and monocropping, which depleted rather than replenished 
soil nutrients. 
The parallels between these formulations of the metabolic rift and Dr. Zhang’s 
explanation of the state’s development plans of bringing people together in urban settings, and 
pigs together in concentrated and often peri-urban spaces, are clear. But in China, the two breaks 
that Foster and Magdoff describe are happening in tandem. The state-led meatification project is 
simultaneously separating people from land and livestock from feed, with declining soil fertility 
on the one hand and toxic nutrient overload on the other.  
But as I argued with Philip McMichael, focusing only on these nutrient pathways without 
specifying the farming practices that underlie them produces disembodied analyses of the 
metabolic rift (Schneider & McMichael, 2010). In the next section I describe the restructuring of 
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pig production to lay the foundation for my examination of farming practices on backyard farms 
and on commercial CAFOs. My intention is to show how, in addition to the separations and rifts 
that Foster and Magdoff propose, the meatification project also separates agricultural practices 
from agroecological processes, and food production from agroecological specificity and limits. 
The result is an epistemic rift that conceals (or disregards) the role of agroecological cycles in 
structuring farming, diets, and economies.  
 
Restructuring Pork Production from Farm to Factory 
For thousands of years, small-scale farmers raised all of the pork in China. As recently as 
1985, these so-called backyard farmers who raise fewer than five pigs per year, in addition to 
crops and other livestock on about half an acre of land, produced at least 95% of the country’s 
pork. Throughout the reform era, however, the number of backyard farmers and their share of 
production has declined precipitously as state policies and investments support the industrial 
operations that have catapulted China’s pork production to its current world dominant position. 
In 2008 alone, the number of rural household that raise pigs dropped by 50 percent (Li, 2010). 
By 2009, analysts estimate that government policies to encourage scaled-up production after the 
PRRS epidemic in 2006 were so successful that farms raising more than 50 hogs a year 
accounted for almost 60% of total slaughter, up from less than half in 2007 (Woolsey & Zhang, 
2010). 
Li Jian, an anthropologist at the University of Northern Iowa, studied the decline of 
household pig farming in Sichuan Province in particular. He found that labor shortages, low cash 
returns, disuse of pig manure in lieu of chemical fertilizers, lack of veterinary services, and 
policy failures contributed significantly to household farmers giving up pig raising (Jian, 2010). 
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Jian’s study specifies some of the proximate causal factors behind the broader reorganization of 
the swine sector, or what I’m calling the meatification project. The key process underlying these 
causes is the scaling up and industrialization of production, which is accomplished through the 
metabolic rift that separate people from agriculture, livestock from feed sources, and agricultural 
practices from ecological cycles.  
Scaling-up from backyard pig farming takes two primary forms. First, central and local 
governments have aggressively subsidized specialized household farms (zhuanyehua de 
jiatingshi yangzhichang 专业化的家庭式养殖场). There is some disagreement about how to 
define the farm size parameters of this category, through annual production of 10 to 500 pigs is 
the standard (INFORMA, 2009). The general idea of the specialized household farm is that pig 
raising is a professional endeavor based on production for sale instead of self-consumption. 
Operations may be run by individual families, by small-scale companies, or by several backyard 
farmers who have come together to focus on pig raising more exclusively. Some specialized 
household farmers produce under contract with large commercial farms, while others sell piglets 
and meat pigs to local dealers who then sell pigs to slaughter, processing, and retail firms.  
The government incentivizes this scale of production primarily through investments in 
infrastructure. Whereas backyard farmers typically use a single pen for pigs, and often allow 
them to roam the farm and graze, in order to encourage scaling-up to specialized households, 
central and local governments subsidize the building of “pig barns” that have more than 10 pens. 
According to Dr. Zhang, subsidies don’t typically go directly to farmers. Rather, local 
governments use state funds in two ways: they either build larger-scale pig barns, which they 
maintain ownership of and rent to farmers, or they invest in buildings along with private 
investors, hiring farmers to raise pigs for a wage. In addition to subsidies, specialized household 
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farms are also supported through the “company and farm” contract model, which I’ll discuss in 
detail in Chapter Five.  
The second form of scaled-up production, a scale that is intended to work in concert with 
specialized household pig farms, are large-scale commercial farms (daxing shangye 
yangzhichang 大型商业养殖场). Commercial farms breed, feed, rear, slaughter, process, and 
market pigs and pork. They do so in a variety of ways, from being specialized in one particular 
phase of production, to operating in some or all phases, to managing contracts with other farms 
and companies to produce and sell an end product. The scale of production on these farms 
typically ranges from 500 to 50,000 pigs per year, but is rapidly increasing. It is not uncommon 
for a single farm to produce 100,000 hogs in one year, either through contracts or in a single 
production facility. Some firms have plans to produce as many as one million pigs on mega 
operations (People’s Government of Jilin Province, 2012).  
Commercial farms resemble, or perhaps reproduce, the so-called “factory farm” model 
that dominates pig production in the United States, Europe, and increasingly in global locations 
around the world (GRAIN, 2008; Nierenberg, 2005). Industrial facilities in China use the same 
production technologies and equipment as similarly-sized facilities elsewhere. Firms purchase 
equipment from international dealers like Big Dutchman, from Chinese copycat companies like 
Big Herdsman, or from non-copycat Chinese firms.  
 
From Farm to Factory: Some Categorical Considerations 
 While these three farm categories are consistently used in analyses of China’s pork 
industry, the boundaries between them are anything but fixed. During my fieldwork, I found 
specialized household farms particularly difficult to identify and access. Surely, this was related 
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in part to the contacts I was working with: my university and agribusiness contacts were 
reluctant to show me any farms outside of the large-scale, as they considered farmers to be 
backwards and an embarrassment. Even Dr. Zhang, who confessed some concern for the 
conditions smallholders face, consistently denied my requests to visit a specialized household 
farm. My NGO and farmer contacts, on the other hand, worked in areas with or as small-scale 
backyard farmers exclusively.  
But even when I visited farms that would seem to be specialized household farms on 
paper – based mostly on their annual pig production numbers– I was uncomfortable classifying 
them as such. Official reports, media reports, and experts who I interviewed defined this mid-
scale form of production as one in which pig raising became the professional activity, while 
cultivation of other crops and livestock was abandoned. I interviewed farmers who raised 50 pigs 
per year, putting them in the specialized household category by size, but all of them also 
maintained other agricultural activities. From my experiences, these livelihoods don’t fit neatly 
into the prevailing farm type classification schemes, suggesting that those schemes need to be 
reconsidered. 
In East Creek Village, a study site that I detail below, two farmers who I visited raised 
more than 10 pigs per year, but they did not receive subsidies for their barns, did not rent barns 
from the government, did not work for a wage, did not operate under contract with an integrator, 
and did not concentrate their activities solely on pig raising. They operated much more like 
backyard farmers, but on a slightly larger scale, and using more purchased feed grains and 
additives. In both cases, the farmers did raise primarily for the market. Mr. Lan, for instance, 
raises 30 meat pigs per year, only one of which is consumed by his household at Chinese New 
Year. He occasionally buys meat from the local butcher.  
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In another village about 50 kilometers from East Creek, I visited Ms. Xiang’s farm. 
Before 2008, Ms. Xiang and her family raised 10 pigs each year in addition to other crops and 
livestock. But with money they saved from her husband’s work as a migrant laborer, they built a 
brick pig barn and increased their production to 100 pigs per year. I asked Ms. Xiang if she 
received any subsidies for her building or her swine: she laughed and said, “No. Subsidies are 
only for big farms. Everybody knows that.” I asked if she produced under contract. She said, 
“no.” I asked if her life and livelihood had improved since scaling-up. She told me, “the life of 
peasants (nongmin) is always full of suffering.” I asked what she meant, but she didn’t care to 
elaborate.  
By saying that I couldn’t find the specialized household farms that Dr. Zhang described 
to me, I don’t mean to suggest that they don’t exist, or that they aren’t necessarily as prevalent as 
reports on the structure of the industry detail (INFORMA, 2009). My experiences do, however, 
indicate that the boundaries between farm types are hazy, and analyses based on strict size 
categorizations should be read with caution. It is more useful analytically and politically to 
consider farm types in terms of agricultural practices and associated metabolic rifts, as I’ll detail 
below. 
Another categorical issue has more critical implications. Analysts routinely site the 
dominance of smallholder production as a significant limitation and vulnerability in the 
development of China’s pork industry. They count specialized household farmers along with 
backyard farmers as “small-scale producers,” arguing that industrialization cannot proceed 
quickly enough to overcome the challenges associated with such dispersed, uncoordinated, and 
unregulated production. Lumping these two forms and scales of production together, however, 
blurs the important differences between them. Based on my fieldwork and the meatification and 
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metabolic rift approach,  it is my contention that the relationship between agricultural practices 
and agroecological cycles is the most appropriate proxy for categorizing farm types. To get a 
better sense of the organization and socio-ecological impacts of particular types of farming, 
farms should be defined not only in terms of where and how they produce and sell their products, 
but also the practices and resources they use to produce them.  
The next sections provide ethnographic accounts of a backyard farm in East Creek 
Village in Sichuan, and a large-scale commercial pig breeding and production operation in 
Guangdong Province. I use these two cases to specify the changing practices and values that 
accompany the political economic restructuring of pig farming. I’ll return to the measurement 
issue at the end of the chapter. 
 
Study Sites 
 During my fieldwork, I visited 29 farms, most of which were located in Sichuan Province 
in China’s southwest region where I lived for 9 months. I also went to farms and agribusiness 
firms in Guangdong Province in the southeast, Hebei Province in the north, Heilongjiang 
Province in the northeast, and the Beijing, Shanghai, and Chongqing municipalities. I went to 15 
smallholder farms that raised pigs, 11 of which I feel comfortable labeling as “backyard farms” 
as I’ll detail below, and 4 that fall somewhere between backyard and specialized household 
farms. I visited 8 large-scale commercial farms, with no doubt as to their category. I also went to 
2 organic farms, 3 government demonstration farms, and 3 farmer cooperatives (there is some 
overlap in these categories). My sketch of farming system categories in this section is based on 
observations and interviews on these farm visits, as well as interviews with university 
researchers, government officials, agribusiness executives, and researchers at domestic and 
 	   64	  
international agricultural organizations. I’ve supplemented primary data with secondary data in 
the form of government documents, academic and media articles, and agribusiness reports. 
 The majority of smallholder farms I visited were in East Creek Township in Sichuan 
Province. East Creek is a 50 square kilometer area that encompasses 21 small villages. It is 
located less than five kilometers from a small (by Chinese standards) city of 1.5 million, and 50 
kilometers from Chengdu, the provincial capital. It is typical of villages in terms of population 
composition, with the majority of able-bodied workers away working as migrant laborers in 
urban centers, leaving mostly young children and grandparents to tend to farming and rural 
communities. East Creek is on the Chengdu Plain with a subtropical climate and alluvial soils17. 
Smallholder farmers there grow a diverse mix of crops including grains, vegetables, and fruits, in 
addition to raising pigs, chickens, ducks, rabbits, and fish. Maize, rice, and sweet potato are the 
primary crops planted in the spring, and wheat and rapeseed are sown in the fall and winter. 
I visited East Creek Village on three separate occasions, twice on my own, and once with 
Betty, a college student I hired to accompany me as a research assistant and help with translation 
from the local Sichuan dialect into Mandarin Chinese and into English. Because she was from a 
small city near East Creek Village, Betty could easily understand the local dialect. Because she 
was a college student, she could translate into Mandarin Chinese. And because her English was a 
bit better than my Mandarin, we were able to conduct interviews and discuss our findings in a 
Mandarin-English mix. Betty also accompanied me to an agribusiness firm near Chengdu to help 
with interviewing. At the time, she was majoring in veterinary science at a provincial agricultural 
university. She’s currently a graduate student in pharmaceutical science in Chengdu.  
On each visit to East Creek, I was invited and hosted by Mu Song, a local farmer I met at 
an agricultural expo in Heilongjiang Province where we were both guests of a “sustainable 
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soybean” delegation. Mr. Mu is a farmer-entrepreneur who operates a farm cooperative 
concentrated on specialty organic soy foods. Over the past ten years, Mr. Mu’s operation has 
developed in conjunction with funds and support from Dr. An Ying, a plant breeder at a major 
agricultural university in southern China, who Mr. Mu met through a contact at a Sichuan 
university. Dr. An breeds non-GMO soybeans for organic farming systems in particular, and for 
different regions and environments across China. The two of them have a mutually beneficial 
relationship in which Dr. An provides soybean seeds, financial backing, and food processing 
equipment, while Mr. Mu provides the land and labor to grow and harvest the soybeans, and to 
turn them into packaged foods to be sold in urban supermarkets. At the same time, Mr. Mu 
provides feedback on which varieties grow best on his small farm and the farms of others who 
produce for the cooperative. Dr. An’s program provided 20,000 RMB ($3,300) to Mr. Mu to 
purchase food processing equipment in 2007. In the near future, they plan to pursue another 
grant to begin processing organic soy milk. 
I first met Mr. Mu and Dr. An on a van ride from the airport in Qiqiha’er in southwest 
Heilongjiang Province to the First International Soybean Industry Expo and Beidahuang 
Soybean Festival in Jiusan (九三), about two hours away.  As we drove through the Heilongjiang 
countryside, I marveled at how much the landscape and the sky reminded me of my hometown in 
Nebraska: Heilongjiang is part of the China’s new maize and soy frontier, brought about by 
policies and investments that have pushed smallholder farmers off the land in favor of large-scale 
monocrop production (Ma & Yan, 2010). On either side of the highway, there were neat rows of 
crops as far as the eye could see. Above was blue sky and puffy clouds, a far cry from the at 
times crippling pollution in Beijing and Chengdu, the two cities where I’d been living. My 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Baidu Baike entry for Chengdu Plain (in Chinese).  
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surprise and fascination at seeing this China opened up conversations with Dr. An about 
agronomy and plant breeding, and soon after, with Mr. Mu about living in Sichuan. I shared with 
Mr. Mu about the challenges I’d had finding villages to visit and small farmers to talk to about 
their production systems. He graciously invited me to his home in East Creek, which I accepted 
enthusiastically just days after returning from the conference. Mr. Mu took me to a commercial 
pig breeding farm near his village, to the homes of his friends and family, and on my third trip 
with Betty, he asked his friend Mr. Xiu to accompany us for a day to conduct interviews in the 
small villages that make up East Creek. With Mr. Xiu we visited 10 households, eight of which 
raised pigs as their primary source of income. My sketch of smallholder farmers is based largely 
on these visits. 
 
Backyard Farms (houyuanshi siyangchang 后院式饲养场) 
 
“Raising pigs is easy. There are no problems other than price.  
Price is the most important thing.” 
                 Mr. Bao, smallholder farmer 
East Creek Village, Sichuan Province, November 2010 
Bao Farm, East Creek Village 
As we approach Mr. Bao’s farm, he’s carrying manure out to the small field next to his 
house in two buckets attached to a pole over his shoulder. Mr. Xiu yells to him to ask if he has 
time to talk with me, an American friend of Mr. Mu who is interested in pig farming. He 
responds favorably, and we continue on to the house where Mr. Bao invites us to sit in the 
courtyard, and offers us oranges as a snack. He has a bushel-sized basket full of oranges, like all 
the houses we’ve been to this day. Mr. Xiu tells us later that the price for oranges is so low at the 
moment, that people are eating as many as they can from their personal orchards, and throwing 
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the rest away. They have no market, and the trees are still laden with fruit. Betty and I both left 
East Creek with a pig feedbag full of oranges.  
As we sit down, a neighbor called Mr. Li arrives to join the conversation. Mr. Bao’s four 
grandchildren are inside the house. The oldest, a six year old boy, is working on math homework 
while the three younger children are playing and eating oranges. Their parents, Mr. Bao’s 
children, are working in Guangdong Province, and only come home once a year at Spring 
Festival. Their earnings, however, arrive back in East Creek more frequently to pay for the 
children’s’ education and contribute to the household. 
 On their half acre (3 mu) farm, Mr. Bao and his wife (who I didn’t meet) produce fruit, 
vegetables, grains, chickens, and pigs. Pigs are their most significant source of agricultural 
income, and they raise about 10 per year. Mr. Bao began breeding his own pigs several years ago 
when he got hybrid boar semen from the local government veterinary station, and used it to 
inseminate his local, indigenous sow. After making this initial cross, he’s continued the practice, 
keeping only one or two sows to hybridize for four to five years. He sells piglets to other farmers 
in the area when they reach 15-17 jin (7.5-8.5 kg), and meat pigs to local dealers when they 
reach about 200 jin (100 kg) around 4 months of age. Pig feed primarily comes from the farm: 
the Baos grow niupicai (no translation), sweet potato vines, squashes, and melons as “juicy” feed 
plants, and grind maize to feed at key times in the production cycle. They purchase some 
additional feed and feed additives from local dealers, but are almost fully self-sufficient. They 
spread manure from pigs and chickens on their crop fields, and use very little purchased 
chemical fertilizer.  
 Mr. Bao and his wife do not produce under contract with integrators, and don’t know of 
anyone in the area who does. I asked how he sells his pigs, and if he ever encounters any 
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problems at the point of sale. He said there are no problems: when you are ready to sell, you just 
call around to the local dealers and sell to whoever is offering the highest price. When the price 
is good, he can make a profit of 300 RMB per head on meat pigs, and slightly more on piglets. 
When the price is bad, he makes only 100 RMB per head or may lose money if the price of 
purchased feed additives are factored in. He said, “Raising pigs is easy. There are no problems 
other than price. Price is the most important thing.” Especially since Reform and Opening, 
commodification of pigs has meant that they are both an important source of farm income, and a 
gamble for smallholders, whose annual incomes fluctuate according to market prices for pigs, 
pork, and feedgrains. 
Farm income is supplemented by remittances from migrant labor in the family. Income is 
not, however, typically supported by the increasing farm subsidy packages that central and 
provincial governments administer. The Baos received sow subsidies in 2008 as part of 
government efforts to reinvigorate pig production after the PRRS epidemic in 2006. For each of 
their two sows, they gave the insurance company 12 RMB. The insurance company then gave 
the Baos 100 RMB per sow, and if they had lost a sow that year, the company would have paid 
out 800 RMB each. This program lasted only one year for smallholders, and was the first and last 
time the Bao family received government support for agricultural production. These are the kind 
of government supports Dr. Zhang told me that his agribusiness friends vehemently oppose. 
The Bao farm is typical of the backyard farms I visited in Sichuan Province during my 
fieldwork, and of smallholder integrated crop-livestock farms in China more broadly. This is the 
form of production that has predominated in China for thousands of years, and historically 
produced the country’s pork. Like the Baos, backyard farmers in general raise fewer than 10 pigs 
per year in addition to crops and other livestock on small plots of land, using locally occurring or 
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produced feedstuffs and centuries of accumulated agricultural knowledge and practice. Pigs are 
valued for their manure as much as for their meat, converting weeds, crop residues, and kitchen 
scraps into nutrient-rich fertilizer for crop fields and orchards. Raising pigs for manure, 
combined with the use of “night soil” (humanure), crop rotations, and nitrogen-fixing legumes,  
enabled production of what was long considered one of the healthiest diets in the world, from 
one of the most enduringly sustainable agricultural systems (Campbell & Campbell, 2006; King, 
1911; Netting, 1993).  
Today, smallholders typically raise indigenous-exotic hybrid pigs. They keep one or two 
local sows as breeding stock, and either purchase hybrid boar semen from other farmers, receive 
semen from the state through breed improvement programs, or hire a boar from neighbors to 
service their sows. 
 
Commercial Farms (daxing shangye yangzhichang 大型商业养殖场) 
Mindi:  “What are the biggest challenges facing your company in the next five years?” 
Ms. Da: “First, land resources. Second, environmental protection and water pollution. Third,  
feed supply. Fourth, human resources. Fifth, disease issues.” 
Mindi:   “And the biggest opportunities?” 
Ms. Da: “The market is very good. And policies too.” 
 
From an interview with the General Manager of Precious Treasure Animal Husbandry Company 
Guangdong Province, June 2010 
 
 I opened the previous section on backyard farms with a quote from Mr. Bao that his only 
problem in pig production is price. Like the other smallholders I interviewed, his concerns center 
on whether or not he can make money from his pigs at the point of sale. In stark contrast, the 
excerpt above from my interview with Ms. Da, the General Manager of a livestock breeding 
farm in Guangdong Province, illustrates the many production challenges that large-scale 
commercial operations face. In addition to these five core issues, managers I interviewed at other 
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commercial enterprises also added food safety standards to the list, and favorable markets and 
government policies were always mentioned as the biggest opportunities.  
It is certainly no coincidence that market price is the greatest challenge for Mr. Bao, 
while it is the greatest opportunity for Ms. Da’s company. It is also no coincidence that pollution, 
feed source, and disease problems plague large-scale operations, while backyard farmers with 
diverse farming systems rarely or never encounter these issues, at least not of their own creation. 
The political economic mechanisms of the meatification project that I discussed in Chapters One 
and Two – namely state support for scaling-up and industrializing pig production, selectively 
liberalizing feed markets, and replacement of indigenous pigs with exotic breeds – condition the 
changing practices and problems that emerge as the swine sector is restructured from the 
backyard to the factory farm. In this section I outline the operation of Ms. Da’s commercial 
operation to demonstrate the metabolic rift as a result of agricultural practices being 
disembedded from agroecological cycles. 
 
Precious Treasure Animal Husbandry Company 
 Dr. Zhang, the swine expert I’d been working with in Sichuan Province, invited me to 
accompany him to Guangzhou in Guangdong Province (southeast) where he would attend a 
national swine breeding meeting with Ministry of Agriculture officials and other scientists. I 
wouldn’t be allowed to go to the meeting myself, but his colleague at a local university would 
arrange for me to visit a nearby commercial farm, and I would also get the chance to attend the 
Guangdong Pig Industry Association’s Annual Swine Expo. I accepted the travel invitation, and 
on the day after our arrival in Guangzhou, Dr. Zhang’s colleague arranged for a driver and a 
graduate student from the local agricultural university to accompany me to Precious Treasure, 
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located in a small city about 60 kilometers from Guangzhou. Ms. Da, the General Manager, had 
agreed to meet me for an interview. She also agreed to let me record our conversation, she 
provided me with company brochures, and she showed me a short film about the operation. My 
sketch in this section is based on these materials. 
Precious Treasure’s history is typical of many agribusiness firms in China. The company 
was founded in 1958 as a state-owned enterprise, and became a private joint-stock company in 
2000. It is a commercial livestock breeding farm with over 200 employees. They currently raise 
120,000 head of Duroc, Landrace, and Large White pigs per year, in addition to one million head 
of exotic breed chicken at the company headquarters. At the time of my interview in 2010, they 
were in the process of building another facility in western Guangdong Province that will produce 
an additional 400,000 pigs annually. Their three major markets are selling breeding stock to 
Chinese farms, exporting breeding stock to Hong Kong and Macau, and selling pork under their 
own retail brand.  
Precious Treasure uses CAFO (confined animal feeding operation housing) production 
technologies, including pig housing, feeding, prophylactic antibiotic use, and manure 
management. In this system, feed is their most significant production cost, as it is at every 
commercial firm I visited. Soy is the main feed component, followed by maize. Ms. Da said that 
eight large-scale soy processing firms in Guangdong crush soy for livestock feed, and about 70 
percent of the beans are imported from the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina. I asked if she viewed 
imports or the foreign ownership of soybean processing as a threat. She said, “In my personal 
view, because China has very limited arable land, we have to import soybeans.” She went on to 
say that profits for domestic soy went down when China began importing more than 10 years 
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before, so farmers now plant maize instead. Because maize prices are high, she predicts that the 
government will start importing it in earnest as well. 
On describing the operation, Ms. Da said, “Our system is drastically different from the 
traditional way in China, we are more like the system in the U.S. now.” She added that while this 
system is superior for high productivity, it comes with challenges, as in the interview excerpt 
above. Environmental problems associated with manure and urine management are among the 
most pressing. Ms. Da told me that the company has a sewage treatment plant, a fermentation 
pond built with the help of government subsidies, and a biogas generator. Additionally, 
surrounding crop farms use some of their manure as fertilizer, and some of their urine in 
irrigation water, but output is so much that there is not enough local land to absorb it. They also 
dry manure in the sun so that it meets discharge requirements. I wasn’t clear about the meaning 
of this last point, and whether Ms. Da meant that they could dump dried manure onto land or into 
waterways without concern for violating regulations. Whatever the case, managing manure is a 
significant part of the company’s operation. 
I was not allowed to see the pigs at Precious Treasure. In fact I was never allowed to see 
any pig at any commercial farm I visited in China, other than viewing them on closed circuit 
television in conference rooms. Because industrial swine are genetically near identical, if a 
disease causing organism finds its way into their closed production environment, it can easily 
wipe out the entire herd. This reluctance to allow outsiders entrée into pig barns is not unique to 
China. When I toured CAFOs in Iowa in 1999 and 2002 as part of agroecology field school, 
most farms similarly denied access, and those that did allow us a peek inside required that we 
either wrap our shoes in plastic, or wear full body suits inside the building.  
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China’s Metabolic Rift 
Scaling up and industrializing hog production is a steady progression of disembedding 
agricultural practices from agroecological cycles. As Harriet Friedmann argues, this is a central 
paradox in what she calls human “food getting” (2000). In the process of agricultural production, 
humans inevitably alter “webs of living cycles and material cycles of air, water and soil,” but 
many production practices especially since the 16th century, “have flowed from the illusion of 
transcendence over these webs and flows” (p. 481). CAFO production operates on this illusion, 
deepening the metabolic rift. 
The environmental problems associated with CAFOs in China are the problems 
associated with CAFOs everywhere (Imhoff, 2010). Put another way, the crises of industrial hog 
production in China are its crises in general, and are conditioned by the disembedding of practice 
from agroecological webs and cycles. Chinese commercial producers use the same technologies, 
resources, and logics as those in the U.S. and elsewhere, and the managers I interviewed all 
discussed the U.S. model as a form of agriculture that China should emulate. While the business 
of industrial production in China includes unique challenges for securing land use rights, and 
unique opportunities for taking advantage of focused government support programs, the practice 
of CAFO production is a shared process among industrial operations worldwide. 
Still, China’s meatification project, of which CAFO production is its technical arm, has 
particular characteristics. First, the shift is a profound departure from centuries of smallholder 
agroecosystem reproduction with pigs at the center. Restructuring and industrialization not only 
create ruptures in nutrient cycling and more general deterioration of ecological sustainability, 
they also transform cultural meanings and values. Second, the scale of production, the scale of 
feed inputs and toxic outputs, and the scale of rifts and disembedding in China’s system are 
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unprecedented. Discussing scale is not the same as equating ecological crises to population size, 
or to demonizing China for following a model used internationally. But taking a planetary view 
that considers these processes and crises at a global scale, China’s world-leading soy imports, pig 
production, and pollution cannot be dismissed as rights to development, understood in a as a uni-
dimensional path that countries inevitably follow in the process of modernization. How the 
government, agribusiness firms, and farmers in China resolve the problems of CAFO production 
– or not – will have impacts around the world, and domestically. This section details what is 
already taking place. 
 
Feeding: From “poor method” to “rich method”  
There are a number of changes in agricultural practices, resources, and meanings that 
accompany the industrialization of pig farming and the enactment of the meatification project. 
Changes in feeding practice and materials, however, are at the very heart of the transformation, 
and are in fact the logic that animates it. Both scaled-up “pig barns” on specialized household 
farms and large-scale commercial “factory farms” are forms of Concentrated Animal Feeding 
Operations, or CAFO’s. These systems concentrate animals in enclosed structures, such that all 
feed (or the vast majority in the case of smaller-scale specialized household farms) must be 
provided for the animals inside. More importantly, the logic of these systems is that they 
overcome land-based limitations on meat production by spatially separating animal raising from 
feed production. Raising more animals on less proximate land equates to substituting feed crops 
grown alongside livestock with purchased feedgrains and oilseeds shipped to the farm from other 
more distant locations.  
In simplest terms, CAFOs replace the “poor method” of pig raising with the “rich 
method.” In their well-known book from 1987, Feeding a Billion: Frontiers of Chinese 
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Agriculture, Sylvan Wittwer, Yu Youtai, Sun Han, and Wang Lianzheng describe differences 
between the two forms. The “poor method,” used by smallholder farmers throughout China’s 
more than 7,000 years of agricultural history, is based on raising pigs as part of integrated crop 
and livestock systems that rely on local resources, labor, and knowledges. This method 
recognizes that pigs are omnivorous creatures that will eat both plant and animal materials of all 
kinds, and that in doing so, they produce nutrient rich fertilizer for crop production. The authors 
outline the this system as follows: 
The “poor method” can be summarized in five words: “reserving,” “planting,” 
“collecting,” “storing,” and “processing. 
“Reserving” means to reserve or save certain amounts of grains and legumes (beans) for 
fine feedstuffs. 
“Planting” means to plant green and juicy feed plants, especially for pigs. Green feeds are 
numerous and vary with different locations in China. They include many aquatic plants, 
leafy plants such as the sweet potato, green manure plants, and green cut soy beans and 
corn plants. The juicy feeds include many kinds of root and tuber plants such as the sweet 
potato, different types of squashes and melons, and various waste and cull fruits, melons 
and squash. 
“Collecting” means to collect various kinds of herbs, terrestrial or land weeds, aquatic 
weeds, trees leaves and fruits. 
“Storing” means to ensile and to use fermented and dry feeds for winter and spring time. 
“Processing” means to use for pig feed the byproducts of processing agricultural products 
such as in grain processing, oil pressing and starch manufacturing; sugar plant residues 
and byproducts; and winery and bean curd by-products. All of the above are important 
sources of feedstuffs in China (p. 320). 
 
The authors call this the “poor method,” presumably because it relies on feed resources from the 
farm, rather than those purchased from a market. In this system, especially before pork became a 
commodity with Reform and Opening, farmers value pigs most for their manure production as 
fertilizer (Schmalzer, 2002). 
In East Creek, the backyard farmers I met used all of the “poor method” practices in pig 
raising. They reserved maize and beans, planted green and juicy plants such as niupicai and 
sweet potatoes, collected fruit tree leaves and spent fruits, stored maize, and used by-products for 
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feed. In these small, but highly diverse agroecosystems, farmers use intercropping, composting, 
green manuring, and legumes, all scientifically recognized methods of sustaining soil fertility, 
diversity, and resilience (Olson & Francis, 1995). From identifying crops that I could recognize 
in their fields, and from talking to farmers about their production systems, I counted 21 crops in 
production on the 11 farms that I visited on my third trip to East Creek. Given that farmers plant 
vegetables extensively according to season, manage fruit trees and bushes throughout the year, 
and vary juicy feeds for livestock, my cursory crop inventory is an underestimate. My point is 
that these are diverse systems in which crop and livestock integration are key to managing 
agroecosystems in ways that enhance soil health, while producing a varied plant-based diet. 
On the other extreme, CAFO production is the ultimate expression of the “rich method” 
of pig raising, as it relies entirely on “fine or rich feedstuffs (grains) and thus neglecting cost 
considerations” (Wittwer et al., 1987, p. 319). Commercial pig farms use commercial pig feed 
exclusively; from farrow to finish, pigs in these system eat only processed feedstuffs from the 
market and/or from vertical integration arrangements. Depending on size and availability of 
capital, specialized household farms may use commercial feeds exclusively, or in combination 
with their own self-produced feeds. For those farms that produce under contract with firms, 
feeding is typically part of their agreement, with the firm either supplying feed to the farmer at a 
set price, or mandating the kind and brand of feed that farmers must use. All of the eight 
commercial pig farms I visited had these kinds of feeding stipulations in their contracts.  
As I detailed in Chapter Two, feeding China’s CAFO pigs is only made possible by 
importing massive amounts of soy, and increasingly maize, from monocropped fields in North 
and South America. The ecological and climate implications of industrial crop production and 
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the long-distance grain trade are well-rehearsed, and I will not reproduce them here18. Rather, my 
point is that the scale of China’s feed imports is expressed in a global scale metabolic rift, with 
declining soil fertility in the global locations where farmers grow crops to feed China’s pigs, 
coupled with excess nutrients inside China where those pigs eat and defecate. The millions of 
tons of soy and maize (both imported and domestically produced) being pumped through CAFO 
pigs creates millions of tons of modern pork and billions of tons of manure. While the 
corporations and farmers who produce industrial livestock feed douse their land with nitrogen 
fertilizer to overcome the limitations of soils that are either inappropriate for producing annual 
crops (like the oxisols in South America’s newly cleared forests), or degraded from decades of 
industrial practices (as in parts of the United States), manure from industrial hogs (and chickens) 
has become China’s number one source of water pollution.  
 
Manure: From Resource to Waste to Toxic Nightmare 
 When the pig is a commodity, its highest value comes in the form of the pork it produces, 
as expressed in price. The state and private firms that control its production, distribution, and sale 
benefit most directly from this form of value, while for smallholder farmers “there are no 
problems other than price” (Mr. Bao, 2010). Replacing the manure value of pigs with the price 
value of pork ruptures agroecological cycles, as manure shifts from being a valuable resource to 
a toxic waste. The dangerous condition of China’s waterways is the clearest evidence of this rift. 
 In February of 2010, the Chinese government released results of the first ever national 
pollution census19（zhongguo wuran yuan pucha 全国污染源普查). The most startling finding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  See	  for	  example,	  the	  FAO’s	  (2006)	  well-­‐known	  report,	  Livestock’s	  Long	  Shadow:	  Environmental	  Issues	  and	  
Options.	  
19 China Pollution Source Census (in Chinese), http://cpsc.mep.gov.cn/gwgg/ (accessed June 1, 2010). 	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of this nearly 3-year, 737 million RMB ($110 million) investigation was that agriculture is today 
a bigger source of water pollution in China than industry. Researchers found that farming was 
responsible for 44% of chemical oxygen demand (C.O.D. is the main measure of organic 
compounds in water), 67% of phosphorus discharges, and 57% of nitrogen discharges into 
bodies of water. The Ministry of Agriculture immediately recognized that these findings were the 
direct result of the shift to intensive farming methods over the past 30 years. The Ministry’s 
Wang Yangliang said,  
Fertilizers and pesticides have played an important role in enhancing productivity but in 
certain areas improper use has had a grave impact on the environment. The fast 
development of livestock breeding and aquaculture has produced a lot of food but they 
are also major sources of pollution in our lives (Watts, 2010). 
 
Fertilizer and pesticide-containing runoff from crop fields (vegetables, grains, oilseeds, 
cotton, etc.) is an important source of this water pollution. Greenpeace estimates that China uses 
35 percent of the world’s fertilizer, and pesticide use is increasing every year.  In 2006, Chinese 
farmers used 1.2 million tons of pesticide on approximately 300 million hectares of farmland and 
forest. As a result of increased fertilizer and pesticide application, at least seven percent of arable 
land is polluted from improper use, in addition to significantly increased water pollution levels 
throughout the country (Yang, 2007).  
Manure, the very resource that used to fertilize Chinese farmers’ fields, is an even more 
important source of pollution.  Experts warn that the massive increase of animal waste from the 
livestock industry is the main source of water pollution in China today.  According to Ministry of 
Agriculture statistics, in 2000, China’s livestock produced 3.8 billion tons of manure, and by 
2008, the figure was 4.8 billion tons (Zhu, 2010).  The sheer volume of manure shifts it from 
being an important resource, to a waste management problem with severe ecological 
consequences. Such massive amounts of manure contribute to nutrient overload on land and in 
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waterways, which is particularly evident in the rapidly increasing incidence of blue-green algae 
outbreaks in China’s lakes and streams. Eutrophication results when industrial livestock farms, 
which generally lack effective water treatment methods to deal with the rivers of manure coming 
out of them, deposit excessive amounts of phosphorus and nitrogen in nearby bodies of water 
(Zhu, 2010). The problem is exacerbated when inland water flows to coastal areas. As a direct 
result of runoff containing excess nutrients from fertilizers and manure carried by the Changjiang 
(Yangtze) and Huanghe (Yellow) Rivers, a dead zone has developed in the East China Sea, with 
serious consequences for ecosystem functioning (Diaz & Rosenberg, 2008).  
Because the government has failed to institute regulations to strictly manage manure 
runoff (technological problems that in and of themselves do not solve the problem), industrial 
pig operations are not being forced to internalize the environmental costs of production and 
manure treatment. Instead, they are operating in a way that challenges social reproduction for 
rural populations and smallholder farmers in particular. First, the contamination of China’s 
waterways by industrial manure exacerbates water challenges in the countryside, where at least 
300 million people are already without access to safe water (Xie, 2009). This is a problem for 
household water needs, which for smallholder farmers, includes the need for non-toxic water to 
grow crops and raise livestock. Second, and related, polluted water contributes to the already 
shrinking land base for agricultural production in China. When water is rendered unusable, 
people can no longer “live on the land,” and are further compelled to move to the city.  
Water pollution from industrial manure is results from and deepens the metabolic rift in 
both its material and epistemic forms. Disembedded and non-adaptive agricultural practices lead 
to nutrient overload in water, pushing people from the land and alienating human interactions 
with nature.  Perversely, this separation is equated with progress, and although backyard farmers 
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practice a form and scale of agriculture that is more agroecologically sound, they are cast as 
enemies of development, and throwbacks to a backwards and shameful past. This association of 
people with the soil (tu 土) is an insult that further contributes to the urbanization drive (see 
Chapter Four). It also reflect the epistemic rift in human-nature relations. 
  
Epistemic Rift  
When I visited smallholder farms in Sichuan and elsewhere, I marveled at how the 
production systems and practices I observed were living examples of principles I studied in 
Agroecology courses during my Agronomy master’s degree program, and in many ways, 
operational models of what the organic farmers I worked for in Nebraska were striving to 
achieve. I shared these insights with Ms. Fang, a smallholder farmer I stayed with for a week in 
Hebei Province in 2010. As we were walking back to her home in Big Mountain Village after 
buying vegetables at an open market in the neighboring village about five kilometers away, I told 
her I thought her way of farming was the best way to farm. She laughed, and insisted that she 
was just a “backwards peasant” who didn’t know anything about anything. She had a very low 
level of education, after all, and was a farmer because she was poor, and was poor because she 
was a farmer. I argued with her that she knew as much about farming as the people who wrote 
the text books I studied in school, and that farmers like her should be paid much more for 
growing the food that feeds us. She smiled, shook her head back and forth, and laughed again, 
dismissively. 
 I had similar conversations with smallholder farmers in East Creek Village, with the same 
reaction. My ideas of sustainability and value seemed to fly in the face of dominant discourses in 
China that define “peasants” (nongmin 农民) as “low quality” country bumpkins with nothing to 
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contribute to a modern China (see Chapter Four). I knew that this was the prevailing sentiment 
from interviewing people in agribusiness, university research, and government, but these 
conversations with smallholders seemed to indicate that many farmers themselves internalized 
the discourse as part of their sense of identity. Yan Hairong (2008) argues that this is the result of 
both the cultural and material construction of rural places and rural people as backwards (luohou 
落后). In the first sense, discursive representations of backwardness come from television and 
other media, and through interactions with mostly young return migrant laborers who come back 
to the countryside with new “urban sensibilities.” Materially, the lack of financial and policy 
support for farm households and rural areas, combined with the withdrawal of the state from 
social supports, creates a countryside characterized by low income, low education, lacking health 
care services, and lack of opportunities.  
 In these exchanges, I was very aware of my social position as a graduate-educated 
researcher from a place where my life chances were significantly higher in terms of education, 
income, and opportunities. Did this position, combined with my study of agroecology, mean that 
I was romanticizing peasant production? I’ve been criticized for this when talking about my 
work with friends, colleagues, and other researchers. The standard line of critique is first that I 
can only discuss smallholder farms as sustainable because I don’t have to be a smallholder 
farmer myself. They’re lives are terrible, they have no money, and they don’t want to be in the 
countryside. Second, I’m typically asked, rather condescendingly, what I’m willing to give up in 
my quest to transform the world into smallholder farming, since clearly, smallholders can’t 
produce everything I want or need, or in the quantities that I want and need them.  
It is crucially important for a researcher to constantly check in with how her own position 
vis-à-vis the people she encounters in the process of research shapes her perceptions and 
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understandings. My point in writing about and working on issues surrounding smallholder 
farmers and small-scale production is not advocate “keeping people poor,” as I’ve been accused 
of, or confining the world to a constant state of want. It is, however, about taking to heart the 
idea that smallholder farmers have the knowledge and practices that provide the best opportunity 
for producing food in ways that repair the metabolic rift (Clausen, 2007; Wittman, 2009), and 
actively address environmental and climate crises (Altieri, 2008; ETC, 2009; Lin et al., 2011). 
I’ve come to see these critiques, and the economic ideologies and/or scholarship that underlie 
them, as an expression of the epistemic rift that arises from the metabolic rift.  
As our food getting (Friedmann, 2000) increasingly occurs under the illusion that we 
have transcended agroecological webs and cycles, social thought has also attempted to disembed 
from natural or biological bases. This is the episteme at play when people argue that 
smallholders can’t feed the world; they can’t conceive of the fact that smallholders already do, in 
fact, feed the world, or that feeding humanity necessarily takes place inside of agroecological 
cycles. It is also the form of knowledge that animates the Chinese state’s focus on continually 
increasing pork production by further scaling up production, “going out” for feed, following a 
“pollute now, clean up later” (Day, 2005) approach to the socio-environmental impacts of the 
meatification project. Reembedding agricultural practice in agroecosystems, as Rebecca Clausen 
argues has happened in Cuba, offers the best opportunity to repair the metabolic rift. At the same 
time, agroecological management will reveal how much meat is feasible. It will not, however, 
solve distribution issues, which is a much larger political question (Lappé, 1971). 
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Conclusion 
By way of conclusion, I want to argue that classifications of Chinese pigs farms that are 
based on either annual production numbers or whether or not pig raising is the farmers’ primary 
professional activity do not capture the character or the trajectory of the swine sector. In addition 
to considering the organization of the household, farms should also be classified metabolically, 
taking into account feed sources, manure management, and agricultural practice. For example, 
while large-scale commercial farms are considered paragons of efficiency for practices that 
quickly convert feed into meat, they are also the operations most responsible for ruptured 
nutrient cycles and associated environmental and social harm, especially when feed is off-shored, 
as in China’s case. What’s more, the industrial practices of the CAFO are defined as efficient in 
part because they are rationalized, specialized, and standardized to be carried out as general 
practices in any given global location or environment. The very logic and structure of the CAFO, 
therefore, makes these systems incapable of responding to the dynamics of particular and shifting 
agroecosystems, which as Behnke and Scoones (1993) argue, is vital for sustainably managing 
inherent ecological imbalances. On the other end of the spectrum, a metabolic classification 
brings to light the sustainability of small-scale farming based on locally-available and -produced 
resources, practices that are embedded in agroecological webs and cycles, and levels of 
production that are commensurate with local conditions.  
With a range of farm organization and practices in between these two types, this broader 
classification not only reveals the varieties of the metabolic rift, it also defines the limits to 
increasing meat consumption: in order not to destroy the biological base within which social 
reproduction takes place, and in order not to deprive already vulnerable populations of basic food 
getting for the sake of middle and upper class meatification, humans can only eat as much meat 
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as can be produced in a way that responds to ecological shifts and complexity without rupturing 
nutrient cycles and creating inexorable imbalances. A “metabolic” farm classification is a step in 
the direction of defining those limits, and highlights the ways in which locally-embedded and 
ecologically responsive practices of smallholder farmers are valuable for “rethinking 
development” along lines that unify social and natural worlds.     
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Chapter 4 
 
NONGMIN DISCOURSES  
 
CONSTRUCTING a PROBLEM for  
INDUSTRIAL AGRICULTURE to SOLVE 
 
_____________ 
 
 
“China is the land par excellence of smallholder  
intensive cultivators. No other society on earth has the 
 same unbroken history of a dense rural population  
practicing permanent, sustainable agriculture in the 
 context of a great and enduring civilization.” 
Robert McC. Netting (1993, p. 232) 
 
 
“农民 nongmin: peasant, farmer, rural folk generally.” 
Definition of “nongmin” from Kieran Broadbent’s (1978) 
A Chinese/English Dictionary of China’s Rural Economy  
 
 
Nongmin and Development 
Small-scale agroecological farming is the best hope for repairing the metabolic rift and 
avoiding long-term food and environmental crises. Research increasingly demonstrates 
smallholding to be a highly productive and resilient form of agriculture that is not only a solution 
to hunger and malnutrition in the poorest regions of the world, but also contains the best chance 
for reversing agricultural pollution, reducing agriculture-related greenhouse gas emissions, and 
mitigating the effects of climate change (Altieri, 2008; DeSchutter, 2011; Holt-Giménez, 2002; 
Pretty, 2007; Rosset, et al. 2011; Lin et al., 2011). At local levels, this means re-embedding 
agricultural practices in agroecological cycles and relying on local resources and knowledges for 
food production; in national context, it means recasting agricultural development in ways that 
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recognize and enhance agroecological systems and limits, rather than trying to overcome them 
using industrial notions of efficiency, as in the CAFO model of pork production.  
In China, where industrial agriculture is wreaking havoc on the country’s water and soil 
quality, and where roughly half of the population resides in smallholder farming communities, 
efforts to support small-scale agroecological farming would seem a logical development 
objective. As Robert McC. Netting (1993) argues in the quote above, “China is the land par 
excellence of smallholder intensive cultivators” and “[n]o other society on earth has the same 
unbroken history of a dense rural population practicing permanent, sustainable agriculture in the 
context of a great and enduring civilization” (p. 232). But rather than benefitting from the 
knowledges and practices that smallholders have accumulated over centuries for achieving high 
agricultural production without deteriorating local resources, political and economic elites in the 
reform era propose a development trajectory that instead aims to eliminate smallholding as a 
social form. Decreasing the rural population through labor migration, and industrializing 
agriculture through support for agribusiness firms and vertical integration are the mechanisms 
and the raison d'etre of the contemporary agricultural development model (see Chapter Five).  
Certainly this industrial fixation is not unique to China, nor is the idea that agricultural 
modernity means replacing smallholder farming with large-scale commercial agriculture. The 
political economic mechanisms of these transformations are captured by David Harvey’s (2003) 
concept of accumulation by dispossession (McMichael, 2006), and are debated in scholarship on 
the agrarian question as global processes (see for example Akram-Lodhi & Kay, 2009), and in 
China in particular (LeMons Walker, 2006, 2008; So, 2007). But in addition to conceptions of 
these material mechanisms that describe the reproduction of capitalism, there are also discursive 
constructions that coproduce them. The ways in which elites define peasants in policy and 
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practice, in other words, influences how and why smallholders leave farming for industrial 
employment. In this chapter, my intention is to analyze how the process of defining smallholder 
farming is a political act in and of itself that directly relates to the framing and practice of 
agricultural development, and consequently, to opportunities for repairing – or deepening – the 
metabolic rift. 
My argument is that in order for the state to propose industrial agriculture as China’s 
food security and development solution, smallholder farmers need to be cast as the problem. At 
the same time, political and popular discourses of the constitution and meaning of smallholder 
farmers is directly related to the material conditions of their reproduction. More specifically, the 
word nongmin in China, which signifies both farmer and peasant, is associated with ignorance 
and backwardness, and is considered a traditional social form that should be abandoned as 
quickly as possible. This discursive construction, and others that similarly employ nongmin as an 
unsavory backdrop against which to gauge progress, is expressed in policies that serve to 
eliminate, dispossess, or integrate smallholder farmers vis-à-vis industrial agriculture. In this way, 
nongmin discourses underlie political economic restructuring, and at the same time, new 
capitalist logics reproduce those discourses, making them seem “true.” In other words, 
smallholder farming is not supported in the current model, and smallholder farmers have most 
acutely felt the withdrawal of state support for social services such as health care and education. 
The idea that farmers are “backwards” is a cultural and historical construction, but the reality that 
farmers lack basic supports is a material certainty. 
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The following excerpts from the Baidu Baike20 entry for “nongmin” illustrate some of the 
most pervasive discourses in China on rural and agricultural livelihoods and people, and reveal 
the term’s discursive importance: 
In China, the evolution from “peasants to farmers” (nongmin to professional farmers) is 
far from complete. The existence of a large number of farmer-identified people, more 
than the fact of China’s large population of people actually working in the farm fields, 
deeply reflects our country’s current state of underdevelopment. Or, more precisely, if 
the latter fact signifies that industry is underdeveloped, then the former means that 
society is underdeveloped. The proportion of people identified as “nongmin” far exceeds 
the proportion of people actually engaged in agricultural business, clearly illustrating 
that China’s social development has lagged behind industrial development21. 
 
Whether in research or in the context of everyday life, when people discuss “farmers” 
(nongmin) what comes to mind is not just a type of occupation, but also a social rank, an 
identity or quasi-identity, a mode of survival, a community and social organization, a 
cultural mode, and a psychological structure22. 
 
There is an idea here that what defines a peasant (farmer) and who is included in the category is 
contested, but that whoever the peasants are, they are members of a low-status, low-value, pre-
modern group, and their existence symbolizes a state of underdevelopment and backwardness in 
Chinese society. The language in these entries also demonstrates that a central goal of 
contemporary agricultural development is to eliminate non-market economies and move peasants 
from the fields to the factories. Building on my argument in Chapter Three, this separation of 
people from agriculture – both materially and epistemically – is an expression of the metabolic 
rift that animates the meatification project, and China’s development trajectory more broadly.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Baidu	  Baike	  is	  China’s	  largest	  online	  encyclopedia.	  	  21	  From	  Baidu	  Baike	  (in	  Chinese).	  The	  English	  translation	  above	  is	  my	  own,	  from	  the	  original	  text:	  “从农民到
农业者”的演进在我国远未完成，我国存在着大量的农民身份者，这一事实比我国有大量人口实际上在田间
劳作一事更深刻地体现了我国目前的不发达状态。或者更确切地说，如果后一事实意味着产业上的不发达
，那么前一事实则意味着社会的不发达。而身份性“农民”比重之庞大远远超过实际务农者的比重，则说明
我国社会的发展已经明显滞后于产业的发展。 22	  From	  Baidu	  Baike	  (in	  Chinese).	  The	  English	  translation	  above	  is	  my	  own,	  from	  the	  original	  text:	  无论在研究
中还是在日常生活的语境中，人们谈到“农民”时想到的都并不仅仅是一种职业，而且也是一种社会等级,
一种身份或准身份,一种生存状态,一种社区乃至社会的组织方式,一种文化模式乃至心理结构。 
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In addition to illustrating common constructions and meanings of nongmin (peasants or 
farmers), the above statements also suggest the social and political context within which policy 
to regulate rural people and rural practice is made. Put another way, nongmin constructions are 
part of the dominant political discourses of development in China today.  
In order to better understand the ways in which nongmin is framed in popular and 
political discourse, and how these constructions relate to policies that for industrializing 
agriculture and rural livelihoods, I conducted a critical discourse analysis, which is the 
centerpiece of this chapter. Before detailing the methods and results of that study, in the next 
section I provide a brief overview of the occurrence and use of the word nongmin in China since 
the 20th century. The historical context within which nongmin emerged as a concept, and through 
which it has been reproduced as a multi-layered category, is crucial to capturing its significance 
in the present moment. 
 
A Brief History of Nongmin  
Popular imaginations have it that China’s long history is filled with peasants, and defined 
importantly by intermittent peasant revolution. Despite these fantasies, nongmin, the word used 
to denote peasants in Mandarin Chinese, is relatively new. Myron Cohen (1993) sites nongmin’s 
first appearance in written and spoken Chinese in the early 20th century when Meiji-era Japanese 
modernizers translated literary works from the West into Mandarin. Before this time, terms were 
for rural and agricultural identities and relations had no feudal referent23.  
The emergence of nongmin in China paralleled the shift from “farmer” to “peasant” in the 
English language work of authors writing about China from outside the country. Charles Hayford 
(1998) traces this shift, arguing that before the 1920s, both foreign Orientalists (who maintained 
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that China didn’t need the West) and foreign Progressives (who wanted reform in China) used 
“farmer” to describe rural populations. After 1920, “peasant” was more commonly used, and by 
the 1940s, it was the predominant way to describe and construct the countryside.  
In this context, nongmin emerged in Mandarin Chinese as a social construction with the 
purpose of defining and politicizing not only farmers and rural people, but also China as a whole. 
Cohen argues that Chinese intellectual elites in the early 20th century used nongmin as part of a 
larger cultural project to redefine a new and modern China in relation to an old, traditional, and 
unpleasant one. Similarly, Hayford argues that nongmin became the “man with the hoe” (1998, 
p. 161) as part of a political project to construct China as “feudal,” such that revolution would 
become essential to cure this “structural malady” (p. 161). Kathy Le Mons Walker (1999) echoes 
these ideas, arguing that essentialized images of “unchanging, immutable, and prepolitical” (p. 4) 
peasants in the Yangtze delta in the late 19th and early 20th century set the scene for instituting 
Western-based constructions of modernity that did not have a place for peasants. In these ways, 
intellectual elites used the “solution” to frame the “problem,” with nongmin signifying 
backwardness as part of broader efforts to shape the future trajectory of the country. Nongmin, in 
other words, constituted an important piece of the traditional backdrop against which a modern 
China could emerge. This relationship continued throughout the 20th century, and into the present 
day. 
From its beginning as a social category, the idea that nongmin meant “backwards” and 
“ignorant” unified the various ways in which it was used. This was true even when the “peasant” 
was a literary hero or the object of sympathetic political campaigners (Han, 2005). In the 1920s, 
when nongmin were the subject of political and academic works, the term expressed the 
character of a villager as “victim and perpetrator of ignorance and darkness” and as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 These words included nongfu, nongding, nongjia, nongren, zhuanghu, and zhuangjiahan. 
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“superstitious, ignorant, and inert” (Hayford, 1990, p. 113). By the 1930s, nongmin stood for a 
pitiable and powerless victim of oppression. For all but a handful of Chinese anthropologists and 
sociologists writing at the time, nongmin meant,  
a culturally distinct and alien ‘other,’ passive, helpless, unenlightened, in the grip of ugly 
and fundamentally useless customs, desperately in need of education and cultural reform, 
and for such improvements in their circumstances totally dependent on the leadership and 
efforts of rational and informed outsiders (Cohen, 1993, p. 154).  
 
Xiaorong Han (2005) details cultural, political, and academic representations of nongmin during 
the pre-PRC 1930s as variously “the ignorant,” “the innocent,” “the poor,” and “the powerful.” 
Cohen argues that Mao Zedong and other mid-century communist intellectuals reproduced many 
of these sentiments, believing that cultural destruction of the peasantry was the only way to bring 
out its liberation, and therefore, the revolutionary force of history.  
 In the post-Mao era, nongmin became a taken-for-granted term, still associated with 
backwardness, but perhaps with even more negative connotation as the failed “class” in Mao’s 
revolution. At the time of Cohen’s writing on The Case of the Chinese ‘Peasant’ in 1993, he 
proposed that the Chinese peasant had two functions. First, the term was an administrative unit 
associated with growing rural-urban differentiation and used to define agricultural households. 
This function is related to hukou, the household registration system in China, to which I will 
return below. Second, nongmin was a distinct cultural category that government officials, 
intellectuals, and the general population reproduced as a backwards group, quite unfit for 
political participation; it was a mechanism of othering (Cohen, 1993). These understandings of 
nongmin continue to be relevant today, and the use and meaning of nongmin in the current 
century still very much reflects its legacy in the last, particularly as a signifier of backwards 
people, places, relations, and even states of development. 
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In addition to its use in legally differentiating rural and agricultural households as part of 
the hukou system (Zeuthen & Griffiths, 2011), nongmin, in many of its categorical 
manifestations, is about expressing a lack of suzhi (素质), or quality. Tamara Jacka (2006, 2009) 
has written extensively on suzhi discourses as they relate to and define nongmin – and 
particularly rural women – as low-quality, ignorant, and backwards (see also Kipnis, 2006; 
Murphy, 2004; Yan, 2008). Taken together, these various categories, meanings, and uses of 
nongmin indicate that as much as a historical category for analyzing capital-labor relations, or as 
a farm-size classification24, it is a social construction enacted in service of othering, denigrating, 
and expressing underdevelopment. Nongmin constructions, especially in relation to suzhi 
discourse, are powerful. Tamara Jacka and Hairong Yan (2008) find that ideological forces, 
articulated in discourses of low-quality and backwardness, play important and reinforcing roles 
in the perpetuation of material conditions of poverty in rural areas, they do so by shaping 
individual beliefs, preferences and choices, and through policy. My analysis in the next section 
reveals that these discourses animate China’s rural and agricultural development policy, and as 
I’ll return to in Chapter Five, the agricultural development model. 
 
Nongmin Discourse Analysis: Methods 
 In order to understand the major nongmin discourses in China today, and how those 
discourses are expressed in policy, I conducted a critical discourse analysis following van Dijk 
(2003). This approach allows for a study of the way social power, dominance and inequality are 
enacted, reproduced, and resisted through text and talk in social and political contexts. Because 
the present study is concerned primarily with policy and political discourse, the discourse 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 For uses of peasant in these typical analytical categorizations, see for example Akram-Lodhi & Kay (2009), 
Bernstein (2010), Bramall & Jones (2000), So (2007), and Zhang & Donaldson (2010). 
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producers of interest are politicians and representatives in government bodies. I conducted the 
analysis in four stages. 
First, I identified recurring and dominant discourses about nongmin by reading policy 
documents, speeches, and statements from officials in the central government, including the 
Ministry of Agriculture25. I coded these texts by looking for language, words, and ideas that were 
common across the documents (Adler and Clark, 2003). I then collected similarly labeled 
passages into categories, and consolidated, organized, and distilled them into the six discourses 
identified in the next section. Throughout the process of coding, I focused only on those passages 
that related directly to smallholder farmers and rural and agricultural livelihoods26.  
After identifying the main nongmin discourses, I studied their appearance in political 
documents and media. I searched Baidu (白度, the number one search engine in China) for the 
occurrence of the six main discourses in major Chinese online newspapers27. I also searched 
Baidu Baike (白度百科), the country’s leading online encyclopedia28, for words and concepts 
related to the discourses. Because Baidu Baike’s more than 3.5 million articles are built by 
registered users, and are heavily censored to be in line with government regulations (Woo, 
2007), they provide highly relevant insight into the reproduction of discourses in widely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 I used the following documents to identify the main discourses: texts from the Ministry of Agriculture website, 
central policy documents (11th Five Year Plan, 12th Five Year Plan, the Outline for Development-Oriented Poverty 
Reduction in China’s Rural Areas, 2011-2020, and the Provisional Measures for Administration of Identification of 
National Leading Enterprises of Agricultural Industrialization and their Operation Monitoring), statements and 
speeches from Ministry of Agriculture and central government officials found online, and Baidu Baike entries. 
26 Other prominent discourses deal with scientific development, creating a harmonious society, sharing common 
prosperity, ensuring food security, promoting ecological and safe agriculture. All of these discourses arguably 
impact rural and agricultural development policies, however, in order to produce a more focused analysis, I included 
only those discourses with the most direct relevance to understanding constructions of nongmin. 
27 There are over 2,200 newspapers in China today (http://www.kidon.com/media-link/cn.php). I limited my search 
to Xinhua News, the official press agency of the central government and the largest news agency in China. 
28 Baidu Baike is the second largest internet encyclopedia in the world, after the English language version of 
Wikipedia (Woo, 2007). 
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accessible Chinese media. I also consulted interview transcripts and notes from my fieldwork, as 
well as discourse analysis research conducted by other scholars. 
The next step was to locate the six discourses in actual policy. I read central policy texts - 
including official documents, white papers, speeches, and regulations – and analyzed the use of 
the discourses in policy directives. The materials I selected for analysis follow Kevin O’Brien 
and Lianjiang Li’s (2006) conception of central policy, which they argue, must be understood in 
its broad, Chinese sense. They state that central policies “include essentially all authoritative 
pronouncements, ranging from Party documents, laws, State Council regulations, and leadership 
speeches to editorials by special commentators in prominent newspapers” (p. 5). The authors go 
on to say that central policies can be both general guidelines and/or specific regulations.  
Finally, I analyzed how the discourses work together to form a coherent “master 
discourse” that effectively communicates central government and Ministry of Agriculture 
definitions, plans, and goals for regulating and structuring the roles for smallholder farmers and 
rural livelihoods in the management of modernization and development. The next section 
explores each of the six discourses in turn. 
 
Nongmin Discourse Analysis: Results 
My analysis revealed three main and three supporting nongmin discourses. The main 
discourses are: (1) “Peasants are Low Quality,” (2) “Relieve the Peasants’ Burden!” and (3) 
“Peasants are Surplus Labor”. Sub-discourses that relate to and support the main discourses are: 
(1b) “The Countryside is Backwards, Traditional, and Ugly,” (2b) “Peasants are Passive” and (3b) 
“Peasants are Rural Consumers.” Individually, each discourse shapes and is enacted in specific 
policies and regulations. When combined, the discourses outline a particular model of 
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development, with explicit goals, methods, and outcomes. I summarized the “master discourse” 
from my analysis as follows:  
In the post-reform era, and particularly in the context of increasing inequalities between 
people in urban areas and the countryside, China’s so-called “three rural problems” 
(sannong wenti 三农问题) of agriculture, farmers, and rural areas are best solved using a 
model that integrates urban and rural development (xietong fazhan 协调发展 ). Measures 
that link industry and agriculture; that equalize land rights, financing, services, 
infrastructural development, and dividends across urban and rural areas; and that 
modernize agriculture and transfer surplus rural laborers to work in cities will bring about 
positive changes. Namely, these coordinated urban-rural development directives will 
increase rural income, relieve peasants’ burdens, and transform agriculture, farmers, and 
the countryside from a “traditional,” “backwards,” and “low-quality” state into one that is 
decidedly modern, and increases China’s global competitiveness. 
 
In the sections that follow, I detail each of the six discourses, including a summary of the 
discourse, where I located it in political documents and widely accessible media, and the policies 
that enact it. 
 
 (1) The “Peasants are Low Quality” Discourse 
The discourse that most pervasively and profoundly shapes definitions, understandings, 
and regulations of smallholder farmers and rural livelihoods is the “Peasants are Low Quality” 
discourse. It is found in both explicit and somewhat veiled forms in policy, media, and everyday 
conversation. As a particularly powerful discourse, the ideas and meanings contained within it 
structure not only how government authorities propose policies and regulations for rural 
development, but also how everyday people think about rural people and spaces. 
As the statement from the Baidu Baike entry for nongmin in the opening section of this 
chapter indicates, the concept of “peasant” or “farmer” in China is better thought of as a social 
category that signifies a particular identity, status, way of life, culture and psychological state of 
being. It is not merely the title for an occupation, nor is it a fitting reference for people engaged 
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in agriculture as a business. As an identity category, nongmin carries meanings and signifiers that 
are broadly used to define the rural poor, as I’ll discuss below.  
The low-quality discourse fits well with the notion that, “in post-Mao China, quality 
(suzhi) has become a key element in a range of discourses on development and the achievement 
of modernity and national power” (Jacka, 2006, p. 589). As such, this powerful discourse can be 
found in a number of places, including Chinese popular culture, widely accessible news media, 
academic papers, official speeches, and central policy. 
The “Peasants are Low Quality” Discourse in Popular Culture and Everyday Conversation 
I found the most explicit expression of the low-quality discourse in the language of 
Chinese popular culture and everyday conversation. The word nongmin itself, which is often 
used to connote that a person is backwards, unsophisticated, uncultured, ignorant, and of “low 
quality” (mei suzhi 没素质). Interestingly, these same connotations apply to the word for “dirt” 
or “earth” in Mandarin Chinese (tu 土), which is commonly used disdainfully to indicate that a 
person is from the countryside, and lacking in intelligence and sophistication (Chao, 2009, p. 26-
27). This use of nongmin, and the simultaneous reproduction of the low-quality discourse, can be 
found in Chinese movies, television, literature and conversation. 
I frequently encountered the low quality discourse in my fieldwork. It came up during 
interviews with university researchers, managers and executives at large-scale pork production 
and processing companies, individuals involved in framing and/or analyzing agricultural policy, 
representatives from various agribusiness firms, migrant workers, and smallholder farmers 
themselves. In almost all cases, when I asked about smallholders, I was told that rural areas were 
backwards (luohou 落后), that smallholder farmers were of low quality (mei suzhi) and in need 
of training and “civilization,” and that the large nongmin population was one of China’s biggest 
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problems. These statements were typically accompanied by a grimaced facial expression, 
revealing disgust and disdain. That farmers themselves shared these ideas with me as statements 
of “fact” indicates that many have internalized this particularly powerful discourse. When I 
asked a smallholder farmer in Hebei province if I could interview her, she said, “Why would you 
want to interview me? I don't know anything. I’m just a nongmin.” 
The Baidu Baike entries for peasant (nongmin 农民), backwards (luohou 落后), rural 
way of life (nongcun shenghuo fangshi 农村生活方式), Three Rural Problems (sannong wenti 
三农问题), and modern agriculture (xiandai nongye 现代农业) all contain elements of the low 
quality discourse. The basic idea reproduced in these articles and definitions is that peasants are 
of low cultural and psychological quality, are traditional and incompetent, and need training and 
support in order for China to achieve a modern agriculture and society.  
 
The “Peasants are Low Quality” Discourse in Politics and Media 
Whereas the low-quality discourse is enacted in ways that are overtly condescending in 
popular culture and everyday conversation, it is often more polite in the media and in central 
policy.  In a white paper issued by the Information Office of the State Council in 2001 titled, 
Rural China’s Poverty Reduction29, the following is given as one of the main difficulties in rural 
areas: 
Although the development-oriented poverty reduction drive has greatly changed the 
poverty and backwardness of the vast impoverished rural areas, there has been no 
qualitative change either in the basic production and living conditions of the poverty-
stricken peasant households, or in the social, economic and cultural backwardness in 
those areas (emphasis added). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 This white paper is related to Outline1 (2000-2010).  
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In this passage, low-quality and backwardness are used to describe social, economic, and 
cultural conditions, separate from poverty reduction and improving rural livelihoods. This 
suggests the deeper meanings of the discourse, which defines peasants as systematically and 
structurally deficient. 
Today, the discourse is largely expressed in policy context in the language of need rather 
than deficiency. For instance, a Ministry of Agriculture (2009) document on rural development  
lists the existence of “more competent farmers” (read: farmers who use industrial practices) as 
evidence of positive changes in the appearance of some rural areas. This notion is more explicit 
in the calls for improving rural education and training in order to improve the quality of farmers 
(rural people). The following passages, taken from statements made by government officials in 
reference to the Building a New Socialist Countryside policy (Beijing Review, 2008), illustrate 
the point: 
“[Measures need to] improve population quality through education, health care and labor 
training, ” Liu Jian, Director of the Poverty Alleviation Office of the State Council. 
 
“To a certain degree, the success of building a new socialist countryside depends a lot on 
the quality of farmers, technical capability and ideological standards,” Zhou Xiaozheng, 
Professor at Renmin University. 
 
“At present most farmers live in areas poor in transportation and information, so they 
lack modern concepts matching a market economy. We can’t teach farmers these modern 
concepts; they must learn these through practice,” Xiong Qinghua, Secretary of the CPC 
Baoshan City Committee, Yunnan Province. 
 
To varying degrees, these political elites reproduce the low-quality discourse in ways that 
are paternalistic and/or derogatory toward farmers. The problem here is not that calls for 
improvements in systems of education and social services are misplaced. Quite to the contrary, 
as investment and attention to improving conditions in rural areas has long lagged behind urban 
bias. Rather, the low-quality discourse is often used in reference to the quality of people, rather 
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than systems. Even where there is recognition of problems in, for instance, the agricultural 
extension system, the solutions to those problems are framed in top-down terms, such that the 
state (or private actors) will sweep in to fix the (ignorant, worthless, backwards) farmers (Yuan 
and Niehof, 2011).  
The low-quality discourse, especially in its more polite formulation, is also pervasive in 
widely accessible news media, including Xinhua news outlets and CCTV 7, the agricultural 
channel on China Central Television.  
 
The “Peasants are Low Quality” Discourse in Policy 
Scholars have analyzed suzhi (quality) discourses, and how they relate to peasants and 
rural migrants, government policies, and discourses of modernity, civility, and development in 
contemporary China (Jacka, 2006, 2009; Yan, 2008; Sun, 2009). Among other things, they find 
that ideological forces – articulated in popular discourses of low-quality and backwardness – 
play important and reinforcing roles in the perpetuation of the material conditions of poverty in 
rural areas, through policies and through the shaping of individual beliefs, preferences, and 
choices.  
In the course of the present analysis, I found that policies and measures related to the 
low-quality discourse can be categorized around two major goals: first, to improve the quality of 
farmers through education and training; and second, to modernize agriculture. The first goal is 
articulated in the following policies: the 11th Five-Year Plan, Building a New Socialist 
Countryside, Two Exemptions and One Subsidy (free rural compulsory education), the 12th Five-
Year Plan, the Outline for Development-Oriented Poverty Reduction in China’s Rural Areas 
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2011-2020, and the Provisional Measures for Administration of Identification of National 
Leading Enterprises of Agricultural Industrialization and their Operation Monitoring. 
The second goal, of constructing a modern agriculture to improve the quality of farmers, can 
be found in any and all current central policies relating to agriculture, including those listed in 
this section. Chapter Five analyzes the central government’s conception and model of modern 
agriculture, which is based on vertical integration, contract farming, and Dragon Head 
Enterprises. This model is based on the idea of using “modern” methods, techniques, and tools to 
transform and improve the quality of agriculture, peasants, and the countryside. In order for the 
model to appear as the solution, backwards farmers need to be cast as the problem. 
 
(1b) Supporting Discourse: “The Countryside is Backwards, Traditional, Ugly”  
The notion that smallholder farmers are backwards, of low-quality, and not modern is 
mirrored in a related discourse that the countryside shares similar features. Sannong wenti, or the 
“Three Rural Problems, ” is used in China to signify that the problems of agriculture, villages, 
and farmers are the most pressing problems for the countryside. In discourse surrounding 
sannong wenti, the problems of rural areas are largely identified as problems of tradition. For 
example, in the Baidu Baike entries for sannong wenti, rural way of life, and modern agriculture, 
the countryside is defined as an antiquated place where traditional agriculture and forms of 
cultural and economic exchange reign supreme, resulting in a kind of backwardness that is a drag 
on efforts to modernization. In more polite political conversation, former Premier Wen Jiaobao, 
for instance, talks about the need to improve the appearance of the countryside, and Zhong 
Hongyu of the Ministry of Agriculture urges the adoption of modern technology to transform 
traditional agriculture (Beijing Review, 2008). These same sentiments are expressed in Xinhua 
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News and on CCTV 7, especially in programs about improving the quality and appearance of the 
countryside. 
This discourse plays out in policy aimed at improving the appearance of the countryside, 
sometimes in ways that could actually improve the lives and livelihoods of rural people, other 
times in ways that seem more likely to increase profits for the agribusiness firms that sell inputs 
and control value chains, and still other times in ways that seem more about “saving face” than 
making real progress in reducing poverty.  
When “improving the appearance of the countryside” means improving rural 
infrastructure – as in the 12th Five Year Plan, Building a New Socialist Countryside, and the 
Outline for 2011-2020 – then rural people are more likely to benefit. However, when this idea 
means “adopting modern technology to transform traditional agriculture,” as in Ministry of 
Agriculture documents, there is some question as to whether this transformation is in the best 
interest of smallholder farmers, or is primarily a way to increase agribusiness profits and 
corporate penetration in rural markets (see Chapter Five).  
Another enactment of this discourse in policy comes in the form of developing rural 
tourism and leisure, and constructing “clean and tidy” (cunrong zhengjie 村容整洁) and model 
villages for aesthetic improvement. These measures appear in the 12th Five Year Plan and 
Building a New Socialist Countryside. While they potentially create income opportunities for the 
few households that can become involved in rural tourism through nongjiale (农家乐, rural bed 
and breakfast-like operations) and related businesses, they seem more likely to be a way of 
keeping up appearances. In the worst cases, these models can conceal the reality of rural poverty 
by presenting a well-manicured experience of the countryside for (mostly urban) visitors to enjoy. 
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(2) The “Relieve the Peasants’ Burden!” Discourse 
While smallholders are approached with disdain in many expressions of the low-quality 
discourse, they are also variously characterized as the people who have borne the brunt of 
government taxes and political corruption in discourses that call to “Relieve the Peasants’ 
Burden!” This notion appears in the Baidu Baike entries for nongmin (peasant) and sannong 
wenti, and is also a common theme in Xinhua news items and in studies of rural development 
and policy.  The discourse is enacted in policies that call on governments to either increase 
farmers’ income, or reduce their financial stress by making public services more accessible. The 
Rural Tax and Fee Reform, New Rural Cooperative Medical System, Rural Social Security 
System, Two Exemptions and One Subsidy (free rural compulsory education), Farmers’ 
Professional Cooperative Law, and agricultural subsidies are all directly intended to “reduce the 
peasants’ burden.” Alexander Day’s forthcoming work (2013) provides a critical analysis of 
these polices. 
(2b)  Supporting Discourse: “Peasants as Rural Consumers” 
As central authorities try to reposition the country in the global economy, they have taken 
up the task of constructing the rural consumer. Officials want China to move from being a 
“developing country” that relies on an export-led economy, to becoming a “developed country” 
with substantial domestic markets. An important part of the process of expanding domestic 
demand is increasing rural purchasing power. In 2005, although rural China had 60 percent of 
the national population, rural consumer spending accounted for only 33 percent of total retail 
sales (Su, 2009, p. 133). In addition to building a “harmonious society” and improving rural 
livelihoods, policies in Building a New Socialist Countryside to increase rural incomes are at the 
same time aimed at expanding rural (market) consumption and creating a class of rural 
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consumers to help fuel the country’s economic growth. The 12th Five Year Plan also calls for 
increased domestic consumption (Casey and Koleski, 2011). 
 
(3) The “Peasants are Surplus Labor” Discourse, or The “Coordinated Urban-Rural 
Development” Discourse, or The “CURD” Discourse  
 
While the previous discourses relate primarily to definitions of farmers and rural 
livelihoods, this third discourse adds conceptions of how to define and manage development, 
how to integrate rural and urban places and people, and how the three rural problems fit into the 
resulting model. According to the Ministry of Agriculture (2009), 
A strategic task that China is facing in the next step is to build the new socialist 
countryside, pursue a path of modern agricultural development with Chinese 
characteristics, strive for integrated development between cities and countryside, 
economy and society.  
 
 
Emergence of the “CURD” Discourse in Policy 
At the 17th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2002, authorities 
declared for the first time that the countryside was key to achieving moderate prosperity, and that 
socio-economic development must incorporate both urban and rural areas. Since that time, a 
series of goals intended to promote urban-rural integration have been rolled out in central policy 
documents, including the Number 1 papers from 2004-2009, the Outline for 2011-2020, the 12th 
Five Year Plan, and the “Decision by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on 
Some Important Issues Regarding the Promotion of Rural Reform and Development” in 2008. 
Today, coordinated urban-rural development (CURD) is one of the leading discourses coming 
from the central government, the Ministry of Agriculture, widely accessible news media, and 
central policy. 
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The “CURD” Discourse as a Development Model 
According to Professor Ye Xingqing (2009) of the Department for Rural Economy at the 
Research Office of the State Council, the basic tenants of the CURD plan are to use urban 
industry to support rural agriculture, equalize rights and services across rural and urban areas, 
and modernize agriculture to release surplus rural laborers for employment in urban areas. Some 
scholars argue that these moves signal that China’s national development policy may be shifting 
away from rural extraction for industrial production and urban bias (Looney, 2011; Su, 2009). 
Surely this idea is one of the goals of the discourse. However, while it may be true that CURD is 
a profound departure from the Maoist conception of agriculture supporting industry, this 
argument only holds if extraction refers only to money and financial flows. Considering the 
discursive elements of CURD as a development model, it seems that rural extraction remains, but 
is taking a human form: CURD calls for surplus laborers to migrate from the countryside to the 
city in support of industry. 
As a development model, CURD aims to improve poor rural and agricultural livelihoods 
by relieving peasants’ burdens, modernizing agriculture (see Chapter Five), and importantly, 
increasing household income through migrant labor. These plans fit with the call to eventually 
abandon self-sufficient agricultural production altogether, in exchange for wages and industrial 
labor. Put another way, CURD (and related policies) proposes that the best way to improve 
agricultural livelihoods is to eliminate them. 
 
The “CURD”Discourse, Surplus Labor and Hukou 
Efforts should be made to speed up the development of the non-agricultural sector in 
rural areas, thus shifting surplus rural laborers out of agriculture into mid-size and large 
cities.         
– Ministry of Agriculture, 2009 
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CURD, especially as a development model, is complicated by hukou, the household 
registration system in China, which assigns different legal classification to rural and urban 
citizens. Hukou classification for rural people is related to the difficulty in defining who counts 
as farmers. People born in rural areas, regardless of the family’s occupations, are classified as 
“agricultural,” while those born in cities are “urban.” Many of the inequalities expressed along 
urban-rural lines are the direct result of hukou, as social and public services like education, 
health care, and pensions may be unavailable to rural residents, or available only in vastly 
inferior forms. Hukou is particularly problematic for migrant workers who, even if they have 
worked in a city for 10 years, are still legal residents of their home village, and entitled to social 
services only in that place. This has resulted in mass inequality, exploitation, and poor conditions 
for migrant workers from all parts of China (Shi, 2010; Wong, 2011).  
Despite these challenges, CURD is based precisely on the notion of peasants as surplus 
labor for work in the cities. Labor migration has been so successful as a development scheme 
that that share of income in a rural household that comes from non-agricultural sources – mostly 
wages from migrant work – is rising rapidly. In 1990, the figure was 22.3 percent, and by 2004, 
it had risen to 52.4 percent (Zhong, 2011). The figure is no doubt higher today, and will continue 
to rise as peasants are increasingly transformed (discursively and materially) into surplus labor 
for urban factories, construction sites, restaurants, and sex work (Pai, 2012; Shi, 2010).  
Hukou classification is important when considering the lives and struggles of the rural 
poor and migrant workers, and is also vitally important to include in analyses of the effectiveness 
of rural policies. Hukou elicits a number of puzzles in this context. For instance, if counted 
according to hukou classification, do rural population statistics reflect the reality of the number 
of people living in the countryside? When statistics show increased rural income, do those 
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numbers reflect successes in rural development policies, or are they more the results of 
remittances from migrant work?  
CURD (and related policies) does address some of the issues surrounding hukou. In 
recent years,  hukou reform has been on the central government’s docket, with pilot projects in 
several cities including Chongqing. Authorities are experimenting with allowing some rural 
residents to change to urban hukou, especially in small- to medium-sized cities (Zhong, 2011). 
Presumably, persons of “higher quality” will have the opportunity for urban hukou, while those 
of “lower quality” will remain rural peasants and migrant workers. 
 
(3b) Supporting Discourse: “Peasants are Passive” 
The discourse of integrated urban-rural development, which relies on the existence of a 
mass of surplus rural laborers for industrial production, rests on the assumption that those 
farmers-turned-laborers are passive. This discourse is related to the top-down nature of policy 
implementation in China, and here, in Building a New Socialist Countryside and CURD in 
particular. In these plans, the central government defines objectives and guidelines, and is the 
ultimate evaluator of success or failure. Provincial governments set up broad development 
programs based on central directives, which they pass down to cities and counties for further 
specification. County governments then translate guidelines into specific projects that are 
executed in townships and villages. In this last stage, county officials are expected to cooperate 
with township and village officials, though this is a goal more in theory than in practice (Ahlers 
and Schubert, 2009). In any case, villagers have very-little-to-no voice in the process of reform 
(Su, 2009, p. 6), even as rule is increasingly decentralized.  
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The notion that peasants are passive recipients of regulations and developments that come 
down from above (a directive disguised as an observation) is especially visible in discourses, 
policies, and controversies surrounding farmers’ professional cooperatives. For example, the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) reports that local governments have 
directly set up approximately 70 percent of the country’s rural cooperatives (Ma, 2008). 
Similarly, Han Jun (2007), a central policy researcher from the NDRC, found that most 
cooperatives in China were established either by government agencies or leading enterprises, and 
that very few were set up by ordinary farmers (Han, 2007). These top-down procedures relegate 
smallholder farmers to ever-more subservient positions with little control over their own 
livelihoods. 
The passive peasant discourse is relevant here, as policies are framed in a way that 
assumes– and in fact relies on the idea – that villagers will accept what is defined for them, and 
should not be consulted or empowered in the process of development. The incidences of rural 
protest and petitioning on the one hand (Chen & Wu, 2006; O’Brien & Li, 2006), and the 
emergence of the New Rural Reconstruction Movement on other (Day & Hale, 2007), challenge 
this discourse. The New Rural Reconstruction Movement includes experimental farmer-led 
cooperative programs, which specifically target villages that experienced high levels of peasant 
petitioning and protest prior to Rural Tax and Fee Reform.  
 
Gender: The Missing Discourse 
Gender is conspicuously missing in discourses and policies regarding smallholder 
farmers and rural livelihoods. Lin Zhibin, the director of the Migrant Workers Action Research 
Center in Beijing, says that, “Although poverty-alleviation policy documents do not yet reflect 
 	   108	  
the concept of gender, the introduction of the idea of ‘regarding people as central’ has obviously 
served as a turning point in advocating women’s empowerment and gender equality” (Lin, 2008, 
p. 28). In 2011, in the State Council white paper that summarizes the Outline for Development-
Oriented Poverty Alleviation in China’s Rural Areas (2011-2020), there is passing mention of 
gender. The document reads,  
The state has included development-oriented poverty reduction schemes for ethnic 
minorities, women and the disabled in its planning, made unified arrangements for their 
implementation, given priority to their implementation when all conditions are equal, and 
strengthened support for these groups. 
 
The inclusion of women as a group with ethnic minorities and disabled persons is telling of how 
the central government considers women in policy. Rather than engaging with gender in terms of 
the different roles, expectations, opportunities, and constraints for men and women, the language 
in this document suggests that women are disadvantaged in ways similar to ethnic minorities and 
the disabled. This does little to address the real needs of women, who are responsible in large 
part for rural agricultural production, as well as the reproduction of rural households. It also 
makes assumptions about men, what they want, need, and are capable of. 
Gao Xiaoxian, the secretary general of the Shaanxi Research Association for Women and 
Family, argues that in mainstream Chinese discourse, “women have low quality,” and that the 
tone of the discourse is one of blaming women for situations like poverty (Gao, 2008, p. 21). 
Especially in agriculture, women’s income is significantly less than men’s income. They are less 
educated as a group, and are subject to patrilocal residence after marriage, which often breaks 
their social networks. Land and asset ownership is also unequal along gendered lines, with 
women who marry outside of their home villages missing out when land is redistributed, leaving 
them and their children landless (Li et al., 2008). At the same time, there is a historical legacy 
that treats women as “the second gender,” subordinate and inferior to men. This, when combined 
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with the Peasants are Low Quality discourse described above, creates a double negative for rural 
women in policy and in lived experience.  
 
Conclusion 
The discourse analysis presented in this chapter illustrates that nongmin has multiple 
meanings and uses. Table 1 below details the various categories that nongmin can express. I 
constructed that table from Baidu Baike entries, Chinese policy documents, media reports, 
scholarship, and conversations with government officials, academics, farmers, and people in 
rural and urban China.   
 
Table 1. Nongmin: Analytical categories, meanings, and uses in contemporary China. 
Analytical Categories Meanings and Uses 
occupational category “farmer” 
legal/administrative category “holder of agricultural hukou” 
identity category “farmer” / “peasant” / “rural” / “migrant” 
social category “peasant” (low social rank) 
political category “unfit for politics” /“uppity”  
historical category “pre-capitalist”/ “transitional" 
cultural category “backwards”/ “low quality” 
psychological category “ignorant” 
way of life category “subsistence” 
farm size category “small-scale farmer” 
farm labor category “householder”/ “family labor” 
farm production category “subsistence”/ “petty commodity producer” 
development category “underdeveloped” 
  
 
In this chapter I’ve argued that the ways in which nongmin is constructed has important 
political significance, and relates to the management of material conditions in the countryside. 
CURD policies and the Building a New Socialist Countryside policies that are continued in the 
12th Five-Year Plan for 2010-2015, are intended to restructure agriculture in such a way that the 
economy of agricultural self-sufficiency prevalent in rural areas is eventually abandoned in 
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exchange for urbanization and subsequent depeasantization. Central authorities hope that these 
processes will at once alleviate rural poverty, develop a robust and vertically integrated domestic 
agro-industrial sector, further promote urban industrial development, and enhance China’s 
competitiveness in global markets. These goals, and the measures enacted to achieve them, rely 
on a set of ideas about smallholder farmers and rural livelihoods that are embodied in political 
discourse. As my analysis reveals, these discourses suggest that smallholders are backwards 
(lagging behind, traditional, detestable), of low quality (culturally and psychologically deficient 
and in need of improvement), passive (enough to be herded into migrant work without complaint 
or preference, and with very little political interest or participation), and form both an army of 
surplus labor for industrialization and a pool of untapped domestic consumers who will help shift 
China’s import-export balance. The policies that result often look more like policies to create 
wealth for a few, than to create the “common prosperity” called for in the 11th Five Year Plan 
(Fan, 2006). 
China’s industrial agricultural development model is proposed as the modern solution to 
the traditional nongmin problem. Cast in this light, Dragon Head Enterprises – state-supported 
and vertically integrated agribusiness firms – emerge as the rural and agricultural development 
leaders. As the same time that state policy props up the Dragon Heads, it also displaces, 
dispossesses, and/or eliminates smallholder farming. This transformation, a profound departure 
from the once “unbroken history of a dense rural population practicing permanent sustainable 
agriculture” (Netting, 1993, p. 232), deepens the metabolic rift, positioning industrial agriculture 
as its solution.  
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Chapter 5 
 
 
DRAGON HEAD ENTERPRISES  
and the 
STATE of AGRIBUSINESS in REFORM ERA CHINA 
 
_____________ 
 
 
 “To support industrialization is to support agriculture,  
to support enterprises is to support farmers.”  
Ministry of Agriculture, PRC 
Research Center for Rural Economy (2010, p. 6).      
 
 
Introduction 
 The statement above succinctly describes the Chinese state’s approach to agricultural 
development: industrialization is the goal, and agribusiness is the mechanism. The idea of what it 
means to “support farmers” here has a very specific meaning that hinges in part on the nongmin 
discourses I analyzed in Chapter Four. Simply put, the state-led model is intended to replace 
small-scale farming and self-sufficient rural livelihoods with vertically integrated agribusiness 
firms, contract farming, and strategic agricultural trade. This is a model that sees smallholders as 
backwards; a drag on both national-level development, and in terms of China’s changing role in 
the global agro-food system. The excerpt below from the Baidu Baike30 entry for “nongmin” is 
telling: 
Another issue for agricultural industrialization in China is that today, the country’s 
agriculture can be classified as basically a self-sufficient peasant economy, with no 
economies of scale. After joining the WTO, how should we deal with the challenges 
associated with intensive-style agriculture in other countries? As a large agricultural 
country, this will be a serious problem for China to face. From now on, it seems that at 
the same time that China liberates surplus labor by accelerating agricultural 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Baidu	  Baike	  is	  China’s	  largest	  online	  encyclopedia.	  The	  3.5	  million	  articles	  are	  built	  by	  registered	  users	  and	  censored	  to	  be	  inline	  with	  government	  regulations	  and	  discourses	  (Woo,	  2007).	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mechanization and improving productivity, China should also abandon the self-sufficient 
peasant economy in order to meet WTO challenges31. 
 
 In addition to transforming farmers into migrant laborers, agribusiness-led vertical 
integration is the primary mechanism for abandoning the self-sufficient peasant economy. In the 
meatification project in particular, state-supported agricultural processing firms called Dragon 
Head Enterprises (longtouqiye 龙头企业) lead the march. Dragon Heads are tasked with the dual 
role of developing markets for economic growth and profit on the one hand, and improving the 
quality, or suzhi (素质), of farmers on the other. Vertical integration in the Chinese sense means 
coordinating production, processing, distribution, and sales of agricultural products, or in the 
language of Sinograin, the China Grain Reserves Corporation32, “Constructing the industrial 
chain from field to dining table” (jianshe cong tianjian dao canzhuo chanyelian 建设从田间到
餐桌产业链) . As a form of rural development, vertical integration means value chain 
integration, with farmers at one end of the chain producing primary products, and Dragon Heads 
at the other end processing and selling value-added commodities on local, regional, and national 
markets.  
Dragon Head Enterprises are at the intersection of state socialism and neoliberal logics. 
The state supports Dragon Heads through direct subsidies, tax incentives, favorable loans, and 
certifications that increase the firm’s legitimacy in the market. In exchange, Dragon Heads are 
expected to play a role in rural social welfare through contract farming, as well as create new 
arenas for profit and accumulation. In the pork sector, large-scale production, processing, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  From	  Baidu	  Baike:	  http://baike.baidu.com/view/24915.htm	  (in	  Chinese).	  The	  English	  translation	  above	  is	  my	  own,	  from	  the	  original	  text:	  农业产业化的另一个问题是中国农业目前基本上属于自给自足的小农经济，
没有形成规模经济。加入世贸组织后，如何应对国外的集约型农业的挑战？这将是中国作为一个农业大国
面临的严峻问题。从现在看来，目前中国应在解放剩余劳动力的同时，通过加快农业机械化提高农业劳动
生产率，抛弃小农经济的自给自足，迎接入世挑战。 32	  Sinograin	  website:	  http://en.sinograin.com.cn/eng/index_Eng.jsp	  (in	  English).	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retail operations take many forms. They may be state owned, privately owned, partnerships 
between private and state owned firms, or joint ventures between Chinese and foreign firms. 
Most, however, are domestic agribusinesses, and most of the industry’s biggest players are 
Dragon Heads. As expressions of both socialist governing and neoliberal thinking and strategies, 
analyzing Dragon Heads is also analyzing the form and trajectory of China’s development 
model. 
 To date, there are few studies of agribusiness politics in China, or of the impacts of the 
country’s agribusiness-led development model. One reason for the lack of China-specific 
examinations is that literatures on agrifood firms in the neoliberal era have focused on 
transnational corporations (TNCs) as central actors in global governance (Clapp & Fuchs, 2009; 
Cutler, 1999; Sklair, 2002) and as the key players in creating a global agrifood system (see, for 
example, Bonanno et al., 1994; Lang and Heasman, 2004; Magdoff, Foster, and Buttel, 2000; 
McMichael, 2005). If China is mentioned in these literatures, it is characteristically framed as an 
emerging economy that TNCs are keen to enter, and not as a new site of agribusiness 
development in its own right. Where governance related literatures have touched down in China, 
scholars concentrate on how TNCs operate through foreign investment, joint ventures, and 
wholly-owned subsidiaries, typically focusing on retail, food service, and high-value-added food 
sectors (Hu et al., 2004; Wilkinson, 2010). But these studies do not adequately reflect the 
mechanisms or relations of China’s agricultural development model, its social implications at 
home, or the way that its operation is recomposing the relations of the global agrifood system 
itself. 
Dragon Heads, as expressions of multifaceted public-private relations, also complicate 
notions of China’s development model more generally. While scholars from various fields 
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disagree over the proper designation of China’s political economic form and trajectory, they tend 
to agree that privatization is an orienting logic. Deng Xiaoping initiated Reform and Opening in 
1978 on the idea that “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” would use markets to develop 
productive forces and eliminate poverty (Deng, 1984). After 30 years of reform, however, 
Richard Walker and Daniel Buck (2007) argue that because of its close parallels to the 
development of capitalism in Europe and North America, “capitalism with Chinese 
characteristics” is a more apt moniker. In a similar vein, David Harvey (2003), following Wang 
Hui (2003), refers to China’s system as “neoliberalism with Chinese characteristics,” echoing 
Martin Hart-Landsberg and Paul Burkett’s (2005) argument that China’s so-called market 
socialism has “led the country down a slippery slope toward an increasingly capitalist, foreign-
dominated development path” (p. 13). Aihwa Ong and Li Zhang (2008) challenge what they call 
Harvey and others’ “homogenizing view of neoliberalism” (p. 9) by arguing that China’s system 
is (a) “socialism from afar,” in which “the adoption of neoliberal reasoning has made possible a 
kind of socialism at a distance, in which privatizing norms and practices proliferate in symbiosis 
with the maintenance of authoritarian rule” (p. 4). Whether articulated in terms of socialist or 
capitalist primacy, all of these approaches hinge importantly on practices and logics of 
privatization, an assumption that conceals the complexity of Dragon Heads. 
In this chapter, my intention is to provide a more detailed treatment of agribusiness 
politics in China today and how those politics relate to the country’s development trajectory. My 
argument starts from a fairly straightforward premise that state and private elites in China are 
working together to consolidate a robust domestic agribusiness sector, as both an arena for 
national-level rural and economic development, and as a new frontier for access to resources and 
markets abroad. In the first sense, government funding supports agricultural processors to use the 
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“company and farm” model of contract farming as a way to source primary products from rural 
producers. In exchange for being put in a position to profit from their heightened control in the 
food system, the state mandates that lead firms disseminate technologies, training, information, 
and market opportunities to farm households through “radiation driven” development, which is 
akin to “trickle down” development, but with an explicit state directive. In the second sense, the 
state increasingly supports agribusiness firms to invest in feed and agricultural resources abroad, 
to set up food processing operations in other countries, and to export processed meat products. 
Through this “go out” (zouchuqu 走出去) strategy, the state intends to expand the global reach  
of Chinese state and private firms, a process which is beginning to challenge TNC hegemony in 
the global agri-food system (see Chapter Two). As a result, China is turning into an important 
new site for agribusiness development in its own right, not just a destination for transnational 
capital. 
The sections in this chapter alternate between general treatments of China’s agricultural 
development model and specific instances from the pork sector. First, a section that introduces 
and defines Dragon Head Enterprises, followed by an analysis of the extent to which Dragon 
Heads have come to define the pork sector. Next, a discussion of vertical integration and the 
“company and farm” model in central policy, and how those logics play out in the pork industry. 
Finally, a section that predicts that state support for Dragon Head-led vertical integration is 
conditioning a bifurcated, yet self-reinforcing, national-global development trajectory.  
 
Developing Domestic Agribusiness: Dragon Head Enterprises33 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Throughout	  the	  chapter,	  I	  use	  Dragon	  Head	  Enterprise,	  lead	  firm,	  and	  leading	  firm	  or	  enterprise	  interchangeably.	  All	  signify	  the	  Mandarin	  word,	  longtouqiye	  (龙头企业).	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In Chinese culture, the dragon is a symbol of both the Han majority and the Chinese 
nation as a whole, and is thought to embody power, wisdom, and auspiciousness. The name 
“Dragon Head Enterprise” comes from the dragon dance, a universally-recognized ceremonial 
dance in China, which dates to the Han Dynasty, and continues to be a fundamental performance 
at festivals and holiday celebrations34. In the dance, one performer wears a fierce dragon head, 
leading others who are bent over each other to make up the dragon’s body, in a long line of 
coordinated and undulating movement. Inspired by this imagery and meaning, central authorities 
empower Dragon Head Enterprises to don the “head” of the dragon in order to guide masses of 
farmers on the path of industrialization, and to lead the nation on the path of modernization.   
Dragon Heads first appeared in central policy in 199835, when authorities proclaimed that 
lead firms would be the key for modernizing China’s agriculture by integrating and scaling-up 
production (Zhang & Donaldson, 2008). Then in 2003, eight government institutions36 jointly 
issued a document for identifying and monitoring lead firms, with an update following in 201037. 
Most recently, in March of 2012, the State Council issued “Views on Supporting the 
Development of Lead Enterprises for Agricultural Industrialization.”38 In addition to outlining 
the current phase of state support for agribusiness, this document was also the precursor to 
establishing the “China Association of Leading Enterprises for Agricultural Industrialization” 
(Zhongguo nongye chanyehua longtouqiye xiehui 中国农业产业化龙头企业协会), or the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  For	  a	  detailed	  description	  of	  the	  dragon	  dance,	  see	  http://baike.baidu.com/view/102578.htm	  (in	  Chinese).	  
35 “Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Several Major Issues in Agriculture and 
Rural Work,” issued by the Third Plenary Session of the 15th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, 
October 1998. 36	  The	  “Provisional Measures for the Administration of Dragon Head Enterprise Identification and Operation 
Monitoring”	  document	  was	  jointly	  issued	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Agriculture,	  the	  National	  Development	  and	  Reform	  Commission,	  the	  State	  Economic	  and	  Trade	  Commission,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Finance,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Trade	  and	  Economic	  Cooperation,	  the	  People’s	  Bank	  of	  China,	  the	  State	  Administration	  of	  Taxation,	  and	  the	  China	  Securities	  Regulatory	  Commission.	  37	  Full	  text	  is	  available	  at:	  http://wenku.baidu.com/view/090cc1e96294dd88d0d26be4.html	  (in	  Chinese).	  38	  Full	  text	  is	  available	  at:	  http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2012-­‐03/08/content_2086230.htm	  (in	  Chinese).	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“Dragon Head Association,” in November of 201239. With each set of pronouncements, 
government support for agribusiness grows, as does the power of these firms in restructuring 
agricultural economies, production systems, and livelihoods. The new Dragon Head Association 
in particular provides an institutionalized space for state and private enterprise to work together 
in the construction of an integrated and increasingly consolidated domestic agribusiness sector.  
According to the State Council in 2012, Dragon Heads are “the major agents for 
constructing a modern agricultural system, and are the key to advancing agricultural 
industrialization40.” They are,  
not like ordinary commercial enterprises: they are responsible for opening up new 
markets, innovating in science and technology, driving farm households, and advancing 
regional economic development. They are capable of driving agricultural and village 
economic restructuring, driving commodity production development, promoting 
increased efficiency, and increasing farmers’ income41. 
 
The Dragon Head label entitles a company to government programs that subsidize these 
responsibilities, and to bragging rights as a lead firm, which translates into enhanced legitimacy 
as a trustworthy company in the market. Today central, provincial, and local governments can 
bestow Dragon Head status, with national-level designation being the most honorable and 
profitable42.  
To become a Dragon Head, a firm must meet a set of operational, financial, and farm 
integration criteria, as outlined in the 2003 and 2010 “Provisional Measures” documents. 
Operationally, a company must primarily function as an agricultural processor, distributor, or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  See	  the	  Association’s	  Baidu	  Baike	  entry	  at	  http://baike.baidu.com/view/9676144.htm	  (in	  Chinese).	  40From	  “Views	  on	  Supporting	  the	  Development	  of	  Lead	  Enterprises	  for	  Agricultural	  Industrialization”	  policy	  document.	  Retrieved	  from	  http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2012-­‐03/08/content_2086230.htm	  (in	  Chinese).	  41	  From	  Baidu	  Baike	  entry	  for	  Dragon	  Head	  Enterprise,	  http://baike.baidu.com/view/125729.htm	  (in	  Chinese).	  The	  English	  is	  my	  translation	  of	  the	  original	  text:	  它不同于一般的工商企业，它肩负有开拓市场、
创新科技、带动农户和促进 区域经济发展 的重任，能够带动农业和农村经济结构调整，带动商品生产发展
，推动农业增效和农民增收。 42	  Criteria	  are	  less	  evident	  and	  financial	  support	  less	  assured	  at	  the	  local	  level,	  such	  that	  the	  Dragon	  Head	  title	  may	  be	  the	  only	  payout	  (Zhang	  &	  Donaldson,	  2008).	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intermediary, with processing and distribution accounting for at least 70 percent of the value of 
the company’s products. Also, it must have legal standing as a state-owned or private enterprise, 
a group or corporation, a China-foreign joint-venture, or a wholly foreign owned enterprise43.  
Financially, the state sets minimum asset and sales thresholds for attaining Dragon Head 
status, depending on a firm’s location, and operational type. Minimums for processors and 
distributors by region are as follows: 
 Assets Minimum Sales Minimum 
East 150 million RMB ($24 million) 200 million RMB ($32 million) 
Central 100 million RMB ($16 million) 130 million RMB ($21 million) 
West 50 million RMB ($8 million) 60 million RMB ($9.7 million) 
 
For wholesale firms, those in the East must have a annual sales transactions in specialty markets 
of at least 1.5 billion RMB ($241 million), with 1 billion RMB ($161 million) in the Central 
region, and 800 million RMB ($129 million) in the West. Additionally, Dragon Heads must be 
profitable (returns on assets must be higher than interest on bank loans, etc.), have an asset-
liability ratio under 60 percent, and a bank credit rating of at least A. Their products must be 
competitive in the market, and they must first have provincial Dragon Head status before 
applying for national-level designation.  
In order to fulfill the rural development responsibilities that come along with the Dragon 
Head name, lead firms must have a strong “interest coupling mechanism” (liyi lianjie fangshi 利
益廉洁方式) for integrating farm households into their operations and markets. Mechanisms 
include contracts, shareholding, and cooperation with rural households, and 70 percent of the 
primary products for the company’s processing and distribution must come through these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Currently, it is not common for foreign firms to be designated as Dragon Heads. I analyzed 216 agribusiness firms 
from eight different agricultural sectors (pork, chicken, soy, maize, rice, wheat, peanuts, livestock feed) in 2011. 
Only one of the foreign firms had Dragon Head status (Schneider 2012). That firm was People’s Food Holdings 
Limited, which I discuss in the next section.  
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arrangements. Firms in the East are required to integrate 4,000 households, those in the Central 
region, 3,500 households, and in the West, 1,500 households. Whether or not these minimum 
thresholds are met, and more importantly, whether or not they are beneficial to farm households, 
are matters of debate to which I return in the below. 
Measures to promote Dragon Heads since the turn of the 21st Century fall under two 
broad categories. First, there are supports for firms directly involved in agricultural processing 
and distribution. In the period from 2000-2005, the central government spent 11.9 billion RMB 
($1.9 billion) subsidizing construction and operation expenses of these large-scale, national-level 
Dragon Heads (Huang, 2011). In addition to direct payments, authorities also offer tax 
exemptions and reductions, export tax rebates, discount loans for export-oriented products, and 
access to special loans with little or no interest (Zhang, Fan & Qian, 2005). The second category 
of policy supports are to subsidize wholesalers and agriculture-related sectors, such as companies 
that specialize in frozen pork storage, product research and development, and sewage 
management (Zhang, Fan & Qian, 2005). Support programs for these firms are similarly based in 
financial, fiscal, and tax policies.  
As a result of concentrated state support and industry cooperation, lead firms have 
expanded both in number and in the scope of agrifood system ownership and control. According 
to official figures for 201144, China had more than 280,000 enterprises engaged in agricultural 
industrialization, including 110,000 officially designated national-level Dragon Heads. These 
firms were working with 110 million rural households, following the model of “radiation driven” 
(fushe daidong 辐射带动) farming, in which technology, information, and market opportunities 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  From	  the	  inaugural	  speech	  given	  by	  Hui	  Liangyu,	  Deputy	  Prime	  Minister	  of	  the	  State	  Council,	  at	  the	  launch	  of	  the	  China	  Association	  of	  Leading	  Enterprises	  for	  Agricultural	  Industrialization	  in	  2012.	  Full	  text	  of	  the	  speech	  available	  at	  http://baike.baidu.com/view/9676144.htm	  (in	  Chinese).	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radiate to farmers through their relationships with Dragon Heads. In 2011, this model was 
operating on 60 percent of the country’s crop production area, and covered 70 percent of 
livestock (pigs and poultry) and 80 percent of aquaculture production. Combined sales revenue 
of Dragon Heads in 2011 was 5.7 trillion RMB ($917 billion), and their products accounted for 
one-third of the country’s supply of farm produce and processed foods, and two-thirds of the 
average food basket in major cities. While scholars argue that official statistics in China are not 
the most reliable measures of reality, even if these numbers are inflated to some degree, they 
demonstrate the scale and trajectory of Dragon Head power. 
 
Dragon Heads and the Pork Sector 
 The pork sector illustrates the prevalence of domestic agribusiness firms, and the success 
of state support for agricultural processors in particular. Based on 2011 sales data, of the top 10 
pork processing firms, 90 percent were Dragon Head Enterprises. Pork slaughter and retailing 
were similarly headed, with lead enterprises accounting for 80 percent of the top 10 firms in 
each. While processors are the focus of Dragon Head policy support, on the idea that these firms 
can most efficiently coordinate the agrifood system for modernization, companies involved in 
production are also increasingly designated as leaders. Sixty percent of the top 10 pig breeding 
and production firms were Dragon Heads in 2011.  
Table 2 illustrates the dominant presence of Dragon Heads in the pork sector, as well as 
the relative absence of foreign firms45. Combined with the predominance of Dragon Heads in the 
sector, the domestic nature of pork industry ownership suggests its political significance. Across 
the sector, only two firms have foreign involvement, though not in the typical joint-venture 	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fashion. First, in 2006, Goldman Sachs bought a 10 percent share in the Shineway Group 
(Shuanghui jituan 双汇集团), and then sold half of those shares in 2009 to CDH Investments, a 
Chinese private equity fund (“Goldman plans to sell,” 2009). Shineway is a former state-owned 
enterprise, now private, and one of the top three pork processors in China. Second, Jinluo Meat 
Products (Linyi Xincheng Jinluo rouzhipin youxiangongsi 临沂新城金锣肉制品有限公司) was 
founded by a medical doctor, a business entrepreneur, and an officer of the planning department 
of the Linyi Industrial Bureau in Linyi City, Shandong Province in the early 1990s. The three 
Chinese co-founders incorporated the company first in the British Virgin Islands, and later in 
Bermuda to form People’s Food Holdings Limited as a conglomerate46. So while Jinluo is a 
wholly foreign owned firm, its origins are in China, and it is an officially recognized Dragon 
Head Enterprise. It is also one of the country’s top three pork processors. 
Compared with the pork sector, chicken is most similar in terms of domestic ownership 
and control. All of the top firms in chicken slaughter and retailing are Dragon Heads, and two 
have foreign joint ventures. Xinchang Foods (Shandong Taisen Xinchang shipin youxiangongsi 
山东泰森新昌食品有限公司), the tenth largest chicken processor and eighth chicken retailer, 
established a joint venture with Tyson Foods in 2009, in which Tyson took a 60 percent share of 
the company’s assets (Mickelson, 2008). Beijing Dafa Chia Tai (Beijing Dafa Zhengda 
youxiangongsi 北京大发正大有限公司), the sixth largest chicken processor and number one 
chicken retailer, is a joint venture with the Chia Tai Group of Thailand.  
Dragon Heads are also embedded in feed and staple food processing, though to varying 
degrees, and in varying competition with foreign firms. These differences are related to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  I	  compiled	  sales	  data	  from	  industry	  and	  government	  resources,	  and	  then	  crossed	  referenced	  the	  top	  10	  firms	  in	  each	  sector	  with	  official	  lists	  of	  national-­‐level	  Dragon	  Heads.	  Data	  sources	  are	  listed	  below	  the	  table.	  46	  I have compiled Chinese agribusiness profiles at http://pigpenning.wordpress.com/agbiz-profiles/.  
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state’s management of food security crops on the one hand, and selective liberalization of feed 
crops on the other (see Chapter One). In the first case, the state defines rice, wheat, and maize as 
“strategic crops for food security” because of their role as staple foods for human consumption. 
Even in the wake of WTO accession in 2001, the state has maintained tighter controls on their 
production, pricing, and imports (Solot, 2006). This political focus is evidenced by the relatively 
higher ratio of Dragon Heads to foreign firms in the rice and wheat sectors (Table 2). Maize, by 
contrast, with more foreign firms than Dragon Heads in processing and an equal number in retail, 
tells a different story. With its increasing management as an industrial and livestock feed crop, 
and as revealed by the massive spike in imports in 2010, maize may be falling out of strict 
government control. As I argued in Chapter Two, the state is likely to liberalize maize in a 
manner similar to soy – in large part to feed more pigs and increase pork consumption – with the 
effect of displacing smallholder maize production and shifting food security policy to an even 
narrower range of only two primary crops. Unlike soy, however, where TNCs are deeply 
embedded, Chinese domestic agribusiness firms like New Hope Group (Xin Xiwang jituan 新希
望集团) are poised to be the key maize traders (GRAIN, 2012). 
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Table 2. Share of Dragon Head Enterprises and foreign firms in the top 10 of Chinese 
agricultural sectors, 2011. 
 
 Dragon Heads Enterprises 
as a % of Top 10 Firms  
by sales in 2011 
Foreign Firms 
as a % of Top 10 Firms 
by sales in 2011 
   
Pig Breeding 60 0 
Pig Production 60 0 
Pig Slaughter 80 10 
Pork Processing 90 10 
Pork Retail Brands 80 10 
   
Chicken Processing 100 20 
Chicken Retail Brands 100 20 
   
Rice Processing 80 10 
Rice Retail Brands 60 0 
   
Wheat Processing 50 20 
Wheat Retail Brands 40 0 
   
Maize Processing 10 30 
Maize Retail Brands 20 20 
   
Soybean Oil Processing 30 60 
Soybean Oil Retail Brands 30 20 
Soybean Meal Importers 0 0 
Soybean Meal Exporters 10 80* 
Soybean Importers 10 30 
   
Feed Processing 50 40 
   
*This figure is out of 5 companies, rather than 10. 
 
Sources of data: 
Pig breeding and slaughter: China Swine Health Net (www.1350135.com). 
Pig slaughter, and chicken slaughter and retail: China Meat Association (www.chinameat.cn). 
Pork processing: China Report Net (www.chinabaogao.com). 
Pork and rice retail: Dete Market Research Network (www.detemr.com). 
Rice and wheat processing: China Grain Industry Association (www.chinagrains.org.cn). 
Wheat and maize retail, maize processing: Bosi Data Research Center (www.bosidata.com). 
Soybean oil processing: Guotong Research Report Network (www.bjzjqx.com). 
Soybean oil retail: Goukk Network (www.goukk.com). 
Soybean meal importers and exporters: China Commodity Marketplace (www.chinaccm.com). 
Soybean importers: Baidu documents (wenku.baidu.com). 
Feed processing: AiKai Data Research Center (www.icandata.com). 
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The soy sector is an important exception to the domestic agribusiness rule, but is not a 
model that other sectors will follow. In his article on the globalization of agribusiness, John 
Wilkinson (2010) cites the estimate that global traders control 70 percent of China’s soy crushing 
industry. While it may be tempting to generalize foreign investment and ownership in soy 
crushing to the whole of China’s agrifood system, it would be a mistake to do so: soy sector 
restructuring in China has a unique history, and serves as an example of how the state does not 
want to proceed with agricultural development. I detailed the processes through which soy 
became transnationalized in Chapter Two, including selective liberalization in the early 1990s, 
the soy crusher defaults in 2004, and subsequent TNC ownership in soybean crushing and soy oil 
production. Responses from the central government, particularly restrictions passed in 2008 to 
limit the foreign investment in soy processing, suggest that if not for the crusher defaults in 2004, 
the soy sector too would be domestically owned and operated. Authorities are also taking 
measures to develop domestic soy crushing to compete with foreign firms, and ostensibly, to 
regain some lost ground. In other words, TNC control in soy crushing and oil processing is not a 
general process; rather, it is the result of a unique set of political economic circumstances and 
choices that should not be generalized to other areas of the food and agricultural system. 
 
Dragon Heads, China’s Agricultural Development Model, and Vertical Integration 
 Agricultural development is a political project. It is based on a set of logics and 
objectives, and enacted through a set of policies and relations, which are managed together to 
construct an agricultural development model. Understood in this way, models are constantly in 
the process of being made, and as such, are moving analytical targets, reflecting specific points 
in time. My analysis in this section reveals that China’s contemporary agricultural development 
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model is based on agribusiness-led agroindustrialization, and the dual objectives of national-level 
development and global-scale access to resources and markets. The model is framed in central 
policy and enacted in a system of coordinated decentralization. 
 
Modernization through Vertical Integration  
Central authorities are the architects of agricultural development. They set the tone, 
language, and goals of the model, and delegate funds to provincial and local governments, 
agribusiness firms, and particular agricultural sectors. Officials in provincial governments 
interpret central directives, further specifying them to reflect local contexts before passing them 
along to county authorities for implementation. In agricultural development policy, Dragon 
Heads are increasingly recipients of state funds, as well as implementers of the model, operating 
from their position as lead firms that distribute information, technologies, services, and market 
access. Farmers, then, embody the model in the sense that their labor, and sometimes their land, 
are enlisted in the process of “agricultural modernization,” although typically not in a way that 
allows them control over production decisions. This coordinated decentralization in the practice 
and framing of agricultural development is related to more general reforms since the early 2000s, 
which have gradually converted the country’s fiscal structure into a transfer system that channels 
central funds to local governments where initiatives are carried out (Ahlers & Schubert, 2009).  
Central policy is the primary arena that officials use to communicate the agricultural 
development model. As O’Brien and Li (2006) argue, central policy must be understood in the 
broad, Chinese sense: 
Central policies, in this usage, includes essentially all authoritative pronouncements, 
ranging from Party documents, laws, State Council regulations, and leadership speeches 
to editorials by special commentators in prominent newspapers. Central policies can be 
both as general as ‘guidelines”’(fangzhen) that cadres should ‘develop the economy’ or 
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be ‘clean and honest’ or as specific as regulations prohibiting local fees from exceeding 5 
percent of a village’s net per capita income the previous year…At the same time, central 
policies may be formally ratified, like the State Constitution, or only informally 
publicized, like Deng Xiaoping’s remark that “some people should be allowed to get rich 
first.” The scope of central policy in China thus encompasses what constitutes law in 
most other nations but also reaches into far murkier realms, such as pledges made by 
officials on inspection tours, Party propaganda, and the ‘spirit of the Center’ (zhongyang 
jingshen) (p. 5). 
 
My analysis in the following sections is based on central policy in this broad, Chinese sense. 
 Throughout the reform era, authoritative pronouncements have expressed modernization 
through vertical integration as the state’s orienting logic for agricultural development. Zhang 
and Donaldson (2008) traced the history of central policies that articulated this logic, starting 
with Deng Xiaoping’s “first leap” to dismantle the people’s communes, and through the “second 
leap” to coordinate rural production. A brief review of these initial phases in model construction 
is useful for understanding more recent developments. 
At the beginning of the reform period (early 1980s), central authorities implemented the 
Household Responsibility System (HRS) to divide communal land among individual rural 
households, giving farmers more leeway in selecting crops and selling surplus production.  
Referred to more generally as baochan daohu (turning over production to the household), this 
system, which Kate Xiao Zhou (1996) argues the state instituted only after farmers were already 
using it to organize production, made the household – not the collective – the dominant unit of 
production. When the state increased grain procurement prices after decollectivization, 
productivity increased initially, playing a role in poverty reduction for more than 200 million 
farmers47. Also around this time, selective liberalization of agricultural markets and privatization 
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) spurred the emergence of agribusiness firms that began to deal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Several	  factors	  have	  contributed	  to	  poverty	  reduction	  in	  the	  reform	  era.	  See	  for	  example	  Ho,	  Eyferth,	  and	  Vermeer	  (2004).	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in managing the sale of surplus farm production. Dismantling the communes was the so-called 
“first leap” in Deng Xiaoping’s vision for rural development.  
During the first decade of reform, state investment in agriculture and rural development 
was spotty, and the productivity gains from the early-to-mid 1980s gave way to stagnation as 
investment dwindled throughout the 1990s. Then in 1998, under the leadership of Jiang Zemin, 
the central government embarked on Deng’s “second leap,” issuing statements and policies on 
developing a collectivized and coordinated rural economy. The “Decision by the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Several Key Issues in Rural and Agricultural 
Works” document described moving from “traditional” to “modern” agriculture as the broad 
development goal, and from uncoordinated and low-scale operation to coordinated and large 
scale operation. Authorities defined “modern agriculture” as commercialized (shangpinhua 商品
化), specialized (zhuanyehua 专业化), scaled up (guimohua 规模化), standardized (biaozhunhua 
标准化), and internationalized (guojihua 国际化), and “traditional agriculture” as the backwards 
opposite of these ideals. At the same time, they identified vertical integration (chanyehua 产业化
) as the principal mechanism for achieving modernity, and appointed Dragon Heads as the 
vehicles to bring it about (Zhang & Donaldson, 2008).  
Contract farming between Dragon Heads and smallholder farmers quickly became the 
state’s primary plan for coordinating rural production, and improving rural livelihoods along 
market-based lines48. In the “Provisional Measures for the Administration of Dragon Head 
Enterprise Identification and Operation Monitoring” policy document from 2003, authorities 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Authorities	  also	  proposed	  farmer	  professional	  cooperatives	  as	  a	  way	  to	  scale-­‐up	  and	  coordinate	  smallholder	  production.	  See	  Hale	  (2013),	  Huang	  (2011),	  and	  Looney	  (2011)	  for	  critical	  analyses	  of	  cooperatives.	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formalized contract farming and the “company and farm” (gongsi + nonghu 公司＋农户) 
model49 for linking Dragon Head processors with rural primary producers.  
The “company and farm” model originated in a chicken start-up operation in the early 
1980s when Beiying Wen, an entrepreneurial farmer, contracted with other farmers in an effort 
to scale-up and standardize production for his broiler processing and sales business. Wen’s 
company supplied baby chickens, feed, veterinary supplies, technical training, and services to 
nearby farm households, and farmers in turn provided the labor and facilities for raising 
chickens. The company offered “protective prices” to ensure delivery and farmer loyalty, and to 
maintain a constant supply of birds for processing (Liu & Lu, 2008). This small start-up 
company is now one of the largest domestic agribusiness firms in China – the Guangdong Wens 
Foodstuffs Group (Wens) – and this early form of contract farming is now widely used across the 
country and across agricultural sectors (Zuo, Lu, & Ou, 2008). The “company and farm” model 
is perhaps the clearest expression of how the state proposes managing farmers and agricultural 
development, while promoting the domestic agribusiness sector.  
It is important to note that “vertical integration” in the Chinese policy context refers to 
two parallel processes: regional scaling-up of production, and the integration of cultivation with 
processing and marketing (Zhang & Donaldson, 2008). In this way, the “company and farm” 
model is a form of vertical integration, as it connects producers (farmers) with processors and 
retailers (Dragon Heads). By official estimates, the model has been quite successful. The 
Ministry of Agriculture established the Office for Vertical Integration of Agriculture (nongye 
chanyehua bangongshi 农业产业化办公室) in the mid-1990s, with branch offices now in every 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Other	  variations	  of	  the	  model	  include	  “company	  and	  production	  base	  and	  farm”	  (gongsi	  +	  jidi	  +	  nonhu),	  “production	  base	  and	  farm	  and	  industry	  and	  processing”	  (jidi	  +	  nonghu	  +	  qiye	  +	  jiagong),	  and	  “company	  and	  farm	  and	  cooperative	  and	  production	  base”	  (gongsi	  +	  nonghu	  +	  hezuo	  +	  jidi).	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province. The Office issued its first full-length report in April of 2008 (Zhongguo nongye 
chanyehua fazhan baogao 中国农业产业化发展报告), which stated that by 2005, fully one half 
of China’s cultivated area and 36 percent of farm households (about 87 million) had been 
vertically integrated, either by lead firms, specialized co-ops (and other brokerage organizations), 
or specialty markets (Huang, 2011). Vertical integration has penetrated agricultural production 
even further today. As sited above, official statistics show that products from Dragon Head 
enterprises accounted for one-third of all farm produce and two-thirds of the average food basket 
in major cities in 2011.  
 
Vertical Integration and Smallholder Farmers 
 While discursively framed as a plan to improve rural income and livelihoods, vertical 
integration is practiced in a way that consolidates power and control with agribusiness firms, to 
the detriment of farmers and rural environments via the metabolic rift. When I asked about 
vertical integration and rural development, a person involved in agribusiness in China answered, 
“The government is a little bit naïve. They think that this ‘company and farm’ model will benefit 
both big companies and small farmers, but it mostly benefits the companies.” This sentiment, 
expressed by someone working inside agribusiness, was shared by the smallholder farmers I 
interviewed, none of whom operated under contract. University, government, and NGO 
researchers also expressed skepticism that the model was in the best interests of smallholders, 
citing lack of transparency in the operation of contract farming as an important problem. As one 
NGO researcher in Beijing commented, “Who knows what the ‘company’ side is doing?” 
 The contract farming system in China is plagued with serious challenges for smallholder 
farmers, the intended beneficiaries of the “company and farm” model as a rural development 
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mechanism. Based on increasing scholarship on the organization and impact of contract farming, 
these challenges can be divided into problems of exclusion and problems of inclusion to indicate 
both the difficulty in obtaining contracts, and the difficulties encountered if a contract is secured. 
Problems stem primarily from the ways in which the agricultural development model structures 
state-agribusiness-farmer relations, locating power and control with authorities and firms. 
In the first place, smallholder farmers are excluded from contracts in a number of ways. 
The limited availability of contracts (Guo et al., 2007; Miyata et al., 2008; Stringer et al., 2008), 
combined with prohibitively high costs of participation (Guo et al., 2007; Lu et al., 2010; Miyata 
et al., 2008), unattainable market standards (Stringer et al., 2008), lack of farm labour (Miyata et 
al., 2008), declining soil and water quality for production (Miyata et al., 2008), and the 
preferences of firms to contract with larger farms (Stringer et al., 2008; Zhu, 2007) create often 
insurmountable barriers for smallholder farmers to enter into contract relationships.  
These problems can be largely attributed to the vast power imbalance between the firm 
(supported by the state) on one hand, and the farmer on the other. Firms use deliberate 
exclusionary tactics to avoid contracting with smallholders, and then over-represent the number 
of contracts they hold with them when self-reporting to authorities (Zhu, 2007). The structure of 
incentive allocation and distribution also heavily favors firms, and consolidates power in their 
hands. For instance, firms set the terms of contracts, and have a monopoly on price setting. This 
reduces smallholder bargaining power, and often makes rural households dependent on firms as 
market outlets when other options disappear or become unviable. One study found that when 
there isn’t a tax credit incentive to contract with smallholders, firms are likely to exclude rural 
households altogether (Guo, Jolly & Zhu, 2007). In Hui Liangyu’s speech at the inaugural 
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meeting of the Dragon Head Association, he stated that increasing firms’ self-monitoring and 
self-regulation was an important goal for the future, which will only exacerbate these issues.   
In the second instance, even if they secure a contract, challenges for smallholder farmers 
don’t necessarily end. Contract enforcement and breach is a problem (Yu et al., 2008; Zhu, 
2007), smallholders can become dependent on contracts and stop growing food for home use 
(Lingohr, 2007, 2011), they frequently lose decision-making power (Hu & Hendrikse, 2009), 
often lack legal understanding which opens them up to being taken advantage of by firms, and 
they bear most of the risk in contract relationships when prices fall (Lingohr, 2007, 2011).  
Taken together, these challenges of exclusion and inclusion raise serious challenges to 
claims that contracts improve smallholder livelihoods. What’s more, studies of the impact of 
contract farming on smallholder income are inconclusive, and even in cases where positive 
effects have been found, authors caution that the number of households that can be brought into 
contract production is inadequate for this to serve as an all-encompassing model of rural and 
agricultural development (Miyata, Minot & Hu, 2008). Qian Forrest Zhang (2012) argues that 
although contract farming is increasing in China today, it is relatively undesirable compared with 
alternate forms of production, and it “primarily serves the interests of agro-capital and can hardly 
be considered pro-poor” (p. 482). 
An anecdote from my fieldwork clearly illustrates these challenges and supports Zhang’s 
claims. I interviewed an executive at a Dragon Head in Sichuan Province that specializes in pig 
genetics. When I asked about the “company and farm” model, the executive told me that the 
company doesn’t encourage this model because “farmers (nongmin) always avoid their 
responsibilities,” He also said that the firm’s plans for the future do not include smallholder 
contracting. But, in addition to the preferential loans and tax breaks the company receives as a 
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Dragon Head, it also participates in a government-supported breed exchange project.  The 
company sells “improved” pig varieties to smallholders for 1,000 RMB ($161) per head, while 
receiving 2,000 RMB ($322) per head from the government in subsidies. Here, the company is 
not only failing to fulfill its agreement to contract with rural producers, but is also profiting 
handsomely from the combination of state subsidies and sales to smallholder farmers.  
 
Vertical Integration in the Pork Sector  
Chinese scholars and policymakers celebrate the pork sector as a paragon of “modern 
agriculture,” and a shining example of successful and continuing vertical integration (Cui, 2009). 
In the pork sector, vertical integration is not only of the Chinese variety as detailed above, but 
also increasingly reflects the way the concept is used outside of China to connote the activities of 
single firms. William Heffernan (2000) states that, “vertical integration occurs when a firm 
increases ownership and control of a number of stages in a commodity system” (p. 68). Table 3 
illustrates this kind of firm-level vertical integration and Dragon Head-ization among the top 10 
firms in different stages of pork production and processing.  
 
Table 3. Vertical Integration among the top 10 firms in pig breeding and production, and pork 
slaughter, processing, and retail.  
Firms that rank in the top 10 of more than one stage of production (vertically integrated) appear in bold. 
Dragon Head Enterprises are indicated by *. Data sources are provided in the notes to Table 2. 
 Pig  
Breeders 
Pig  
Producers 
Pork 
Slaughter 
Pork Processors Pork 
 Retailers 
1 Xunxin* Wens* Jinluo* Shuanghui* Shuanghui* 
2 Tieji Lishi Chuming* Yurun* Jinluo* Jinluo* 
3 Fuxin Bohiya Shuanghui* Zhucheng* Yurun* 
4 Zhengyang ZhuMei Neixiang Muyuan Zhiyuan Zhongpin* Gaojin* 
5 Beijing Capital Ag* Xinwufeng* Pengcheng* Delisi* Tangren Shen* 
6 Zhongshan Baihe Shuangge* Gaojin* Jinluo* Meihao* 
7 Shuangge* Tianzhong* Zhongpin* Beixu* Delisi* 
8 Xinwufeng* Huangjinxiang* Panyu Furun* Ke’erqin Cattle* 
9 Chanjiang* Zhongshan Baihe Delisi* Weifang Legang* Chundu 
10 Tianzhong* Luhuan Jingyan* Jitailong Qianxihe 
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Three firms stand out as being on “the cutting edge of modernization” in terms of 
management, production, and marketing in the pork sector, and as vertical integration leaders. 
Over the past decade, Shineway (Shuanghui), Jinluo, and Yurun have shared the spotlight in pork 
processing and sales, vying for the number one position year after year (Cui, 2009). Their 
combined annual sales in 2011 were 115.6 billion RMB ($19 billion), which accounted for 68% 
of total sales for the top 10 pork processors. Combined annual profits were 6 billion RMB ($965 
million), or 86% of total profits for the top 10 pork processors. Together, these three firms 
employ 119,000 employees, and are concentrating market share in pork processing and sales 
(Schneider, 2012). Shuanghui is a formerly state-owned enterprise, Jinluo is Chinese-founded 
and British Virgin Islands incorporated, and Yurun is a private firm founded in Nanjing. All 
three are Dragon Heads. 
 
Current Agricultural Development Objectives and Trajectories 
 Recent central policy continues the modernization through vertical integration mantra 
from earlier in the reform era, as well as the centrality of Dragon Head Enterprises, and the 
assumption that smallholder farmers are redundant. The “Decision of the CPC Central 
Committee on Major Issues Concerning Rural Reform and Development,” which was adopted at 
the 3rd plenary session of the 17th CPC Central Committee in 2008,50 is the most recent statement 
of China’s rural and agricultural development goals, as outlined in Table 4 below. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  The	  full	  text	  of	  the	  Decision	  of	  the	  CPC	  Central	  Committee	  on	  Major	  Issues	  Concerning	  Rural	  Reform	  and	  
Development	  is	  available	  at	  http://english.agri.gov.cn/sa/ca/201112/t20111227_3751.htm	  (in	  English).	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Table 4. Summary of the objectives of China’s current agricultural development model. 
 
Goal Description of Key Points 
(1) Ensure sufficient supply 
of farm produce through 
domestic resources 
Stable growth of grain production; ensure sufficient supply of major farm produce 
from domestic resources; food security policy focused on grain production & 
marketing, with measures also taken for edible oil, cotton, swine. 
(2) Consolidate rural 
fundamental operating system 
Maintain validity of land contracts; secure farmers’ rights for land contracting and 
operation; reform traditional agriculture; foster agribusiness; expedite farmer 
cooperatives. 
(3) Upgrade the quality and 
safety of agricultural products 
Improve agricultural standardization through quality and safety accountability 
systems, including examination & testing, and supervision & law enforcement. 
(4) Increase farmers’ income 
and promote off-farm 
employment of rural laborers 
Double 2008 net income of farmers by 2020, expand channels for income 
generation in agriculture, expand non-agricultural sector in rural areas to shift 
surplus rural laborers out of agriculture and into mid-size and large cities, remove 
urban-rural barrier, build integrated labor market. 
(5) Advance agricultural 
science and technology 
Boost independent innovation of agricultural science and technology; establish 
model for sci-tech advancement; educate farmers in business and technology; 
establish rural compulsory and vocational education and training. 
(6) Build a new social service 
system for agriculture 
Combine public services with for-profit services to provide distribution of 
agricultural supplies, extension of agricultural technologies, plant protection, 
disease prevention, agricultural information, product marketing and machine 
operation. Service provision by public service agencies, cooperative economic 
organizations, leading enterprises, non-governmental actors. 
(7) Strengthen agricultural 
input and infrastructure 
construction 
Increase subsidies for grain production, agricultural supplies, machinery; increase 
minimum grain procurement price; expand national reserves of grain, cotton, edible 
oil, and pork; increase investments in rural areas; encourage local banking and 
loans; develop agricultural insurance. 
(8) Improve agricultural laws 
and regulations 
Strengthen comprehensive law enforcement and education. 
(9) Open agriculture wider to 
the outside world 
Fundamental goals are to enhance agricultural efficiency, farmers’ incomes, and 
international competitiveness of agricultural products by building a modern 
agriculture. Mechanisms are strengthening South-South cooperation under the 
FAO’s Special Program for Food Security; participating in bilateral and 
multilateral agricultural cooperation; promoting agricultural trade and honoring 
WTO commitments. 
Source: “Issues Pertaining to the Development of China’s Agriculture and Rural Economy” section of the Decision 
(2008) document, available at http://english.agri.gov.cn/sa/ca/201112/t20111227_3751.htm (in English). 
 
 
The goals in the “Decision” document are best read in relation to the 2012 State Council 
pronouncement, “Views on Supporting the Development of Lead Enterprises for Agricultural 
Industrialization.” Where the former lays out policy objectives, the latter defines the agents and 
mechanisms for bringing them about: in line with earlier policies, Dragon Head Enterprises are 
the leaders and vertical integration is the means. Statements in these two documents echo much 
from the model in its 1998 frame, especially continuing state support of agribusiness for rural 
development. What is new in these directives, or at least much more pronounced, is the further 
 	   135	  
consolidation of Dragon Heads, and the focus on supporting lead firms for a combination of 
national-level and global-level developments.  
 
National-level developments 
 For the task of improving conditions inside China, especially in rural areas, vertical 
integration continues to be the orienting logic in the current incarnation of the agricultural 
development model (see Goal 2 in Table 4 above). The 2012 “Views” document lists adhering to 
a household contract management system (jiating chengbao jingying zhidu 家庭承包经营制度) 
as the guiding principle of agricultural industrialization, based on instituting the market to 
allocate resources and improve rural livelihoods through increased income (see Section II of the 
“Views” document). In order to further this principle, authorities now propose the development 
of “lead firm clusters” (longtouqiye jiqun 龙头企业集群), composed of companies with 
complementary functions working together to create markets, construct large-scale and intensive 
production bases, standardize processing, and disseminate knowledge and technology to farmers 
through the radiation driven system.  
Clustering is the next phase of vertical integration in Chinese agriculture, moving it 
closer to a model of agribusiness concentration in countries like the United States (see, for 
example, Heffernan, 2000), where a handful of firms control the lion’s share of agricultural 
production in sectors like pork and livestock feed. In China, the most powerful firms will be 
mainly domestic, and largely Dragon Heads. A pork industry insider in Beijing told me that he 
jokes with colleagues in the National Swine Industry Association that “soon you won’t need an 
association because you will only have one or two members!”  
 	   136	  
Agribusiness clustering and vertical integration are the primary agricultural means for 
improving rural income by connecting farmers with markets. It is important to note, however, 
that non-agricultural wages from migrant labor is the primary mechanism for increasing rural 
earnings (Goal 4). In 1990, the share of non-agricultural income in a rural household was 22.3 
percent, and by 2004 had risen to 52.4 percent (Zhong, 2011). In 2011, the figure remained over 
50 percent, and “The income of migrant workers has significantly increased in recent years and 
has become the main means by which farmers increase their incomes” (“Average monthly 
income,” 2011). The agricultural development model, therefore, is part of a broader set of 
policies and practices for rural development, both of which aim to abandon the “self-sufficient 
peasant economy.” 
In the case of income and livelihoods, relying on non-agricultural wages for rural 
economic growth is discursively and materially framed in central policy as coordinated urban-
rural development (CURD) (chengxiang tongchou 城乡统筹) 51. The basic tenants of CURD are 
to use urban industry to support agriculture, to equalize rights and services across rural and urban 
locations, and to industrialize agriculture to release surplus rural laborers for employment in 
urban areas (Ye, 2009). Vertical integration and clustering work together with CURD initiatives 
in the sense that contracts restructure smallholder farming from a system of self-sufficiency to a 
system of market price payments, and consolidation of Dragon Heads at once drives migrant 
labor, as large-scale production bases displace smallholder economies, and is proposed as a 
waged employment destination for the “freed” surplus labor created in the process. CURD and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  CURD	  initiatives	  are	  included	  in	  the	  Number	  1	  papers	  from	  2004-­‐2009,	  the	  12th	  Five-­‐Year	  Plan,	  the	  Outline	  
for	  Development-­Oriented	  Poverty	  Reduction	  in	  China’s	  Rural	  Areas,	  2011-­2020,	  the	  2008	  Decision	  by	  the	  
Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  on	  Some	  Important	  Issues	  Regarding	  the	  Promotion	  of	  Rural	  
Reform	  and	  Development.	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related policies propose that one of the best ways to improve agricultural livelihoods is to get rid 
of them. 
The central place of Dragon Heads in food security policy, combined with the sectors 
highlighted as areas of policy focus, are also telling of the national development trajectory. Goals 
1 and 7 designate pork, edible oil, and cotton as strategic sectors that are managed to guarantee 
domestic supplies and national reserves. As the so-called national food, ensuring increasing 
amounts of pork provides a platform from which the state can claim legitimacy for its role in 
progress, modernization, and construction of a generally improving society. Edible oil, on the 
other hand, is a sector that has been slipping out of domestic control since the soy crusher 
defaults in 2004 when foreign firms took majority control of soy crushing, and consequently, of 
soy oil production and sales. A focus on edible oil in recent central policy likely signals a 
renewed effort to increase domestic ownership and control of the soy sector. Finally, cotton 
seems out of place in objectives for food security and reserves, nevertheless its inclusion 
suggests the crop’s increasing economic value for both domestic use and export, especially in 
China’s Western region. But while cotton is most clearly included in the agricultural 
development model’s goals for economic reasons, the pork and edible oil sectors are arguably 
also as related to economic growth and capital accumulation as they are to food security. Both 
are increasingly commercialized, both are increasingly controlled by agribusiness firms, both are 
increasingly profitable as middle- and upper-class products (see Chapter Six).  
 
Global-level developments 
The same rationale of vertical integration to propel the agricultural development model 
for national-scale developments also conditions global strategies. While the language of 
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“internationalized” agriculture has been written into central policy since at least 1998, both the 
2008 “Decisions” document and the 2012 Views document more explicitly state that increasing 
international engagement is a fundamental goal of development policy and practice. Dragon 
Head firms are, again, at the heart of this goal. 
Export promotion is one avenue of international engagement in the model. This may 
come in the form of direct subsidies for firms engaged in export markets,52 or in the form of 
standardization through food quality and safety certification measures53. State and provincial 
authorities are increasingly adopting international testing standards to regulate the agrifood 
system, and HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points)54, ISO9001 (International 
Organization for Standardization: Quality management), and ISO22000 (International 
Organization for Standardization: Food safety management)55 are used by most commercial 
agribusiness firms in China today. In this era of food safety scandals (Wu, 2012) and declining 
consumer-citizen trust (Zader, 2011), using international standards allow firms to communicate 
to domestic consumers that they are following well-defined and institutionalized protocols. At 
the same time, adopting international standards primes domestic firms for selling their products 
on international markets. I interviewed general managers and CEOs of Dragon Head pork 
processing firms who told me that the primary reason they adopted ISO and HACCP standards 
was to begin exploring export markets. 
Another avenue for global development in agriculture, and one that is drawing increasing 
attention in scholarly research and in the press, is related to state support for Chinese firms to 
invest in operations and resources abroad. The “go out” (zou chuqu) policy, officially launched 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 See 2003 and 2010 Provisional Measures documents, and the 2012 Views document. 
53 see Goal 3 in Table 3 above and the Views document.	  54	  HACCP	  Alliance	  website:	  http://www.haccpalliance.org/sub/index.html.	  55	  ISO	  website:	  http://www.iso.org/iso/home.html.	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in central policy in 2000 and further spurred by the Ministry of Agriculture in 2008, is part of a 
business development strategy to expand the global reach of Chinese state and private firms and 
institutions (Hofman and Ho, 2012; Ping, 2008).  According to the Strategic Plan for 
Agricultural Going Out (nongye zou chuqu zhanlue guihua 中国走出去战略规划), issued by the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), Chinese enterprises that invest in 
agriculture, forestry, and fisheries abroad can benefit from up to 30 million RMB ($4.8 million) 
in fiscal and financial support, in addition to tax breaks and insurance (“Chinese agriculture goes 
global,” 2012). To date, the state’s agriculture-related “going out” focus has been on “strategic 
SOEs that Chinese policy-makers see as capable of rivaling established multinationals” (Cotula 
et al., 2009, p. 55). For example, Beidahuang, one of China’s largest state-owned agribusiness 
firms with operations in grain, soy, and livestock production and processing has reportedly 
invested in land and/or has interest in investing in land in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, the 
Philippines, and Russia56. COFCO (the China National Cereals, Oils, and Feedstuffs 
Corporation, Zhong liang jituan 中粮集团), the Chongqing Grain Group (Chongqing liangshi 
jituan 重庆粮食集团), and the China National Agricultural Development Group (Zhongguo 
nongye fazhan jituan 中国农业发展集团) have also gone out for land and agricultural resources 
abroad (“Chinese agriculture goes global,” 2012). All are Dragon Head Enterprises. 
In addition to enacting domestic measures to spur international engagement, Chinese 
authorities are also increasingly working through South-South cooperation, including bilateral 
and multilateral agricultural agreements. Goal 9 in the 2008 “Decision” document (Table 4) 
outlines these mechanisms, and suggests that the state is promoting agribusiness firms in ways 
that go around the confines of the WTO and the power of TNCs. It also suggests that building a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  See	  the	  Beidahuang	  page	  at	  Food	  Crisis	  and	  the	  Global	  Land	  Grab,	  available	  at	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robust domestic agribusiness sector is about more than national-level development; the new 
relations that are currently emerging around the operation of Chinese state and state-supported 
firms in global agricultural systems may well define a new phase in global agrifood governance. 
Beidahuang, for instance, may become the “new B” in the A.B.C.D. of global grain traders 
(A.B.C.D. refers to the transnational firms, Archer Daniels Midland, Bunge, Cargill, and 
Dryfuss). 
 
Self-Reinforcing Trajectories 
The example of Jade Meat Processing Company, a provincial-level Dragon Head in 
Sichuan Province, brings several of these points together in a way that suggests both the general 
operation of the agricultural development model, and its trajectory. The case illustrates the 
process of coordinated decentralization for vertical integration, as well the self-reinforcing dual 
objectives of national- and global-level developments.  
 
The Jade Meat Processing  
The Jade Meat Processing Company is a private agribusiness firm located in Minxing 
Country near Chengdu in Sichuan Province. It was founded in 2000, and by 2005, was awarded 
provincial-level Dragon Head status, in addition to state-designation as a “Sichuan Famous 
Brand.” The company is vertically integrated, with operations in boar breeding, hog production 
and slaughtering, and pork processing, distribution, transport, and retail. Jade Meat slaughters 1.3 
million hogs each year for its own-brand processing and retail businesses. The company’s sales 
network covers 26 administrative division (provinces, municipalities, autonomous regions) in 
China, and they market more than 130 kinds of products. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  http://farmlandgrab.org/cat/show/576.	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According to the firm’s general manager, in 2009 central authorities earmarked 400-500 
million RMB ($64–80 million) to support animal husbandry nation-wide. Of that total, Sichuan 
authorities designated 8 million RMB ($1.2 million) of the provincial pot to Minxing County, 
where local officials then allocated 5.8 million RMB ($933,000) to the Jade Meat Processing 
Company for operating expenses. The general manager at Jade Meat said that these favorable 
government policies for agricultural processors were the most important opportunity in the 
business, citing their annual subsidies and no interest loans as key benefits.  
The general manager reported that in 2010, the company contracted with 1,188 local 
farmers, and the “company and farm” model helped them increase household income. I asked to 
visit a farm household that the company held a contract with, but was told that would be too 
“difficult.” Because of this, I don’t have a clear sense of the kind of farm that Jade Meat 
contracts with, whether they are so-called specialized household farms, or backyard farms. 
The company plans to expand substantially in the next five years, increasing both their 
packaged pork business, and adding poultry processing. They are preparing to apply for listing 
on the Shenzhen stock exchange, have adopted HACCP and ISO standards, and have passed the 
national inspection to obtain an export certificate. They currently export packaged pork products 
to Hong Kong, Japan, and South Korea, and hope to greatly expand their exporting business in 
the near future.  
The following excerpt from the Jade Meat’s company brochure summarizes the self-
reinforcing nature of national- and global-level agricultural developments in China today:  
Focusing on economic globalization, Jade Meat Processing Company collects social 
funds, integrates county and municipal resources, and actively seeks national financial 
support in our effort to develop the hog industry in Minxing County, while forging ahead 
in the next 5-7 years to become Chengdu’s largest pork processor, Sichuan’s best Dragon 
Head Enterprise in boar breeding, and Western China’s largest pork processing and 
export enterprise. 
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Jade Meat is just one example of a general trend in agricultural development. As policies locate 
power in state and private agribusiness firms, they become more vertically integrated 
domestically, and are also expanding their presence globally.  
 
Conclusion 
I have argued in this chapter that the structure of state support for Dragon Head 
Enterprises reveals the logics, mechanisms, and trajectory of China’s agricultural development 
model. With the pork sector as an analytical lens, it is clear that China is a new site of 
agribusiness development in its own right, and not just a destination for transnational capital. It is 
also clear that private enterprise is not the only logic defining the present moment in China’s 
modernization project. State-owned agribusiness firms are important loci of profit and 
accumulation, and state support for private firms through subsidies, financial incentives, and 
Dragon Head designation complicates a clear state-private division. As the state also increasingly 
supports firm to “go out,” and companies like Beidahuang play an increasingly important role in 
international markets, private enterprise may no longer be the only logic animating global 
agrifood governance either. It seems likely that agribusiness politics in the future, both in China 
and on the world stage, will be increasingly Dragon-Headed.    
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Chapter 6 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
MEATIFICATION TRAJECTORIES 
 
_____________ 
 
 
  
 My analysis up to this point has specified meatification in China as a state-structured, 
agribusiness-led project that aims to replace smallholder farming with vertically integrated 
commercial agriculture, in an attempt to increase commodity pork production and modern forms 
of meat consumption. The meatification project, I have argued, is enabled by and deepens the 
metabolic rift, as evidenced by the continuing shift from locally-embedded agroecological 
farming practices to global grain trades and toxic rivers of waste. In this concluding chapter, I 
propose that my study of meatification suggests the trajectory of China’s (agricultural) 
development more broadly. My analysis here is both summative and predictive, and highlights 
newly emerging scholarship and questions that remain open for further investigation.  
 
Meatification and Power: Industrialization, Consolidation, Vertical Integration 
 State support for industrial pork production will continue to increase, with subsidies and 
financial incentives awarded to large-scale commercial operations. Funds will be used for 
construction and expansion of CAFOs and processing facilities, and firms will grow in both 
number and scale. The largest domestic agribusiness firms will become further vertically 
integrated and consolidated. For instance, COFCO, China’s largest grain trader, aims to also be 
the country’s largest pig farmer. By 2015, this diversified state-owned enterprise plans to 
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produce 10 to 15 million pigs per year, and will invest 3.5 billion RMB ($570 million) in swine 
and poultry slaughter facilities so that it can process the livestock that it raises (Martin, 2012). 
Other lead firms such as Shuanghui, Yurun, Jinluo, and the New Hope Group will also continue 
to expand. 
 The Ministry of Agriculture will continue to promote Dragon Head Enterprises and the 
company and farm model of contract farming. Lack of transparency in contract operation and 
reporting will continue to be a challenge, and power will shift even further to authorities and 
firms, as the agribusiness sector becomes further consolidated. From 2011 to 2012, I conducted 
research for Oxfam Hong Kong (OHK) on the impacts of vertical integration on poor rural and 
agricultural livelihoods. The work was commissioned to inform OHK in its advisory role with 
the Ministry of Agriculture on new regulations for Dragon Head Enterprises and contract 
farming. Because my analysis concluded that the company and farm model was not in the best 
interests of smallholder farmers, as I argued here in Chapter Five, OHK did not use my findings 
in their negotiations with the Ministry. The notion that supporting smallholder farmers to carry 
out agroecological farming at local levels is not inline with the logic or goals of the country’s 
agricultural development model (Schneider, 2012). 
Transforming nongmin into migrant waged laborers and/or into primary producers for 
vertically integrated agrofood processors, however, is part of the model. Following the discursive 
constructions of nongmin as a backwards drag on development that I detailed in Chapter Three, 
smallholders will continue to be transformed. The adoption of a Rostovian logic of development, 
however, will not result in a death of the peasantry in the near term, as evidenced by findings 
from two lines of current research. First, scholars are studying the role of China’s unique system 
of collective land rights in shaping farmer-firm relations and providing farmers with bargaining 
 	   145	  
power to restrict overt dispossession (Gürel, 2012; Zhang & Donaldson, 2008, 2010). Second, 
researchers are analyzing farmer cooperatives as a “middle way” between individual backyard 
household farms and large-scale commercial farms. Philip Huang (2011)argues that small-scale 
family farms in China are better suited for what he calls “new-age” agriculture, a category that 
includes organic crop and livestock production that require a higher degree of hand labor than 
mechanized farming can provide. He sees vertical integration in the form of co-ops as the 
sustainable way forward, as opposed to the agribusiness-led form that dominates the current 
development model (see Chapter Five). Similarly, critical development scholars propose that 
farmer cooperatives associated the New Rural Reconstruction Movement are a potential socialist 
alternative to agribusiness-led vertical integration (Day & Hale, 2007; Hale, 2013). More 
research is needed in both of these areas to assess the potential of collective land rights and 
farmer-initiated coops in conditioning greater nongmin control over their livelihoods and 
production decisions.  
 
Meatscapes and Meat Types 
 Meatscapes will begin to shift away from the urban street stall, and into the supermarket 
aisle. In addition to transnational retailers like Carrefour and Wal-Mart, domestic firms like 
Beijing Hualian Hypermarket and Lianhua Supermarket Holdings will increasingly become sites 
of modern meat commerce (Data Monitor, 2010). At the same time, the share of meat sold in wet 
markets will continue to decline, especially in metropolitan areas.  
 With increasing retail purchasing power, companies will continue to diversify pork 
products, especially for middle class consumers. Currently, about 85 percent of China’s pork is 
eaten fresh as butchered cuts (McOrist, Khampee & Guo, 2011). Retailers aiming to bring pork 
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indoors and under plastic for longer shelf life, combined with increasing investment in pork 
processing, will increase markets for packaged pork products. Urban domestic markets will be 
the primary focus, but companies will also export sausages and other packaged goods, first to 
other Asian locations, and then more broadly. 
Consumer health and food safety concerns (Li, 2006; Yin et al, 2008), combined with 
concerns about food quality in the new consumer culture (Zader, 2011), will support retail sector 
expansion for “organic” and “sustainable” meat products (Sheng et al., 2009). Supermarkets 
currently account for 80 percent of organic retail sales, with Carrefour and Wal-Mart as the 
leaders (International Trade Center, 2011), but Chinese supermarkets and specialty shops will 
increasingly sell more foreign and domestic certified organic and “sustainable” meats. These 
markets will be exclusively urban and exclusively for the growing middle and upper classes.  
 Campaigns to promote lean pork as the modern, healthy alternative to China’s 
traditionally fatty pork will continue to shift consumer buying patterns, if not consumer 
preferences (McOrist, Khampee & Guo, 2011). While younger urban consumers as a market 
segment increasingly favor lean pork (Personal Communications, 2010), other wealthy 
consumers will have the option to buy more traditional forms of pork, re-defined as a sustainable 
and therefore, uber-modern, consumer product. So-called “boutique pork” markets are 
developing, in which small-scale farming operations use indigenous pig breeds and coarse, rather 
than fine, feeds to produce “specialty” pork. As a newly emerging market, more research is 
needed to understand the form and distribution of these farms, but it seems that they will be a 
niche market for capital, not for smallholders.  
For example, I visited the Lucky Pig in Sunshine farm outside of Chengdu in Sichaun 
Province. The farm’s founder and operator, Mr. Ying, was a stock broker in China for years 
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before becoming a Taoist, biodynamic pig farmer. He told me that with the birth of his daughter, 
his life and priorities changed dramatically. Before, his focus was solely on making money, but 
in the context of mounting food safety scandals and agriculturally-based environmental 
pollution, concerns for his daughter’s health and future persuaded him to leave his banking 
career and become a farmer. He started training in biodynamic farming, acquired land use rights 
in a village near Chengdu, bought an initial stock of local indigenous pigs, and opened a 
restaurant in Chengdu to serve as an outlet for his farm produce. His operation has grown, and he 
now works with pig breeders making several unique indigenous crosses that he raises on the 
farm. He also grows a variety of crops and raises chickens and ducks. In addition to his upscale 
restaurant, he sells pork and produce directly to a small group of wealthy Chengdu consumers 
who share his concern for the health and safety of their children, and who have the income to 
spend on high priced “specialty” pork.  
  Mr. Ying’s brand of farming uses agroecological practices to produce clean, culturally 
appropriate pork. But this kind of boutique pork transforms what was once the “pork of the 
people” – namely, fatty pork produced from indigenous pig breeds raised by small-scale farmers 
on course feedstuffs – into a specialty product for exclusively upper class consumers. Systems 
like Mr. Ying’s have important ecological benefits, but as a class project, offer little in the way 
of addressing the country’s food needs.  
 
Meatification Project and Class Diets 
 Boutique pork is only one expression of pork as a class issue. The way that the 
meatification project is structured and managed more generally constructs a basic diet bifurcation 
between meat for the elite and grains for the masses. “Elite” in this case has a double meaning: it 
 	   148	  
signifies both the state and agribusiness elites who structure and benefit from the operation of the 
project, and the urban middle and upper class consumers who are its intended target.  
First, the meatification project creates new arenas for profit and accumulation, and for 
consolidating power. The state agencies that manage and regulate meatification, and the private 
and state-owned agribusiness firms that enact it, are the primary beneficiaries. The state not only 
acts as the architect of agricultural development, setting the goals and terms of the project, but 
also profits from the leading market position of state-owned enterprises like COFCO, 
Beidahuang, JiuSan, and the Chongqing Grain Group. At the same time, steadily increasing pork 
supplies help to legitimize the state for its role in providing a bountiful food agrifood system, and 
rising to meet consumer expectations. While a grain-based diet used to be “enough,” the famines 
and food rationing in the country’s not-so-distant past; combined with new consumer cultures, 
notions of modern diets and consumption, and a highly productive industrial food system have 
created new expectations for turning “meat dreams” into “meat realities.” The state plays an 
important role in both constructing and fulfilling this demand.  
Second, agribusiness companies in general, and Dragon Head Enterprises in particular, 
lead the meatification project by owning and managing the means of production and arranging 
and controlling the sale of commodity pork. As I argued in Chapter Five, these domestic firms 
are becoming increasingly capitalized, consolidated, and vertically integrated. Commercial firms 
across the board are accumulating capital, but they are also giving rise to a new class of 
agricultural super-rich. Ironically, while China’s poorest people are smallholder farmers (Zhu, 
2011), some of its richest are agribusiness tycoons. Among the ten wealthiest people in China in 
2011, two were CEOs of domestic agribusiness firms involved in the meatification project 
(Forbes, 2011). 
 	   149	  
Urban middle and upper class consumers also comprise the elite in this scenario. 
Satisfying the changing tastes and expectations of these groups of people is a key political and 
economic priority. With the construction of a new consumer culture in which the form and 
content of individual purchases is used to express social position (Zader, 2011), urbanites are 
keen to participate in the meatification project, with daily meat consumption signifying class 
status. To repeat the particularly prescient quote from Mr. Bu, the agribusiness CEO and pig 
enthusiast from Shanghai, “Meat [pork] signifies wealth. The more money you have, the more 
[pork] you will eat.” 
That the meatification project is uneven and urban-focused is evidenced by the unequal 
distribution of meat consumption across urban and rural populations, as well as by the 
emergence of diseases of affluence. People in China’s cities eat almost twice as much as those in 
the countryside. In 2008, average per capita urban meat consumption was 22.7 kilograms per 
person, while it was 13.9 in the countryside (Ministry of Agriculture, 2010). This measure 
includes pork, beef, and mutton, but pork is far and away the most important component.  
The health consequences of uneven meatification are also uneven. A study in 2008 found 
that one in every four adults and nearly twenty percent of children under the age of seven in 
China are overweight. In 2005, the central government reported that 70 to 90 million Chinese 
people were clinically obese, accounting for one-third of the global total (French & Crabbe, 
2010). The combination of increased consumption of meat, processed carbohydrates, sugars, and 
fats contributes to the fattening trend, as well as a range of diseases like type two diabetes, 
coronary heart disease, and diet-related cancers. More important analytically, the urban nature of 
diet-driven maladies further reveals the divergences that the meatification project - in 
conjunction with other similarly constructed dietary changes - creates.  
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While meat moves to the center of urban middle class consumption, grain continues to be 
the foundation of rural diets. Across most food categories, both rural and urban consumption are 
increasing: meat, poultry, aquatic products, dairy products, eggs, fruits, and vegetables intake are 
all rising across the population (Ministry of Agriculture, 2010). Grain, however, is an important 
exception. While grains are being displaced by other foods in the cities, as is expected according 
to nutrition transition theories, consumption of grains is rising in the countryside. The table 
below illustrates these trends, highlighting the meat for the elite, grains for the masses 
phenomenon. 
 
Table 5. Rural and urban grain and meat consumption, 1991-2008 (kg/person/year). 
 Grain  Meat   
Year Rural Urban Rural  Urban  
1991 255.6 127.9 12.2 22.2 
1992 250.5 111.5 11.8 21.4 
1993 251.8 97.8 11.7 20.8 
1994 257.6 102.0 11.0 20.2 
1995 260.1 97.0 11.3 19.7 
2000 249.5 82.3 14.6 20.1 
2001 238.6 79.7 14.5 19.2 
2002 236.5 78.5 14.9 23.3 
2003 222.4 79.5 15.0 23.7 
2004 219.3 78.2 14.8 22.9 
2005 208.8 77.0 17.1 23.9 
2006 205.6 75.9 17.0 23.8 
2007 199.5 77.6 14.9 22.1 
2008 199.1 58.5 13.9 22.7 
  
 
Meatification and Food Security 
 An important reason for the emergence of a bifurcated class diet – in addition to the 
meatification project – is the way the state defines and regulates food security as grain security in 
policy. The term “food security” (shipin fangyu anquan 食品防御安全) is a relatively new and 
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not yet commonly used concept in China. It is used primarily to translate policies and opinions 
from the United Nations and other foreign and development agencies, but it does not appear in 
Chinese policy (Christiansen, 2009). The concept of “grain security” (liangshi anquan, 粮食安
全), on the other hand, has been an important and orienting component of agricultural 
development in China since at least the 1950s, when authorities worried that famines during the 
Great Leap Forward would lead to peasant revolt. In addition to recognizing the need to ensure 
grain for the population, central planners during Mao’s time were also committed to doing so 
without relying on foreign land, commodities, or capitalists. “Grain security” is used in policy to 
mean something akin to the idea of ensured food access, but from its inception as a political 
concept, it has meant “grain self-sufficiency” (Christiansen, 2009). 
Today, grain security is defined as adhering to a 95 percent baseline of domestic rice, 
wheat, and maize production, primarily because of their role as staple foods for direct human 
consumption (Wong & Huang, 2012). Since accession to the WTO in 2001, while selectively 
liberalizing other crops the state has maintained tighter controls on production, pricing, and 
imports of these three “strategic crops” for grain security (Solot, 2006). Food security is grain 
security, and grain security is grain self-sufficiency. These three grains in particular are for the 
masses. 
 As a side note, these issues are often lost in translation from Mandarin Chinese to 
English. International commentators and analysts typically conflate the two when reporting on 
and in China, and even English versions of papers such as the China Daily use “food security” 
when they should use “grain security.” An additional translational challenge is that online tools 
such as Google Translate make no distinction between the two concepts. Zhou Zhangyue (2011) 
 	   152	  
attributes this to the fact that grains have long been staples in Chinese diets, and so the word 
liangshi (grain) is more commonly used that the word shiwu (food). 
On the shifting policies of food security in China, John Wong and Yanjie Huang (2012) 
write, 
It should be highlighted that food production in China is no longer entirely for human 
consumption, but also for production of animal feed and biofuels like ethanol. In fact, 
broadly defined, China’s “food security” today means more than the provision of easy 
access to sufficient calorie intake. The objective now is to provide nutritious and diverse 
food to meet people’s dietary needs for their active and healthy lifestyles (p. 120). 
 
This broader conception of food security is more inline with the definition proposed at the 1996 
World Food Summit in Rome, and used by development organizations internationally (Zhou, 
2011). Ironically, “food security” is coming into vogue in China at precisely the moment when 
the terms of the global debate are changing to include the concept of “food sovereignty,” and the 
notion that people and communities should control what food is produced, how it’s produced, 
and for whom (Lawrence & McMichael, 2012). While the food sovereignty idea that countries 
have the right to consume what they produce (instead of trading it) resonates with the central 
government’s discursive fixation on food self-sufficiency, the kind of democratic control of the 
food system at the heart of food sovereignty is antithetical to the Dragon Head-led, vertically 
integrated form of agriculture that is the logic of China’s reform era development model.  
 
Meatification and Inequality 
The polarization of meat-grain diets reflects other broader inequalities in China today. 
Before Reform and Opening, China was one of the most egalitarian countries in the world. 
Today, with a Gini coefficient of 0.6157, it is among the most unequal (Shen, 2012). In 2011, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 The National Bureau of Statistics stopped releasing official figures for the Gini coefficient in 2001, stating that 
income data for wealthy households was incomplete (Shen, 2012).  
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there 1.11 million millionaires in China (Balfour, 2011), and 115 billionaires (Flannery, 2011), 
ranking number three and number two in the world respectively. At the same time, there were 
214 million people living under the United Nations poverty threshold of $1.25 per day, 500 
million on less than $2.00 per day (UNDP, 2011), and 128 million under the Chinese central 
government’s poverty line of 2,300 RMB ($362) per year (“China raises poverty line,” 2011).  
 In addition to the income extremes between poor rural farmers and billionaires in Beijing 
(and elsewhere), income inequality is also expressed in more moderate relations, especially along 
urban-rural lines. According to China’s National Bureau of Statistics, the 2011 urban to rural 
income ratio was 3.13 to 1. In order to avoid further social conflict and (largely) rural unrest that 
have been persistent and increasing in the reform era, central authorities have made closing the 
income gap a political priority. They have implemented a number of measures aimed at 
increasing income levels for farmers and migrant workers in particular: these include direct farm 
subsidies, vertical integration and contract farming, abolishing agricultural taxes, and adjusting 
the legal minimum wage for workers at least once every two years. According to the State 
Council (2011), the annual rural income growth rate remained higher than six percent from 2006 
to 2011, but scholars find that these increases resulted primarily from migrant labor remittances, 
rather than from the success of other government measures (Ahlers & Schubert, 2009; Göbel, 
2010; Liu, Chen, and Long, 2011). 
 One of the places that migrant workers, farmers, and other poor populations are hardest 
hit is in food expenditures. According to the Ministry of Agriculture, 2008 average annual food 
expenditure in urban China was 4,260 RMB ($636), compared to 1,599 RMB ($239) in rural 
areas. While metropolitan consumers spend almost three times as much money on food, rural 
residents spend a larger share of their income fulfilling basic dietary needs (43.7 percent of rural 
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income, versus 37.9 percent of urban income). When food prices increase, therefore, those in 
already vulnerable positions vis-à-vis food markets are most affected. This is a general 
phenomena across the globe, but in China, the centrality of pork gives it a specific character. As 
the central component of the Consumer Price Index, pork prices are particularly important to 
state authorities, for whom pork price is both an important trace on inflation and a thing to be 
regulated to head off social unrest.  
Pork price is also important to cash-poor consumers. I was project director for a study of 
wages and working conditions in the garment sector of two Special Economic Zones in southern 
China in 2010. Solidaridad, the NGO that commissioned me to conduct the study, wanted to gain 
a better understanding of whether or not minimum wage levels, which are considered by the 
government to be “living wages,” were adequate for workers. I administered surveys to 123 
migrant workers, asking questions about their income levels, needs, and expenditures. The 
workers were half male and half female, with average ages between 26 and 30, and average 
households of five members. More than two-thirds said they were working in the factory to help 
meet their family’s basic needs in the countryside (food, education, health, housing), and the 
same number said that while their wages were rising, increases were not enough to keep up with 
inflation, especially for buying food. Several respondents provided written comments in addition 
to scripted questions that mentioned not being able to afford pork [meat] as one of their primary 
wage complaints (Schneider, 2011a).  
  
Meatification and the Feed Import Regime 
 This idea of meat for the elite and grains for the masses is an expression of the tensions 
between meatification and food security. Central to Tony Weis’s original conception of 
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meatification is that land used to grow feed for livestock competes with land used to grow food 
for direct human consumption. In China, the state manages these tensions through a feed import 
regime that takes the form of both soy and maize imports, and more recently, land grabs at home 
and abroad.  
The feed regime is based on, and justified by, a limited-land-high-population discourse 
that serves to promote an industrial “grain-livestock complex” (Weis, 2007) as the only solution 
to China’s food issues. Most discussions of agricultural development in China begin with a well-
worn statistic: China is feeding 21 percent of the world’s population on nine percent of its arable 
land. This is the most powerful trope used to describe the country’s food security challenges, and 
to rationalize the measures enacted to overcome them. Government reports, official speeches, 
academic studies, and press pieces are replete with allusions to both the challenge of feeding 
China in this context, and the successes of food security policies in overcoming that challenge. 
Timothy Mitchell (1991) argues that a similar “geography versus demography” discourse 
framed economic development in Egypt in the 1970s and 1980s. He details how development 
agencies used imagery of a rapidly expanding population on a limited land base in order to frame 
solutions the country’s food and agricultural problems as technological and managerial, rather 
than social and political. Mitchell argues that the shift to meat consumption in particular – rather 
than the increase in population – was the primary cause of dramatically increased grain imports 
starting in 1974. There are clear parallels here with Chinese meatification, but whereas Mitchell 
documented how international development agencies used the “geography versus demography” 
discourse to naturalize Egypt’s food problems from an outside perspective, in China, the 
discourse comes largely from the state. 
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The state has navigated around the limitations that the “21-9 challenge” would seem to 
impose on food security and meatification by importing feed for livestock. As I detailed in 
Chapter Two, starting in the early 1990s, officials liberalized the soybean sector, and redefined 
soy as an industrial crop for livestock feed production, instead of as an agricultural crop for 
human consumption. By 1996, China became a net soy importer, and by 2003, became the 
world’s largest importer of soybeans. In the 2011-2012 trade year, China imported 56 percent of 
the total global soy market (USDA, 2012). Because soy is no longer counted as a “grain,” these 
massive imports don’t appear on the balance sheets for grain security or food self-sufficiency. 
Soy imports, however, are the country’s single largest agricultural import category, so much so 
that China became a net food importer by 2004, and accounted for nine percent of total world 
agricultural imports in 2010 (Lohmar et al., 2009; Smaller, Qiu, & Liu, 2012).  
From 2010, maize imports have also become part of the feed import regime. Because 
maize is increasingly used in industrial meat production, authorities seem poised to liberalize it 
in a manner similar to soy, removing it from the list of “strategic crops” for food security, and 
from the 95 percent baseline. In a People’s Daily interview on agricultural development in late 
2011, Cheng Guoqiang of the PRC Development Research Council argued that China should 
continue to strive for food self-sufficiency, but also accept the inevitability of imports (Zhu, 
2011). His comment that policies should focus on maintaining self-sufficiency in the country’s 
two staple crops – rice and wheat – seems predictive of the likely redefinition and liberalization 
of maize. If and when maize becomes part of the meat-based selective liberalization plan, 
Chinese domestic agribusiness firms will be in place to control its trade (GRAIN, 2012). The 
state does not want to reproduce the transnational takeover of soy crushing in the maize 
processing industry. 
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 Scholars and analysts have begun to study China’s role as an investor in the global land 
rush (see for example Borras et al., 2012; Hoffman & Ho, 2012; GRAIN, 2012; Pearce, 2012; 
Smaller et al., 2012). Of particular interest for understanding the tensions between meatification 
and food security are land deals related to livestock feed. According to the International Institute 
for Sustainable Development (Smaller et al., 2012), Chinese enterprises have invested in, or are 
planning to invest in, soybean and maize projects in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America and the Caribbean (see Table 6). These are principally livestock feed-related land 
deals58, supported by the “go out strategy” to expand the global reach of Chinese state and 
private firms and institutions (Armony & Strauss, 2012). 
 
Table 6. Geography of Chinese investment in livestock feed-related land deals. 
Soybean Investments  
Brazil Democratic Republic of Congo 
Argentina Sudan 
Bolivia Zambia 
Kazakhstan Russia 
  
Maize Investments  
Burma Cameroon 
Cambodia Democratic Republic of Congo 
Uganda Sudan 
Philippines Tanzania 
Bolivia Zambia 
Russia Zimbabwe 
*See Smaller et al. (2012) for size, status, and sources of investment information. 
 
As Chinese firms continue to “go out,” their power in global markets will increase. As I 
argued in Chapter Five, state-owned agribusiness firms like Beidahuang will begin to reform the 
relations of global agricultural markets by directly investing in land and infrastructure in places 
like Brazil, in order to avoid the constraints and hegemony of the global grain traders. This will 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  Energy	  corporations	  are	  also	  investing	  in	  maize	  projects	  in	  particular,	  suggesting	  that	  some	  land	  may	  be	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be an increasingly important area of study in the coming years. This “state of agribusiness” 
elicits questions about the corporate food regime. As Philip McMichael (2009) argues, “The 
difference made by food regime analysis is that it prioritizes the ways in which forms of capital 
accumulation in agriculture constitute global power arrangements, as expressed through patterns 
of circulation of food” (p. 140). If China is a site of agribusiness development, and if some of its 
most powerful firms are state-owned enterprises, what does this mean for theorizing the 
corporate food regime? Do China’s agri-food politics constitute a new form of accumulation and 
new global power arrangements? Does this construct a corporate food regime with Chinese 
characteristics? And if so, what will be the implications?  
Related to this line of questions, the role of Beidahuang in domestic land grabs for feed 
production also needs further investigation. On a trip to Heilongjiang Province, where I attended 
the First International Soybean Industry Expo and Beidahuang Soybean Festival in Jiusan  (九
三) in 2010, I began to see how state institutions and agribusiness firms are transforming China’s 
northeast region into an industrial soy and grain frontier. Questions about why, how, by whom, 
and to what effect for rural people and environments are questions that I plan to take up in my 
next research project. 
 
Meatification and Metabolic Rift 
CAFOs are another form of land grab, and another technical solution that the state 
proposes for overcoming the “21-9 challenge,” and managing meatification-food security 
tensions. CAFO facilities are celebrated as paragons of efficiency, as thousands of animals are 
packed into buildings, increasing the protein output per unit of land. To initiate this kind of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  intended	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  production.	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  however,	  is	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  primary	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concentrated production system in China, agribusiness firms procure land lease rights from 
village, township, or municipal governments before erecting buildings. Depending on social and 
political relations, this process may take years to complete, or may be done quickly and “behind 
closed doors.” Many of the agribusiness executives I interviewed were also local government 
officials. These kinds of overlapping roles and relations can quickly resolve the land question. 
Whatever the case, land deals for CAFOs are different from land takings for urban development 
that feature in the popular press (see for example Amnesty International, 2012). In most cases the 
process through which companies acquire land for CAFOs appears to be less coercive and 
violent than forced evictions, though the smallholder dispossession that accompanies these deals 
is arguably just a more subtle form of violence. 
The amount of land needed for industrial meat operations is relatively small, ranging 
from a few to at most 50 hectares. But the environmental, and therefore social, impacts of 
industrial meat production spread far beyond the CAFO. The nearly five billion tons of largely 
untreated manure that CAFO operators flush into surrounding waterways every year (Zhu, 2010) 
has serious implications for smallholder farmers who depend on that water for agriculture and 
household use. The World Bank conservatively estimates that 300 million people in rural China 
don’t have access to safe water (Xie, 2009), in part because of industrial livestock production. 
Water pollution is a current and mounting problem, and manure from industrial livestock 
production is the most important source. This suggests China’s food security politics, which 
produce environmental injustices (see for example Schroeder, St. Martin, Wilson & Sen, 2008). 
The development of industrial pork and the meatification of Chinese diets is a political and 
economic objective for creating and sustaining urban middle and upper classes, and for economic 
growth and capital accumulation for domestic state and private agribusiness firms. In the process 
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of developing this sector – both through the land deals for citing facilities and the increasing 
vertical integration and corporate concentration of agriculture – smallholder farmers are 
dispossessed. At the same time, the results, or externalities, of industrial meat production are also 
borne disproportionately by rural populations and smallholder farmers in particular. CAFO-
related water pollution, for example, challenges smallholder agricultural and social reproduction: 
toxic water doesn’t grow crops, and certainly doesn’t serve household water needs. These 
distributional environmental inequalities are produced by the meatification project, at the 
expense of smallholder production and reproduction.  
 The environmental implications of China’s meatification project – both presently, and 
more so in the future – are so severe that the further the project proceeds, the further it creates the 
conditions for its own demise. This too is paradox that needs tracking. 
 
China’s Meatification Project and the Global Food Question 
Meatification is one aspect of contemporary agricultural, dietary, and political economic 
transformations in China, and globally. It is also importantly related to the so-called “food 
question,” which was originally posed as a question of whether food is for people or profits 
(Bernstein et al., 1990). While this framework continues to be of central concern, the dichotomy 
does not capture the complexity of global food systems, either in terms of deepening class diets, 
or the associated environmental and food security implications. Massive increases in meat 
production and consumption in the past several decades is a primary reason for this, suggesting 
that in addition to people and profits, livestock also needs to be included in the frame of the food 
question in order to address and specify inequalities and injustices in the world economy. The 
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meatification project – as an analytical tool – allows for this kind of reformulation, including the 
all-important environmental dimension. 
China’s meatificiaton project complicates global food questions in relation to the feed 
import regime in particular. Liberalizing soybeans (and perhaps maize) and “going out” for 
productive land are part of a state strategy of off-shoring feed production, which serves three 
related purposes that directly impact global food security. First, off-shoring feed allows Chinese 
urban middle and upper class consumers to join a growing global consumer class of meat eaters. 
From 1961 to 2009, average annual per capita meat consumption went from 23 to 42 kilograms 
per person worldwide. Given human population growth during the same time, this figure reflects 
a four-fold increase in world meat production during those five decades (Weis, 2013). Similarly, 
China’s meat consumption has quadrupled since 1980 to its current average of 54 kilograms per 
person per year (Schneider, 2011). These increases mean diversion of more land, resources, and 
crops to feed livestock rather than people.  
Second, in the process of deepening class diets around meat, off-shoring feed production 
serves as a mechanism for displacing some of China’s food security issues onto vulnerable 
populations of mostly smallholder farmers in places like Brazil, who have been dispossessed in 
the rush to serve China’s feed demand. According to GRAIN (2012),  
When China began importing soybeans as animal feed in the late 1990s, it ushered in one 
of the most dramatic agricultural transformations the world has ever seen. On the other 
side of the world, 30 million hectares of farms, forests, savannahs and pastures in the 
Southern Cone of Latin America were converted to soy plantations to provide China’s 
new factory farms with a cheap source of feed…rural communities, both in China and the 
Southern Cone paid the price (p. 2).  
 
Third, off-shoring feed production is a means for externalizing some of the 
environmental harm that comes from industrial monocropping to producer countries and 
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agroecosystems thousands of miles away. It is well known that China faces serious 
environmental pollution problems from fertilizer and pesticide runoff, in addition to the manure 
threat. Off-shoring feed production is a place where Chinese elites can distribute the 
environmental damage associated with producing class diets. Within China and globally, the 
populations who suffer the most from industrial agriculture-related pollution are farmers who 
have to depend on toxic water and land to reproduce their livelihoods.  
 In each of these instances, increasing meat consumption in China impacts global food 
security. The impact, however, may not be expressed in the price of food, which is an argument 
that commonly appears in discussions of China’s role in food crises. Rather, the costs of meat-
based class diets are borne on vulnerable people and agroecosystems around the world in the 
form of dispossession and pollution. In other words, the displacement of China’s food security 
politics can be read in the transformation of forests and grasslands in Brazil into soy and maize 
production centers: the diets of those who have the means to buy modern meat justifies the 
erosion of food getting for those who do not, both inside China and globally.  
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APPENDIX 	  
 
Research Sites by Category 
 
Subtotals 
 
Total N 
 
Locations 
 
**All Research Sites** 
  
120 + 
 
    
Farms  29  
Backyard farms 14 (or 11)  Sichuan, Hebei Provinces 
Specialized household pig farms 1 (or 4)  Sichuan Province 
Commercial pig farms 8  Sichuan, Guangdong Provinces 
Organic farms 2  Sichuan Province 
Government demonstration farms 3  Sichuan, Heilongjiang Provinces 
Cooperatives 3  Sichuan, Hebei Provinces 
    
Agribusiness Firms  17  
Domestic pig/pork 7  Sichuan, Guangdong Provinces 
Domestic feed 1  Shanghai 
Domestic online food network 1  Sichuan Province 
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 3  Heilongjiang Province 
Foreign firms 5  Sichuan Province, Shanghai, Beijing 
Dragon Head Enterprises    
    
Government Agricultural  Institutions  6  
Veterinary and Animal Husbandry Stations 2  Sichuan Province, Shanghai 
Ministry of Agriculture,  
National Animal Husbandry Service 
2  Guangdong Province, Beijing 
Research Department for Rural Development, 
Development Research Center - State Council 
1  Beijing 
National Center for Preservation and  
Utilization of Animal Genetic Resources 
1  Beijing 
    
Universities  8  
Beijing 4  Beijing 
Sichuan Province 3  Sichuan Province 
Guangdong Province 1  Guangdong Province 
    
Agricultural Expos and Trade Shows  5  
Guangdong Pig Industry Association Expo   Guangdong Province 
International Soybean Industry Expo  
and Soybean Festival of Beidahuang 
  Heilongjiang Province 
VIV China   Beijing 
Beijing Agricultural Products Trade Week   Beijing 
China International Meat Industry Exhibition   Beijing 
    
Agriculture and Agribusinesses 
Conferences 
 5  
IATP   Beijing 
Ministry of Agriculture National Animal 
Husbandry Service 
  Guangdong Province 
China Animal Husbandry Conference   Chongqing 
Sino-European Discussion Forum for 
Agricultural Industry Investment 
  Chongqing 
China Tea Association Annual Meeting   Guizhou Province 
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Food Markets  13+  
Wet markets 5  Chengdu, Beijing 
Super markets 5  Chengdu, Beijing 
Hypermarkets 3  Chengdu, Beijing 
Corner stores (xiaomaibu) numerous  Chengdu, Beijing 
Street food vendors numerous  Chengdu, Beijing 
Restaurants  numerous  Chengdu, Beijing 
    
Factories  4  
Sporting shoes, handbag, belt factories 3  Xiamen, Fujian Provinces 
Sports apparel factory 1  Dongguan, Guangdong Provinces 
    
Banquets  20 Sichuan, Heilongjiang, Guangdong, 
Guizhou, Provinces; Beijing, 
Shanghai, Chongqing 
    
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)  4 Beijing 
    
U.S. Agricultural Trade Organizations  3 Beijing 
    
Rural Farm Resorts (nongjiale)  2 Sichuan Province Shanghai, Beijing 
    
Pig Culture Museum  1 Shanghai 
    
Food and Agriculture Organization  1 Beijing 
    
Migrant Worker Legal Support Center  1 Guangdong Province 
    
Reuters Commodities Desk  1 Beijing 
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